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ABSTRACT 
Matthew John Waldschlagel, PhD 
Department of Philosophy, August 2011 
The University of Kansas 
 
 This dissertation makes a contribution to moral philosophy by inquiring into the 
nature, content, justification, and scope of apology and forgiveness. In doing so, I get a 
theoretical purchase on their ethical importance.  I view apology and forgiveness as 
inescapable moral negotiations, which I understand to be ethical activities that mend 
human relationships after they have been compromised by wrongdoing by at least one 
party to the relationship.  I argue that the concepts of apology and forgiveness, though 
analytically separable, form a nested whole in our practical lives such that the 
intelligibility and meaningfulness of either is dependent on the recognition and feasibility 
of the other.   
 I argue that apology and forgiveness are speech acts with an important moral 
function.  I first examine the kind of speech acts that apology and forgiveness are, 
thereby exhibiting their logical structure.  Though they bear a prima facie resemblance to 
the performatives in J. L. Austin’s account, they also differ.  In arguing that Austin’s 
account fails to accommodate the unique logical structure of apology and forgiveness, I 
offer a model that captures the form of their idiosyncratic logic.  In short, I submit that a 
moral apology – an apology that ranges over a moral domain instead of the domain of 
etiquette and manners – always implies a request for forgiveness, and that an apology is 
successful only insofar as forgiveness is granted.  In a complimentary vein, I argue that 
forgiveness in the absence of apology strains the very intelligibility and meaningfulness 
of forgiveness. 
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I then consider the moral structure of apology, which I maintain has three 
necessary parts, one of which is a complete acknowledgement of wrongdoing.  A 
complete acknowledgement satisfies the epistemic dimension of apology, and I propose a 
novel account of acknowledgement.  I go on to identify the moral emotions of guilt, 
shame, regret and remorse as constitutive of the affective dimension of apology, while 
arguing that humility represents its attitudinal dimension.  Lastly, I argue that moral 
apologies are a form of what Margaret Urban Walker calls moral repair: the process of 
migrating from the state of loss and damage to a state in which at least a modicum of 
security in moral relations is reestablished.   
 I then examine the moral structure of forgiveness and some of the motivations for 
and anticipated outcomes of revenge.  After considering a rival account of forgiveness, I 
argue that forgiveness has a threefold common core: forgiveness involves the suspension 
or overcoming of hostile feelings toward the wrongdoer; forgiveness involves restoring 
the relationship damaged by the wrong; and forgiveness involves the removal or 
suspension of the wrong.  However, forgiveness has its limits.  I argue that we cannot 
forgive in the absence of an apology, the dead, ourselves, or unforgivable actions.  When 
confronted by the unforgivable evils of an atrocity, many throughout history have 
considered revenge as an alternative, retaliatory way to restore the moral balance between 
the offender and the victim when moral repair cannot.  I conclude that, despite its 
intuitive appeal, revenge does not achieve such moral balance as it is ultimately self-
defeating, exacerbating the very instability that the vengeful often wish to eliminate.    
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Introduction 
 
Apologizing and forgiving are central features of the moral dimension of our 
lives.  As children, we are instructed by our parents to recognize when we have done 
wrong, and to apologize to the party we have wronged, when our wrong actions are 
directed toward others rather than toward ourselves.  We also are instructed to be 
receptive to the apologies of those who wrong us, and to forgive them.  In the infancy of 
our moral development, apologizing and forgiving may be treated as part of the system of 
etiquette that we, hopefully, learn in tandem.  As we mature, however, we come to see 
manners and morality as constituting separate and autonomous though sometimes 
partially-overlapping spheres, even though we don’t usually express this observation in 
quite such a formal vocabulary.   
It is the province of ethical reflection to express and evaluate this and other such 
observations about morality in the formal vocabulary of moral philosophy.  Among the 
host of concerns that moral philosophers have traditionally been interested in, evidence 
for which is found in any standard anthology of ethical theory, one comes across various 
metaethical issues pertaining to the status of morality and the meaning of moral language, 
evaluations of the many different and often competing moral principles that purport to 
define the structure of normative ethics, examinations of the nature of value and the 
scope and limits of moral responsibility, worries about the relationship between religion 
and ethics, concerns regarding the place of feminist criticism, and applications of various 
moral theories to the areas of business, medicine, and economics.  Clearly, moral 
philosophy is an extraordinarily diverse field.  And yet, despite this diversity, moral 
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philosophers have by and large apparently neglected or overlooked the centrality of 
apology and forgiveness to our moral lives.1   
Speculations upon the possible reasons for this neglect may reveal the reticence 
that many moral philosophers have in examining a discourse that historically, at least in 
the West, has been laden with religious themes and imagery.  I contend that the West’s 
religious examination of apology (which in the Christian tradition would more commonly 
be expressed in terms of confession and repentance) and forgiveness is insufficient, and 
perhaps even misleading, because its account is unnecessarily and uniformly burdened by 
references to sin, claims about the afterlife, and talk of the supernatural.  However, we 
may and indeed should dispense with all such religious claims, references, and talk, in 
attempting to make philosophical sense of the moral relevance of apology and 
forgiveness.  Simply put, moral philosophy is not moral theology.   
This dissertation makes a contribution to moral philosophy by inquiring into the 
structure, justification and scope of apology and forgiveness, and in so doing gets a 
theoretical purchase on the ethical importance of them as inescapable moral negotiations.  
While I acknowledge the influence that Western religious traditions have had on apology 
and forgiveness, this project pursues an understanding of the conceptual and practical 
nature of apology and forgiveness from a secular standpoint.  Whether we are religious or 
not, the moral negotiations involved in apologizing and forgiving are integral to a robust 
picture of our shared moral life.  And because our moral life is, I contend, shared all the 
way down, the analysis I offer of apology and forgiveness does not commit us to any one 
underlying ethical theory, but is compatible with them all.     
                                                 
1 I refer to the bibliography for a sample of the publications within the philosophical literature that serve as 
exceptions, almost all of which are very recent, having appeared within the last twenty years or so.   
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My dissertation will address the following questions:  Is there a connection or link 
between apology and forgiveness, and if so, what is it?  Does forgiveness in some way 
complete an apology?  Just what is an apology, and do all moral apologies share a similar 
form?  What are the elements of an apology that, when combined, constitute a full or 
genuine apology?  What makes an apology sincere, and why is this fundamental to a 
“successful” apology?  Why do we apologize, and what is the proper moral and 
emotional posture of those who ask to be pardoned?  Why do we forgive, and what are 
the constraints on whom we forgive?  Are we ever required or morally compelled to 
forgive?  Is it morally responsible or even possible to forgive, in the absence of an 
apology, just so you can “put the past behind you”?  Is there anything that is 
unforgivable, and if so, why?  Provided that there are at least some things that are 
unforgivable, is revenge ever a justifiable moral response to them?   
In the dissertation I will argue that the concepts of apology and forgiveness, 
though analytically separable, form a nested whole in our practical lives such that the 
intelligibility and meaningfulness of either is dependent on the recognition and feasibility 
of the other.  Because apology and forgiveness are conceptually and practically bound 
together, their interconnectedness puts demands on the internal structures of each 
respective activity.  This interconnectedness – what I call the logic of apology and 
forgiveness – is examined in the first chapter.  I draw upon the resources of speech act 
theory in making my argument for the interconnectedness of apology and forgiveness.  I 
distinguish between what I call moral apologies and quotidian apologies, the latter being 
concerned with the domain of etiquette and manners.  In the dissertation, I am solely 
interested in developing an account of moral apologies, which I see as ranging over a 
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moral domain.  I also make a distinction, which I claim holds for moral apologies but not 
for quotidian apologies, between apologizing and offering an apology.  When we offer an 
apology, we successfully perform the linguistic act of uttering “I apologize for X,” or 
some other such locution to the party we have offended.  When it is said that we have 
apologized, the offered apology has been accepted and, therewith, forgiveness granted by 
the offended party.  Because forgiveness is not sought when we utter a quotidian apology, 
the distinction between apologizing and offering an apology does not obtain in the 
domain of manners and etiquette.         
  In the second chapter, I present and defend my account of the moral structure of 
apology, showing how acknowledgment, the moral emotions, and humility coalesce in an 
apology.  I also pay special attention to what Margaret Urban Walker calls moral repair, 
situating both apology and forgiveness as forms of moral repair.  In the third chapter, I 
present and defend my account of the moral structure of forgiveness against a popular 
competitor.  I argue that forgiveness, which may be granted if and only if apology has 
been first proffered by the wrongdoer, achieves its end when the forgiver ceases to 
express and feel hostility toward the wrongdoer, actively and patiently works toward 
reconciliation with the wrongdoer, and restores the moral equality of the wrongdoer.  
When these three tasks are performed in the context of a morally reparative activity, I 
argue that forgiveness has been achieved.  Because I contend that the possibility of moral 
repair sets the scope for the set of actions that can be forgiven, I argue that we are unable 
to forgive those who fail to apologize, the dead, ourselves, and those who perform actions 
that are unremittingly cruel and impossibly brutal - in a word, unforgivable.  Meditating 
on the unforgivable easily gives way to thoughts of revenge.  I conclude the dissertation 
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by arguing that revenge, though defensible in some highly specified circumstances and 
sometimes even satisfying, is ultimately self-defeating.       
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Chapter 1: The Language of Apology and Forgiveness: A Philosophical Analysis 
 
 
“How great are his signs, how mighty his wonders.”  Daniel, 4:3 
 
The main message of Daniel, one of the last-written books of the Hebrew Bible, is 
that the God of the Jews has sovereign control of history.  Believers hold that Daniel’s 
message is supported through the purportedly great signs and mighty wonders of the 
deity.  But since the signs and wonders of the divine are neither transparent nor manifest, 
many believers are compelled to conclude that the Almighty is inscrutable.  Thankfully, 
few things in the physical world lead us to the conclusion that it is inscrutable.  
Reflection upon the nature of more quotidian “signs and wonders” suggests that the 
world - and our epistemic means of confronting it - are not cognitively impenetrable.   
Take language.  I submit that language is a wonder, but, unlike God, is in no way 
inscrutable.  The marvelous nature of language often escapes our attention, most likely on 
account of our mundane linguistic interactions with one another.  It is a wonder, I 
contend, that language – this strange conglomeration of “hisses and hums and squeaks 
and pops”2 that we fashion with our breath and tongue, made meaningful to ourselves and 
others – is as boundlessly expressive as it is.  Two features of the expressive power of 
language that have been of interest to contemporary philosophers are that language 
provides descriptions of things in the world and that language, by sheer force of its 
expression, actually does things. 
 I take it that this singular observation is the central contribution of J. L. Austin to 
the philosophy of language.  It also serves as our point of departure for thinking about the 
                                                 
2 Steven Pinker, Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language, p. 1. 
7 
 
ethical dimension of apology and forgiveness.  By virtue of the fact that they occur in a 
linguistic medium, apology and forgiveness cannot be understood apart from the 
linguistic expressions that circumscribe them.  Apology and forgiveness are what Austin 
calls performatives: to entreat the former or to grant the latter is to perform an act of a 
linguistic kind.  In this chapter I will lay out Austin’s speech act theory, with an eye 
toward how the study of the pragmatics of language reveals the logic of apology and 
forgiveness.  I identify a lacuna in Austin’s account of the communicative dynamic 
between speaker and audience in those linguistic exchanges that exhibit what I call 
simple bilateralism and complex bilateralism.  In accounting for both types of 
bilateralism, I show how apology and forgiveness form a nested whole and therefore 
follow a unique logic.  I end the chapter by responding to skeptical objections to the 
scheme I propose.   
 
1.1       J. L. Austin on Performative Utterances   
Anglophone philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century was marked by 
its having taken a “linguistic turn.”  With Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, A.J. Ayer, and 
Rudolf Carnap leading the charge, English-speaking philosophers became preoccupied 
with language: its structure, its logic, and – above all – its amenability to analysis.  A new 
philosophical tradition took root and grew in response to the many cultivators who tilled 
the soil of the young movement.  The new tradition became known as analytic 
philosophy.  Many historians of philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century 
testify that it is erroneous to refer to ‘analytic philosophy’ as if it were “homogeneous 
and monolithic.  [They assert that t]here is no single philosophy of analysis.  There is no 
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analytic ‘party line,’ no heresies, no pontifical authorities.”3  This may very well be the 
case.  However, analytic philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century was certainly 
dominated by a focus on the declarative sentence, as it was commonly understood that 
this was the proper object of linguistic analysis.  The declarative sentence (in the 
indicative mood) makes a statement, and is contrasted with the interrogative, the 
exclamatory, and the imperative sentence.  A statement is “any indicative sentence that is 
either true or false.”4  The prevailing philosophical view before Austin was that the 
declarative sentence was the basic kind of sentence.  As a consequence, it seemed 
obvious that whether or not a sentence could admit of being true or false was the litmus 
test for its meaning5.  Sentences that could not be true or false were either ignored or seen 
as meaningless by the philosophical establishment.  Early analytic philosophy did not fail 
to notice that language could be used to ask questions or issue commands, but “these uses 
tended to be treated as peculiar departures from the customary linguistic business of 
reporting”6 on states of affairs.  As a result, Anglophone philosophy in the first half of the 
twentieth century tended to distort the context in which language operates in our 
everyday lives.   
In a series of lectures delivered as the William James Lectures at Harvard 
University in 1955 and later posthumously published in monograph form in 1962, J. L. 
Austin set out to challenge the assumption that analytic philosophy of language held 
about the primacy of the declarative sentence.  He observed that the sustained focus on 
statements neglected other important ways in which language operated.  Rather than 
                                                 
3 Robert R. Ammerman, Classics of Analytic Philosophy, p. 2. 
4 Ernest Lepore and Sam Cumming, Meaning and Argument: An Introduction to Logic Through Language, 
Second Edition, p. 6.   
5 See Michael Morris, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, p. 231. 
6 James Loxley, Performativity, p. 7.   
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seeing language as primarily the means by which to accurately picture or represent the 
world, Austin’s view of language emphasized the multifarious ways in which many of 
our linguistic expressions actually perform actions.  It is no surprise, then, that his 1962 
book was given its rather straightforward and matter-of-fact, if not curious, title. 
In How to Do Things with Words, Austin put forward a taxonomy of language 
built around a theory of speech acts.  Speech acts are “acts performed when words are 
uttered.”7  In Austin’s speech act theory, any utterance involves at most three separate 
acts: the locutionary act, the illocutionary act, and the perlocutionary act.  The 
locutionary act concerns what is said.  So, propositional content is established by the 
locutionary act.  The illocutionary act is what is done in the saying of it.  In saying 
something, we may ask a question, state a fact, make a promise, give an order, and the 
like.  The perlocutionary act is the “effect the speaker has on the listener by or through 
the saying of it.”8  To convince someone of something, to draw someone’s attention to 
something, and to get someone to do something all count as perlocutionary acts when 
they are achieved by means of saying something.   
In leading up to his taxonomy of language, Austin makes a propaedeutic 
distinction between utterances that he terms constantive and others that he calls 
performative.  Constantive utterances are either true or false statements; that is, they are 
declarative sentences of the type in which “the cat is on the mat” is a token.  With 
performative utterances, an act of some kind is established or accomplished in the very 
uttering of the words.  As with constantives, examples abound.  Consider the following: 
(1) I name this ship the Beagle. 
                                                 
7 Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 358. 
8 Douglas Robinson, Introducing Performative Pragmatics, p. 76.   
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(2) I promise to return your pitchfork. 
(3) I declare the county fair open. 
(4) I sentence the accused to 150 days in jail. 
(5) I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. 
(6) Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts 
of war against the Government and the people of the United States of 
America: therefore be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the state of war 
between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has 
thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared.9 
 
(7) I pronounce you husband and wife. 
(8) I apologize for my rude behavior. 
(9) I forgive you for your thoughtless comments. 
With any of these performatives, it is the communication of (some of) the words by the 
right authority, to the right audience, and (if spoken) at an adequate volume that 
“amounts to the carrying out of the action,”10 given the conventions of our speech 
community.  Call this proviso the Speech Community Condition.  So, we will expect that: 
(1) is uttered by an authority naming a sea vessel during a dedication ceremony; (2) be 
avowed by someone making a promise to another; (3) be announced by some official 
with the power to inaugurate the county fair; (4) be communicated by a judge in a court 
of law; (5) be said by a priest or minister during a baptism ceremony; (6) be issued by the 
Federal Government of the United States in going to war; (7) be spoken by a licensed 
wedding officiant, such as a judge or minister, to the bride and the groom at a wedding; 
                                                 
9 Congressional Declaration of War on Japan, December 8, 1941. 
10 Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, editors, Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics, p. 312.    
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(8) be expressed by someone apologizing to the person s/he previously offended; and (9) 
be voiced by someone who was wronged by another.11   
 Although all nine of the above sentences are, grammatically-speaking, declarative 
sentences, they don’t picture or represent the world.  So, in (1), I don’t report on the name 
of the ship; rather, I name the ship.  In (2), I don’t inform you about a promise I made.  
Instead, I promise.  And so on.  In sentences (1) – (9), the “meaning of… [the] 
performative expression is captured by the speech act it is customarily used to 
perform.”12  In uttering sentence (3), say, I use said sentence to inaugurate a public event, 
thereby having accomplished an action that has a distinct linguistic dimension to it.  The 
meanings of sentences (1) – (9) are not tied to the statements being true or false.13  In 
fact, performative utterances are never true or false.  That said, performatives are 
evaluable in other ways.   
 Austin identifies six rules that all successful performatives must follow.  Call 
these six rules Austin’s felicity conditions, for although performatives cannot be true or 
false, Austin argues that they can function in a “happy” or “unhappy” way.  For example, 
not all utterances of the words “I pronounce you husband and wife” can produce a 
marriage, nor does announcing “I declare the country fair open” necessarily yield the 
desired effect.  Perhaps in the first case the speaker is one of the wedding’s flower girls, 
and so does not have the authority to officiate at a marriage ceremony, while in the 
second the speaker is practicing her line in front of a mirror, far away from the place 
                                                 
11 Though this chapter examines of the ways in which language is used when, in overt speech, one 
apologizes or forgives, I do not deny that apologies and acts of forgiveness may occur in nonverbal 
contexts.  However, I maintain that the most precise, unambiguous, detailed and explicit expressions of 
apology and forgiveness occur in overt speech (and the written word).  To say this, though, does not 
diminish the potential power, poignancy and meaningfulness of nonverbal expressions of apology and 
forgiveness. 
12 Robert J. Stainton, Philosophical Perspectives on Language, pp. 156-157.   
13 This is why sentence (5) is meaningful even if the doctrine of a Triune Godhead is false.   
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where the country fair will take place.  Or, perhaps the person who says “I pronounce you 
husband and wife” is a licensed wedding officiant, but the saying of the vows in the 
marriage ceremony have been accidentally expunged, thereby nullifying the officiant’s 
power to marry the bride and groom.  Austin calls such unhappy or infelicitous uses of 
performatives “misfires.”  In its successful or felicitous use, a performative both 
expresses some content and performs a specific action.  Austin maintains that the 
successful functioning of any performative is guided by conformity to all six felicity 
conditions, quoted here in full. 
(A.1)   There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a 
certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering 
of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and 
further, 
 
(A.2)   the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be 
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 
 
  (B.1)   The procedure must be executed by all participants correctly and 
 
  (B.2)  completely. 
 
(Γ.1)   Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons 
having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of 
certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a 
person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact 
have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so 
to conduct themselves, and further, 
 
  (Γ.2)   must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.14 
 
Austin acknowledges that the six rules constitute an incomplete schematic,15 stating that 
he does “not wish to claim any sort of finality for this scheme.”16  Austin indicates that 
the first four rules should be viewed as necessary conditions that all felicitous 
                                                 
14 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Second Edition, pp. 14-15. 
15 Austin gives us no reason to think that his schematic could not be completed. 
16 Austin, p. 14. 
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performatives must satisfy.17  Violations of the two Γ conditions apparently do not 
invalidate the possibility of the speech act’s felicity, but they do amount to what Austin 
calls “an abuse of the procedure.”18  However, it appears that, in almost all cases, when 
all six conditions are met, the performative in question has succeeded in achieving the 
action that the words spoken indicate, and may thus be called felicitous or happy.   
I agree with Austin that the happy functioning of an apology or an act of 
forgiveness must, as a performative, be executed in conformity with the six felicity 
conditions.  The transaction of an apology or an act of forgiveness in conformity with the 
felicity conditions guarantees that the apology will be accepted by the wronged party, or 
that the act of forgiveness will be recognized by the offender.  However, what it is for an 
apology or an act of forgiveness to be fully transacted is not adequately answered by 
Austin.   
 
1.2 A Topography of Communicative Exchange 
In considering the performativity of our above nine sentences, we may be tempted 
to think that the exchange between the speaker and her audience is always executed in a 
unilateral way.  An exchange is unilateral if and only if the action-performing quality of 
the performative utterance is satisfied by none other than the singular speaker who utters 
the performative.19  The exchange between the speaker and her audience in sentences (1) 
– (6) is unilateral.  That is, a singular speaker does the “heavy-lifting” action-wise, while 
the receptive audience listens to, understands, and abides by the speech act performed by 
the speaker.  But unilateralism is not is de rigueur for all speech acts.  A case in point is 
                                                 
17 See Austin, pp. 15-16. 
18 Austin, p. 16. 
19 Of course, the utterance spoken must be in conformity with the Speech Community Condition. 
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that apologies and acts of forgiveness require a more nuanced picture of the exchange 
between those who we would otherwise identify as the singular speaker and receptive 
audience.   
The reason that a more nuanced picture is required is that, in apologies and acts of 
forgiveness (and a handful of other speech acts), the exchange is dialogical; the speaker 
and the audience “switch roles,” as it were, midway through the exchange.  Bilateralism 
better captures the dialogical communicative dynamic between both parties in sentences 
(8) – (9).  In exchanges that are bilateral, both parties take turns speaking and listening, 
and both are jointly responsible for the action-performing quality of the entire speech act.  
Sentence (7) is best captured by what I term trilateralism, which identifies exchanges that 
require three speakers.  In the case of the marriage ceremony in the West, the bride, the 
groom, and the wedding officiant all have a significant role to play in contributing to the 
speech act which carries out the action.  While it may appear as if the kinds of exchange 
that constitute the various dialogical communicative dynamics may continue to grow – 
will quadrilateralism be next? – I limit the analysis to the three kinds listed above.  As a 
way to conveniently classify them, bilateralism and trilateralism (and quadrilateralism, 
etc.) fall under the more general category of multilateral exchange.   
While Austin identifies and makes reference to apology and forgiveness, he does 
not investigate their structure per se; the dialogical communicative dynamic proper to 
apology and forgiveness is not given attention in his speech act theory.20  However, he 
                                                 
20 As I see it, the closest that Austin comes to making a distinction between unilateralism and bilateralism is 
on page 37.  But even here, Austin merely raises various questions about bilateralism without naming or 
defining it.  His consideration of what I call bilateralism is found in one paragraph, which I include here: 
“Naturally sometimes uncertainties about whether anything further is required or not will arise.  For 
example, are you required to accept the gift if I am to give you something?  Certainly in formal business 
acceptance is required, but is this ordinarily so?  Similar uncertainty arises if an appointment is made 
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notes and very briefly comments on the logic of betting,21 which bears structural 
similarities to apology and forgiveness.  I take this as good evidence that what I term the 
Acceptance Condition, which accounts for the transaction that bilateral (and trilateral) 
exchanges must conform to in satisfying the two B conditions, is consistent with Austin’s 
speech act theory.  It is to a presentation and defense of the Acceptance Condition, and 
how it operates in apology and forgiveness, that I now turn.     
 
1.3 Bilateralism and the Acceptance Condition 
In satisfying the requirements imposed on it by the six felicity conditions, an 
apology or act of forgiveness will have necessarily met with success.  And yet, as we all 
know, an apology may fail to convince the injured party to accept the apology and 
forgive the wrongdoer.  Similarly, the party in the wrong may reject all attempts at 
reconciliation with the party he injured and decide not to recognize the forgiveness he has 
been granted, choosing to wallow in guilt instead.  In such cases, the failed apology or 
inefficacious act of forgiveness should be viewed, generally, as a misfire.  More 
specifically, it should be viewed as what Austin calls a “hitch.”22  A hitch is a species of 
misfire wherein condition B.2 is not satisfied.  In such cases, our performative will have 
fallen flat, having been rendered infelicitous.  In short, no action will have been 
accomplished.      
While there is a small chance that we may run into a hitch with sentences (1) – 
(6), the likelihood of this kind of infelicity gumming up the works is minimal.  The onus 
                                                                                                                                                 
without the consent of the person appointed.  The question here is how far can acts be unilateral?  Similarly 
the question arises as to when the act is at an end, what counts as its completion?” 
21 Austin, pp. 36-37.   
22 Austin, pp. 36-37.     
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is on the singular speaker to perform the ritual correctly; no contribution by any other 
party is required.  However, there is a risk that sentences (8) - (9) will misfire precisely 
because there is a greater chance that the interlocutor required to complete the transaction 
will be unresponsive, or deny the request23 or forgo the grant24 offered by the original 
speaker.  These sentences are not alone.  Consider the following: 
(10)  I bet you $100 that Smooth Sailing will win the regatta. 
Sentences (8) - (10) seem to require some form of acceptance – tacit or explicit 
recognition of the request or the grant made in and through the performative - on the part 
of the individual to whom the utterance is made.  Call this requirement the Acceptance 
Condition.  As it applies to bilateral exchanges, the Acceptance Condition states that 
whenever a request is made or a grant is offered, an affirmative response must be made 
by the party that receives the request or grant for the performative; to do otherwise is to 
incur infelicity.25   Apologies and bets are speech acts that contain requests, whereas acts 
of forgiveness are speech acts that contain grants. 
An example will help.  Imagine that we are watching a boat race and I utter (10) 
to you.  In accordance with the Acceptance Condition you have a choice as to whether or 
not you will, as it were, “take me up” on my provocation.  If you accept, you have 
granted my request – and in so doing, completed the linguistic action that I inaugurated 
but which I was required to leave incomplete for you to consummate.   If you decline, 
                                                 
23 As Kent Bach defines it, a request “expresses a desire for the addressee to do a certain thing and 
normally aims for the addressee to intend to and, indeed, actually do that thing.”  See Bach, “Speech acts,” 
in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
24 As I understand it, a grant satisfies a request. 
25 As it applies to trilateral exchanges, the Acceptance Condition states that all three parties must produce 
their respective contributions on pain of infelicity.  In a marriage ceremony, the exchanging of the vows by 
the bride and groom and the pronouncement by the wedding officiant that the couple is married collectively 
constitute the speech act.  If any one of the three parties fails to contribute in a way sanctioned by the 
marriage ritual itself, the entire speech act fails. 
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either by shaking your head or verbally refusing, the speech act misfires.26  If you remain 
unresponsive, my challenge still stands (presumably for some undetermined length of 
time), but it is not acted upon, not “picked up.”   
Since sentences (1) – (6) are tokens of unilateral exchange between a singular 
speaker and her audience, they do not express requests.  Nor should they be considered 
grants made in response to requests, as are acts of forgiveness.  With sentences (1) – (6), 
the power of the performative to produce an act through speech is secure even in the 
absence of an interlocutor who may tacitly or explicitly respond to the performative.  
This is because the speech acts expressed in sentences (1) – (6) do not require any verbal 
response.  Unilateral exchanges require an audience, not a fellow interlocutor.  In short, 
sentences (1) – (6) do not need to meet the Acceptance Condition to avoid infelicity.        
Consider how the Acceptance Condition governs apologies.  I argue that the 
person that we want to make party to our apology must actively acknowledge and assent 
to the request in order to make the performative a successful one.  Imagine that one of 
your friends has been spiteful toward you.  Upon perceiving the wrongfulness of his 
actions, your friend vows to not treat you this way in the future, and says to you with all 
sincerity “I apologize for my callous behavior.”  Since the ritual that the modern West 
has adopted for the apology is widely known, it is safe to assume that conditions (A.1) 
and (A.2) have been satisfied in the enactment of the conventional procedure.  And 
precisely because the apology was a sincere one, and because your friend pledged to 
reform his behavior, conditions (Γ.1) and (Γ.2) have been satisfied.  And yet, if you 
rebuff your friend’s apology, condition (B.2) has not been satisfied.  The apology is 
unsuccessful in generating the response from you for which your friend had hoped, 
                                                 
26 More specifically, we would identify this misfire as a hitch. 
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namely forgiveness.  Since the Acceptance Condition was not met, condition (B.2) was 
not satisfied. The apology misfired.  In fact, I submit that your friend did not apologize at 
all, but rather only offered an apology. 
 When it is said that we have apologized, the apology we offer has been accepted 
in our having been forgiven.  In such situations, the apology we offer has met with 
success.  In other words, when we apologize, what we offer - an apology - achieves the 
desired result, namely forgiveness.  But when the apology we offer is refused, or when 
the person to whom we offer an apology must deliberate for some time before reaching a 
decision about granting us the forgiveness we seek, then it cannot be said that we have 
apologized.  To say that we have apologized is to say that a specific kind of action – 
forgiveness – has taken place.  Offering an apology – successfully performing the 
linguistic act of uttering “I apologize for X” - does not mean that the felicity conditions 
for the speech act have been satisfied.  And until such conditions are satisfied, we cannot 
say that the person who uttered “I apologize for X” has, in fact, apologized.                
     
1.4 Simple and Complex Bilateralism 
An analysis of the Acceptance Condition reveals there is a certain asymmetry in 
the very constitution of performativity itself.  Sentences (1) – (6) are tokens of a type of 
speech act defined by unilateralism.  But sentences (7) – (10) are tokens of a type defined 
by multilateral exchange.  On account of the lack of proportion between these two 
general types of speech acts, it is fitting to observe their asymmetry.   
Distinctions beget further distinctions.  Within multilateral exchanges, we find 
that apologies and bets exhibit what I call “simple bilateralism.”  Because it is a kind of 
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speech act that contains grants, forgiveness - being both complement and successor to 
apology - exhibits “complex bilateralism.”  The reasons for this classification scheme 
require some explanation. 
I hold that a successful apology or bet exhibits simple bilateralism in virtue of its 
two segments or “moments.”  Consider, again, apology.  In the first moment we find that 
(8) is spoken by the apologizer.  In the second moment, the person to whom the apology 
is aimed fulfills her role as the recognition-granting interlocutor and accepts the apology.  
This two-moment structure, which both exhibits the property of bilateralism and is 
governed by the Acceptance Condition, does not obtain in sentences (1) – (6).  What 
makes apologies and bets “simple” is that they are not responses to previously-made 
verbal overtures.   They don’t “hitch” up to or complete any previous linguistic exchange.  
I can, out of the blue, bet you $20 that if I flip a coin, it will land tails-up.  Apologizing to 
you requires that I have done something wrong for which I am responsible, but it does 
not require that we have ever even had a previous conversation.  Not so with forgiveness.   
The logical structure of forgiveness is, I maintain, unique.  The dialogical 
communicative dynamic of forgiveness requires that we treat it as a unique kind of 
speech act, classifiable only by itself on account of its complex bilateralism.  A 
successful act of forgiveness exhibits complex bilateralism in virtue of its own two 
“moments.”  And yet, what precedes the first moment is crucial for forgiveness.  The first 
moment is a response to an already-existing request – an apology - made by the 
wrongdoer for forgiveness.  The outstanding apology is a precondition for the 
comprehensibility of the act of forgiveness as a performative utterance; as I will argue 
later, to forgive in the absence of an apology strains the very intelligibility and 
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meaningfulness of forgiveness.  The strain on the intelligibility and meaningfulness of 
forgiveness is achieved, in forgiving in apology’s absence, by making the act of apology 
irrelevant.  To my knowledge, the act of forgiveness is the only performative in the 
English language that piggybacks on some other, outstanding performative in such a way 
as to both fulfill the request of the outstanding performative (in this case, an apology) and 
have enough autonomy to stand on its own as a bona fide performative in its own right.  
As an outstanding request that solicits recognition, the apology is the source of the 
complexity of the bilateralism of forgiveness.   
In the first moment of the act of forgiveness, the wronged party forgives the 
wrongdoer.  So, the person to whom the apology is aimed fulfills her role as the 
recognition-granting interlocutor and accepts the apology in granting forgiveness.  
Acceptance of the apology usually takes place through a formal linguistic response.  
Saying 
(8.1)  “I accept your apology and I forgive you”  
is a most explicit way in which to ensure that Austin’s first four felicity conditions are 
satisfied for the act of forgiveness.  In accordance with (Γ.1) and (Γ.2), an attitudinal or 
behavioral change in the forgiver toward the forgiven must also be made manifest in their 
ongoing relationship over time.  The attitudinal or behavioral change in the forgiver 
ought to include a “softening of the heart” toward the wrongdoer and/or active and 
patient efforts at reconciliation.  For forgiveness to be more than “just words” – for 
forgiveness to be an act – an action of a transformative, healing kind must take place 
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between the forgiver and the forgiven.  The forgiver must do her part in facilitating the 
moral repair that occurs in and through forgiveness.27   
In the second moment, the one granted forgiveness accepts the grant made in 
response to her very request.  This acceptance may take a linguistic form, but it must 
certainly be manifest in behavior or attitude.  The posture familiar of the apologizer – 
regret or sorrow, perhaps shame or self-disgust – must give way to more noble qualities 
of character.  Otherwise, forgiveness is lost on the afflicted, and the entire forgiveness 
ritual is for naught.  An individual who claims to have accepted the forgiveness that they 
have been offered but still has guilt “written on her face” has not truly accepted the 
forgiveness.  Such an individual cannot be said to be doing her part to repair the moral 
fabric of the relationship with her pardoner.  However, regarding its status as a 
performative, the act of forgiveness has misfired in said cases.   
The crux of the matter is this: as the correlative of apology, the act of forgiveness 
is a speech act that contains a grant.  When we decide to forgive someone, the act of 
forgiveness proper operates as the granting of a previously-made request by the 
wrongdoer.  But for the act of forgiveness to be a successful or felicitous performative, 
the one granted forgiveness must accept the grant made in response to her very request.  
As with any grant, in order for the grant to “take effect,” the individual who receives the 
grant must accept the grant that they have requested.  If the grant is refused, then the 
advantages of the grant are not conferred.  If one continues to wallow in guilt even after 
one has been granted forgiveness (as martyrs for self-inflicted suffering will do), then the 
nominally-forgiven individual forfeits the benefits (indeed, the reality) of forgiveness.  
                                                 
27 I will take up the issues of appropriate behavior of the forgiving party and what constitutes “moral 
repair” in the third chapter.   
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Similarly, if one outright rejects the very forgiveness that was petitioned for in the 
apology, the benefits of forgiveness are again forfeit.   
 
1.5 Defusing Objections 
Let’s take stock.  Earlier, I claimed that Austin did not offer an adequate account 
of what it is for an apology or an act of forgiveness to be fully transacted.  In presenting 
the Acceptance Condition and the distinction between simple and complex bilateralism, I 
have, I believe, provided that missing account.  But the skeptic might claim that my 
account is superfluous at best and wrongheaded at worst, charging that there is little-to-no 
textual evidence in Austin to support classifying apology and forgiveness as forms of 
bilateral exchange.  In fact, the skeptic might point to the very part of Austin’s text – just 
one paragraph, pages 36-37 - that I partially rely upon to make the argument for my 
classification scheme, noting that it doesn’t mention apology and forgiveness.  To be 
sure, in discussing the complications that may arise in satisfying condition (B.2), Austin 
refers to bets and to the marriage ceremony.  The skeptic may grant these speech acts 
have a logic classifiable under a multilateral rubric, while maintaining that apology and 
forgiveness be understood as forms of unilateral exchange, as are sentences (1) – (6).  
According to the skeptic, the requirement that apology and acts of forgiveness satisfy the 
Acceptance Condition lacks application.  For the skeptic, the one who apologizes or 
forgives satisfies condition (B.2) without any assistance from an interlocutor.  The 
skeptic may claim that apologizing and forgiving are as “automatic” as naming a ship, 
sentencing the accused, or making a promise.     
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In familiarizing ourselves with the skeptic’s challenge, I provide in full the 
purportedly contentious paragraph from Austin.  Here, Austin offers examples of various 
infelicities.  Among them are those that violate condition (B.2).  They 
are hitches; we attempt to carry out the procedure but the act is abortive.  For example: 
my attempt to make a bet by saying ‘I bet you sixpence’ is abortive unless you say ‘I take 
you on’ or words to that effect; my attempt to marry by saying ‘I will’ is abortive if the 
woman says ‘I will not;’ my attempt to challenge you is abortive if I say ‘I challenge you’ 
but fail to send round my seconds; my attempt ceremonially to open a library is abortive 
if I say ‘I open the library’ but the key snaps in the lock; conversely the christening of a 
ship is abortive if I kick away the chocks before I have said ‘I launch the ship.’28 
 
As they regard misfiring, Austin does not treat multilateral exchanges (such as betting 
and marriage) as categorically different from unilateral exchanges (such as opening a 
library or launching a ship).  The lack of clarification may lead to misconceptions. 
I view Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish as skeptics about the bilateralism of 
apology.  In their 1979 collaboration Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, Bach 
and Harnish identify apology as a kind of “acknowledgment.”  Call this the Bach-Harnish 
account.  Bach and Harnish argue that acknowledgments “express, perfunctorily if not 
genuinely, certain feelings toward the hearer…  Because acknowledgments are expected 
on particular occasions, they are often issued not so much to express a genuine feeling as 
to satisfy the social expectation that such a feeling be expressed.”29  For Bach and 
Harnish, an analysis of apology reveals the following: 
In uttering e, S apologizes to H for D if S expresses:  
i.  regret for having done D to H, and  
ii. the intention that H believe that S regrets having done D to H, or 
i.  the intention that his utterance satisfy the social expectation that one expresses 
 regret for having done something regrettable like D, and 
ii.  the intention that H take S’s utterance as satisfying this expectation.30    
                                                 
28 Austin, pp. 36-37.   
29 Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts, p. 51.   
30 Bach and Harnish, pp. 51-52.  S is the speaker and H is the hearer.   
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Elsewhere (and later, in a 1998 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on speech 
acts), Bach argues that an apology “just is the act of (verbally) expressing regret for, and 
thereby acknowledging, something one did that might have harmed the hearer.  An 
apology… is intended to be taken as expressing a certain attitude, in this case regret.  It 
succeeds as such if it is taken so.”31   
 The virtue of the Bach-Harnish account is that it clearly presents part of what goes 
on in an apology, namely, acknowledgment of wrongdoing.32  But to claim, as does Bach 
in his 1998 article, that an apology just is the verbal expression of regret, is surely wrong.  
I am unable to draw a link between Austin’s failure to clarify between unilateral and 
multilateral forms of exchange and the inadequacy of the Bach-Harnish analysis of 
apology.  However, I think that if Austin had cut language more closely at its joints, 
praise for rather than criticism of the Bach-Harnish analysis would be in order.   
 In his 1998 article, Bach seems to depart slightly from the account of apology that 
he and Harnish presented in 1979 – and from what he maintains at another point in the 
same article.  In his 1998 article, Bach admits that when we apologize, we may intend not 
merely to express regret, but also to seek forgiveness.  He claims that “[s]eeking 
forgiveness is, strictly speaking, distinct from apologizing, even though one utterance is 
the performance of an act of both types.  As an apology, the utterance succeeds if taken 
as expressing regret for the deed in question; as an act of seeking forgiveness, it succeeds 
if forgiveness is thereby obtained.”33  But worries arise.  It is hard to square Bach’s claim 
that an apology just is the act of verbally expressing regret against his other claim that an 
                                                 
31 Bach, “Speech acts” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
32 Strangely, Bach and Harnish make no mention of forgiveness as a speech act.   
33 Bach, “Speech acts” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
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apology can be the act of seeking forgiveness, when seeking forgiveness is distinct from 
apologizing.   Moreover, it is not at all clear why seeking forgiveness is distinct from 
apologizing.   
 We can clear up this confusion while still preserving what I take to be Bach’s 
basic insight in his 1998 article.  A distinction must be made between moral apologies, 
where an apology “implies a request for forgiveness and is initiative toward 
reconciliation,”34 and what I call quotidian apologies, where forgiveness is not sought at 
all.  A moral apology ranges over a moral domain.  The domain of the quotidian apology 
is etiquette and manners.  As I see it, the Bach-Harnish account of apology suits the 
quotidian apology, but fails to account (in full) for moral apologies.  When you 
unintentionally step on my foot, or when I spill tea on your kitchen table by accident, a 
quotidian apology is offered to meet the demands of etiquette.  In apologizing for my 
clumsy behavior, I have expressed regret for the action.  Or, as Bach and Harnish point 
out, I have expressed the intention that my utterance satisfy the social expectation that I 
express regret for my clumsy behavior.  And my regret, so expressed, shows that I 
acknowledge that I did something that has inconvenienced you.  But I am not actually 
requesting to be forgiven for spilling tea on your kitchen table.  And to be granted 
forgiveness in the wake of offering a quotidian apology for spilling tea on your kitchen 
table would simply be out-of-place.  In fact, quotidian apologies appear to be tokens of 
unilateral exchange, not bilateral exchange.  Quotidian apologies do not need to meet the 
Acceptance Condition, given their kinship with sentences (1) – (6).   
 In the next two chapters, I explore the moral structure of apology and, 
subsequently, the moral structure of forgiveness.  However, the conclusions reached in 
                                                 
34 Trudy Govier and Wilhelm Verwoerd, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology,” p. 67.   
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this chapter concerning the logic of apology and forgiveness will continue to inform and 
provide support for the account of the ethical import of apology and forgiveness that I 
develop.    
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Chapter 2: The Moral Structure of Apology 
 
 
‘Then the Lord God said, “Behold, the man has become like one 
 of us, knowing good and evil.”’  Genesis, 3:22 
 
 
In this passage, the retinue of the divine court is informed that the first people 
have eaten the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.  It is this very 
knowledge of good and evil that purportedly makes people god-like, according to the 
Jahwist.  And yet, the first cognitive activity that the original people perform with their 
newly-acquired powers – the choice of which may strike us as beneath a mature moral 
mind – is to realize that they are naked and in need of clothes.  This part of the story, 
historically interpreted in many ways, can be seen as an insight, albeit skewed, into what 
may follow from an acknowledgment.   
In eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, the first people do 
not acquire any additional factual information.  Instead, they find themselves suddenly 
endowed with moral knowledge.  With this moral knowledge, they acknowledge that 
they are naked and, in response, fashion clothes for themselves.  Since the magical fruit 
does not provide them with knowledge of more facts, they must have known that they 
were naked prior to eating the fruit.  But knowing a fact is different from appreciating the 
moral qualities of a thing that are tied to that fact.  It is the latter that Adam and Eve come 
to possess and which the deity is upset about, expelling them from the garden of Eden.   
In highlighting this story, my interest is neither to castigate the dubious judgment 
that nakedness is morally wrong, nor to entertain the equally dubious claim that moral 
knowledge makes one god-like.  Rather, I want to point out that the sheer act of 
acknowledging something – even something we and our interlocutor already know – can 
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have a profound and even unexpected impact on us and on our relationships.  While the 
acknowledgment that Adam and Eve made is morally insignificant, some kinds of 
acknowledgment are distinctly moral.  What makes them distinctly moral is their 
responsiveness to and representation of the moral qualities of our own motives and the 
ethical properties of our own actions.   
In this chapter, I explore and defend a certain account of the moral structure of 
apology.  Like forgiveness, an analysis of apology requires that its moral structure be 
treated separately from its logical structure.  The logical structure of apology and 
forgiveness was examined in the first chapter.  The logical structure represents the formal 
properties of apology and forgiveness, while the moral structure exhibits the ethical 
content of apology and forgiveness.  The moral structure of apology, which supervenes 
on its logical structure, is composed of three distinct parts: an epistemic aspect, an 
affective one and an attitudinal one.  Each of these parts constitutes a necessary condition 
for a genuine apology.  While I treat the epistemic, affective and attitudinal elements 
separately, I argue that any comprehensive account of the moral structure of apology 
must recognize their essential linkage.  I go on explore how apology is often the first and, 
depending on the kind of wrong committed, sometimes only step in facilitating what 
Margaret Urban Walker calls moral repair.   
In examining the epistemic element of apology, I begin the chapter with an 
account of the centrality of acknowledgement for apology.  I show that four conditions 
must be satisfied for an acknowledgement to count as an acknowledgement.  I then 
consider the valuable role that guilt, shame, remorse and what Nick Smith calls 
“categorical regret” play in motivating us to apologize.  These emotions figure in what I 
29 
 
call the affective aspect of apology’s moral structure.  In examining the attitudinal 
component of an apology, I reflect upon the proper posture of those who apologize, 
maintaining that while an apology ought to be delivered in a humble manner, for the sake 
of the self-respect of the apologizer, humility ought not give way to servility.   
Before continuing, reflect once more on the biblical passage.  The deity admits 
that possession of moral knowledge makes people god-like, but is mute on the subject of 
the shape that a moral life takes.  The Christian tradition has historically identified the 
eating of the magical fruit as the felix culpa, the “happy sin” that ultimately necessitates 
the coming of Christ as redeemer.  Treating the story for its literary value, I suggest a 
different reading.  If the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil was 
a fortunate fall, what we fell into was a fuller understanding of what it means to be 
human.  The moral life and concomitant reflection upon it offers us a more complete 
picture of what it means to be human.  The shape of this life includes apology and 
forgiveness as parts of its dimensions.  Among the many accounts of the adventures of 
the deity in the Bible, there are no stories featuring the deity apologizing.  The experience 
of the apology ritual, inextricably linked to our understanding of the shape a moral life 
takes, is wholly unavailable to the deity.  We not only possess moral knowledge; we also 
know what it is like to have done wrong.  And we alone know what it is like to (have to) 
repair a moral bond after we, ourselves, have damaged it.    
 
2.1 Acknowledgment: The Epistemic Dimension of Apology 
Apology is a response to a wrongdoing for which we are responsible.  The wrong 
in question must be one that has harmed, in some way, the person to whom we apologize.  
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A genuine moral apology must contain an acknowledgment of the wrong.  Curiously, 
there is very little written by philosophers about acknowledgement.35  One of the few 
who has is Trudy Govier.  Govier suggests that acknowledgement exhibits its moral 
significance in contexts where wrongdoing is addressed.36  On Govier’s account, 
acknowledgment is a “kind of spelling out or focused recognition of something one 
knows, usually involving an explicit statement to others.”37  It is, she says, a kind of 
admission or avowal.  Govier’s account is a good first step in analyzing 
acknowledgement, but it is neither comprehensive nor sufficiently detailed.38  Her 
account does not consider the crucial role that epistemic justification plays in 
underwriting a successful acknowledgement.  My account remedies this by advancing an 
externalist theory of justification.  Govier’s account also fails to come to grips with how 
acknowledgement satisfies an important epistemic demand: that acknowledgement 
validates what we know.  That is, when we acknowledge something, we corroborate a 
claim; we confirm the veridicality of a belief.  I will expand upon this last point toward 
the end of my analysis of acknowledgement.  
                                                 
35 In what follows, I offer a novel analysis of acknowledgement.  My analysis of acknowledgement differs 
considerably from the use of the concept in the Bach-Harnish account.  Whereas Bach and Harnish identify 
apology as a species of acknowledgement, I treat acknowledgement as just one ingredient, albeit necessary, 
in an apology.  Moreover, I choose the word “acknowledgement” over “recognition” as the latter tends to 
be associated with either perception or Hegelian metaphysics.  Regarding Hegel’s use of the concept, I 
offer two observations.  First, in Hegel, the term “recognition” refers to the various stages of history of the 
forms of consciousness in the individual and collective development of freedom.  My employment of the 
term “acknowledgement” does not carry the philosophical baggage of Hegel’s metaphysics.  Second, as 
Peter Singer points out, in Hegel’s famous discussion of the dialectic of the master and the slave, the 
“demand for recognition is mutual.”  See Peter Singer, Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, p. 78.  I take it 
that this means that the master is driven to have the slave recognize him, and that the slave is driven to have 
the master recognize him.  This demand for recognition pursued by the master and the slave suggests that 
the exchange between them is bilateral.  My analysis of acknowledgement treats acknowledgement as a 
unilateral exchange.   
36 See Govier, “What is Acknowledgement and Why is it Important?,” p. 69.   
37 Trudy Govier, “Acknowledgment and Forced Confession,” p. 5.  
38 In fairness, Govier may not have intended her analysis of acknowledgement to be comprehensive and 
sufficiently detailed.   
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Govier distinguishes between knowledge and acknowledgement, claiming that 
“we may know things that we do not acknowledge.  A woman may know that she is 
short-tempered and prone to yell at her children without ever acknowledging to them that 
she has these failings.  They may know it without ever expressing it to her.”39  Imagine, 
still, that while the woman may have the evidence and the cognitive capacity to know that 
she has these negative qualities, she does not make explicit to herself what she knows.  
Consistent refusal to acknowledge what one knows is to engage in self-deception.  
Tellingly, in his 1969 book Self-Deception, Herbert Fingarette “used the notions of 
disavowal and lack of acknowledgement as the basis for an account of self-deception.”40 
Acknowledgement is easily done when the opportunity to acknowledge 
something involves little to no risk.  In fact, it may be the case that, were the opportunity 
to arise, we would feel comfortable to acknowledge much of what we know.  Then again, 
much of what we know may be so commonplace that its acknowledgement would be 
unrevealing.  It is of little epistemic importance for me to acknowledge that my computer 
monitor sits atop my desk.  Moreover, such an acknowledgement carries no ethical 
weight.  Govier rightly points out that acknowledgement arises as an epistemic (and 
perhaps ethical) concern “when we know or are in a position to know unwelcome things 
that we do not wish to spell out or publicly admit.”41  For acknowledgement to have any 
force, there must be something of epistemic or moral significance at stake.   
Govier offers an analysis of how one may come to know what one later 
acknowledges.  She appears to assume – and rightly so, I think - that in ordinary 
circumstances, we have immediate, direct knowledge of our actions.  Our knowledge of 
                                                 
39 Govier, “What is Acknowledgement and Why is it Important?,” p. 70. 
40 Govier, “What is Acknowledgement and Why is it Important?,” p. 72.  Emphasis not mine.   
41 Govier, “What is Acknowledgement and Why is it Important?,” pp. 70-71.   
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our own behavior, generated from the first-person standpoint, is taken for granted.  
Acknowledging what we have immediate, direct knowledge of poses no epistemological 
problem.  Consider again the case of the short-tempered mother.  In this installment of 
the thought experiment, the mother acknowledges to her children her irritability.  “She 
might, for instance, say to them something like, ‘I know I’ve been crabby this past week, 
and I’ve been yelling at you, and I’m sorry.’  In articulating such an acknowledgement, 
the mother would have first recognized and conceptualized her feelings and behavior and 
then have admitted her failings openly to her children.”42  This installment of the thought 
experiment exemplifies what I call Govier’s epistemology of acknowledgement.     
 Govier’s epistemology of acknowledgement is, however, incomplete.  We may 
also acknowledge what a trusted source tells us we did, even though we have no 
recollection, and therefore no firsthand knowledge, of the purported event.  Take the case 
of Drunk Ted.  Imagine that Ted was at a bar with his friend Joe on Friday night.  
Uncharacteristically, Ted consumes more than twice as much alcohol as he usually does, 
as he is upset about having received a speeding ticket.  On Saturday morning, Ted wakes 
up on Joe’s couch, unable to remember how he got there.  Joe tells Ted that he had to 
practically carry him to his house after Ted nearly passed-out at the bar.  And this is after 
Ted, in his inebriated state at the bar, has ridiculed Joe for his spotless driving record.  
Moreover, Ted’s antics have caused Joe to miss his son’s soccer match, a game he 
promised his son he would attend.  Ted has no recollection of taking a jab at Joe, but he 
also has no recollection of anything after 11 p.m., when he started to drink heavily.  Even 
though Ted has no recollection of having done what he has been accused of by Joe, Ted 
believes that his friend has accurately reported on the alleged events as they unfolded.  
                                                 
42 Govier, “What is Acknowledgement and Why is it Important?,” p. 71.   
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Because of the trust Ted has in his friend and his justified belief that Joe would not 
deceive him, he is compelled to accept, and thereby acknowledge, that he acted thusly.  
The point is this: whether we come to know our actions from the first-person standpoint 
or via reports delivered by a trustworthy source, we may acknowledge only what we 
already know. 
 
2.1.1 The complete acknowledgement: the veridicality condition. 
 For an acknowledgement to count as an acknowledgement, four conditions must 
be satisfied.  The four conditions are the veridicality condition, the authenticity condition, 
the autonomy condition, and the transparency condition.43  Call a Complete 
Acknowledgement one in which all four conditions are satisfied.  The veridicality 
condition states that the acknowledgement must be of that which is the case.  It is 
impossible to acknowledge something if the claim made about it is false.  While we may 
be deceived by others or even by ourselves about what is and what is not the case - the 
risk being even greater than usual when reputation and esteem are at stake, as they often 
are with acknowledgements – to “acknowledge” what is not the case is to fail to 
acknowledge tout court.  The veridicality condition satisfies a metaphysical requirement, 
not an epistemic one.   
But epistemological concerns remain.  Two rival epistemic norms compete to 
provide an account of the procedure by which the veridicality condition is satisfied.  
These two epistemic norms, which are incompatible with one another, find expression in 
competing theories of epistemic justification.  The two competing theories are 
                                                 
43  I am inspired by Govier to present the following four parts of what I call a Complete Acknowledgement.  
The arguments and analysis, however, are my own.   
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externalism and internalism.  I argue that satisfying the veridicality condition, so 
described, requires an externalist theory of justification.  Externalism is the view that 
“epistemic justification can depend in part or perhaps even entirely on matters to which 
the believer in question need have no cognitive access at all, matters that are entirely 
external to his or her cognitive viewpoint.”44  Internalism is the view that an agent’s 
beliefs or awareness reflects all factors relevant to justification.  In satisfying the 
veridicality condition, we make an indirect knowledge claim vis-à-vis an 
acknowledgement; in so doing, we ought to be able to justify the truthfulness of what we 
aver.  I argue that externalism is superior to internalism in its account of the justificatory 
procedure employed to secure true belief for the satisfaction of the veridicality condition.  
Internalism is saddled with Gettier-style counterexamples that show that justified true 
belief (by itself) cannot account for knowledge.  Since the identification of an additional 
internalist criterion that would complete the tripartite account has been heretofore 
unsuccessful, externalism appears to be a more promising alternative.   
Like many others persuaded by externalism, I see reliabilism as the most 
attractive version of externalism.  Reliabilism stresses the causal relationship between 
belief states and the truthmakers (i.e., the state of affairs) that make a belief true.  The 
justification for knowledge is found in the reliable process, not in one’s cognitive access 
to the reasons for one’s beliefs.  According to reliabilism, “knowledge is true belief that 
is the product of a reliable process, where a reliable process is a process that tends to 
result in true beliefs.”45  The reliable process may be any belief-forming mechanism that 
                                                 
44 Lawrence BonJour, Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses, Second Edition, p. 
203.  Emphasis not mine.   
45 Duncan Pritchard, Knowledge, p. 18. 
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functions properly when required.  One such candidate for this reliable process is the 
mechanism of perception. 
Louis Pojman imagines the following scenario in an effort to motivate reliabilism.  
He observes that we often cannot give an account of the beliefs that we hold that are 
derived from our perceptions.  In fact, Pojman claims that we may be ignorant of even 
possessing such beliefs.   
Suppose you come to dinner at my home, and after dinner I take you into another 
room and give you a quiz.  “Do you know what color the walls in the dining room 
were and what pictures were hanging on the wall?” I ask.  You pause, for you 
don’t remember even noticing the walls or the pictures, but you correctly say, 
“The walls were red and a couple of pictures of Oxford were on one wall and a 
Renoir picture was on the other.”  “How do you know that?” I ask.  You admit 
that you don’t know how you knew.  [A reliabilist would answer that your]… 
perceptual mechanism picked up the information, stored it in your mind…,  and 
let you retrieve it at the appropriate moment.46 
 
In this example, the person reporting does not have direct or immediate cognitive access 
to what will justify her responses.  Nonetheless, her reports are correct, and not, it seems, 
on account of sheer luck.  For the reliabilist, at least some features of the subject’s correct 
reports about the color of the walls and what hangs on them can be “attributed to the 
subject from outside her perspective.”47  In this case, what is outside the subject’s own 
cognitive perspective is, counter-intuitively, (some of) her own perceptions.  Those 
unsympathetic with reliabilism may object to the very intelligibility of this assertion.  But 
they should be reminded that there are “plenty of features of our mental states that we are 
unable to access.  Maybe the feature of knowing that distinguishes it from mere true 
believing is one of them.”48  I take it that we cannot always determine when we are 
motivated by virtue, or even if our judgments are free of self-deception.  Perhaps the 
                                                 
46 Louis Pojman, The Theory of Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Third Edition, p. 258.   
47 Linda Zagzebski, On Epistemology, p. 46.   
48 Ibid., p. 47.  
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ability to determine when we satisfy the condition that converts true belief into 
knowledge is likewise hidden from our cognitive access.    
Externalism guards against what I call the Huck Finn problem.49  In Mark 
Twain’s famous novel Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, Huck Finn finds himself floating 
down the Mississippi River on a makeshift raft with Jim, a runaway slave.  The story is 
set in the Jacksonian Era, decades before the American Civil War.  Jim is trying to get to 
Ohio to buy his family’s freedom.  Huck believes that Jim has done wrong in running 
away, and, as the narrative develops, comes to believe that he himself has done 
something wrong in aiding and abetting Jim.  Nevertheless, Huck commits himself to 
helping Jim secure his freedom, partly for the sheer excitement of doing something that 
he believes is wrong.  Perhaps the most poignant example of Huck’s belief that he is 
engaged in nefarious activity is found in the episode in which Huck lies to two white 
slave catchers to protect Jim.  Claiming that he and his “father” are infected with small-
pox, Huck manages to frighten the slave catchers away.  When they leave, Huck is 
introspective.   
They went off, and I got aboard the raft, feeling bad and low, because I knowed 
very well I had done wrong, and I see it warn’t no use for me to try to learn to do 
right… Then I thought a minute, and says to myself, hold on, - s’pose you’d a 
done right and give Jim up; would you feel better than what you do now?  No, 
says I, I’d feel bad – I’d feel just the same way I do now.50 
 
Although he does not acknowledge to an interlocutor that he “knowed very well” 
that he had done something wrong, Huck’s internal monologue captures the spirit of what 
an acknowledgement is.  In his internal monologue, Huck is clearly conflicted.  On the 
one hand, Huck is prejudiced against people of color as inferior.  On the other hand, 
                                                 
49 Many thanks to Ann Cudd for help with this thought experiment.   
50 Mark Twain, Adventure of Huckleberry Finn, pp. 127-128.   
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Huck likes Jim and is somewhat sympathetic toward Jim’s commitment to be something 
other than a slave.  Despite this internal conflict, Huck claims to know that he has done 
something wrong in lying to the two white slave catchers and in helping Jim escape to a 
free state.  In making this epistemic claim in the manner in which he does, Huck assumes 
an internalist scheme of justification.  Acknowledging that he has done something wrong 
when, in fact, he hasn’t, is the Huck Finn problem.  Given the standards that internalism 
uses to determine what counts as a justification, internalism is unable to prevent Huck 
Finn-style cases from satisfying the veridicality condition.  Externalism, though, always 
thwarts Huck Finn-style cases from satisfying the veridicality condition.   
It is by means of an internalist scheme of justification that Huck makes his 
epistemic claim.  For internalists, “a belief is justified only if the agent has good reasons 
for having the belief.  Internalism… holds justified belief to be a kind of reasonable 
belief.  More importantly, the reasonability of a belief is judged relative to the agent’s 
cognitive perspective.”51  Given the standards that Huck and his fellow white Southerners 
unquestionably endorse, abolitionism is manifestly unreasonable.  According to the 
standards of the pre-Civil War white Southerners, racial apartheid is the most reasonable 
social arrangement, given the purported inherent inequality of blacks.  Huck’s 
commitment to these standards requires that he be unambiguously prejudiced against all 
blacks, including Jim.  The purported justifying evidence that Huck uses to arrive at the 
judgment that helping a run-away slave is morally wrong is internally available to his 
consciousness in the form of thoroughly ingrained though seemingly reasonable 
prejudices – prejudices which are continually reinforced and confirmed each day.  For the 
pre-Civil War white Southerner, Josiah Wedgewood’s call to action is folly: the slave is 
                                                 
51 Jack S. Crumley II, An Introduction to Epistemology, Second Edition, p. 160-161.   
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neither man nor brother.  For the internalist, Huck is justified in claiming to know that he 
has done something morally wrong in helping and protecting Jim, because the available 
evidence leads him inexorably to this conclusion.  Moreover, this evidence is available to 
his cognitive perspective.   
But imagine instead that Twain envisioned Huck employing an externalist scheme 
of justification.  Here, the correct belief – that abolitionist activity is either obligatory or 
supererogatory for free moral agents – would have been caused in Huck by means of a 
reliable process external to his cognitive viewpoint.  With the correct belief in mind, 
Huck may acknowledge that he performed the morally right action in eluding the slave 
catchers.  But the correct belief, both in its production and its verity, would very much 
surprise and even confuse Huck.  Huck’s reaction, albeit understandable, should not be 
treated as a reason to reject externalism, though.  Recall that when asked by Pojman to 
report on the pictures hanging on his dining room wall, I may surprise myself when I 
produce the correct answer.  Provided that my – or Huck’s – answers are correct, and 
provided that they are the result of a reliable process, the externalist argument asserts that 
knowledge has been produced.  If externalism is the case, then we will need to come to 
terms with the queerness of the speaker’s inability to reflectively access the correct belief.  
The satisfaction we find in the benefits of externalism should outweigh our worries about 
its queerness.  As I have argued, a most compelling benefit of externalism is that it 
always eliminates Huck Finn-style cases from the class of epistemic operations that may 
satisfy the veridicality condition. 
Worries about externalism linger, though.  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued 
that even if we assume that moral beliefs can be justified so long as they are reliable, if 
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“one does not believe that one’s moral beliefs are reliable, then one cannot believe that 
they are justified, or be justified in believing that they are justified, or show that they are 
justified.”52  If Huck believes that his (reliably-formed) beliefs about the obligatory or 
supererogatory nature of abolitionist activity are not reliable, then, Sinnott-Armstrong 
cautions, Huck is justified in not believing in the obligatory or supererogatory nature of 
abolitionist activity.  But if Huck does not have any beliefs about whether or not his 
reliably-formed beliefs about slavery are reliable, then his reliably-formed beliefs are 
justified.53  Of course, the likelihood of Huck not having any beliefs about whether his 
reliably-formed beliefs are justified is very low.  After all, his reliably-formed beliefs 
endorse abolitionism, with which Huck is unsympathetic.   
However, the larger worry, I think, is that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument 
smuggles-in criteria relative to internalism.  A fully consistent externalism has no truck 
with internalism.  Externalism’s having no truck with internalism entails that externalism 
is immune from the worries that pester and are relative to the standards of internalism.  
Huck’s second-order beliefs about his first-order (reliably-formed) beliefs are, from the 
standpoint of justification, irrelevant.  In this regard, Sinnott-Armstrong’s criticisms are 
misplaced.  Nonetheless, if Huck is to act on his first-order (reliably-formed) beliefs, his 
second-order beliefs ought not be inconsistent with them.  But this is a separate matter 
divorced from justification.   
A more pertinent worry is that externalism does not resolve Huck’s ambivalence.  
Even if we imagine him employing an externalist scheme of justification, Huck may not 
feel any better about performing the right, though unpopular, moral action, namely, 
                                                 
52 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Moral Skepticism and Justification,” in Moral Knowledge? New Readings in 
Moral Epistemology, p. 28.  Emphasis not mine.   
53 See ibid, footnote 60, p. 46. 
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helping Jim escape slave catchers.  Huck will still be plagued by the dictates of his racist 
conscience, which tells him to deliver Jim into the hands of the slave catchers.  This 
worry is not specific to Huck; it hangs over any externalist scheme of justification where 
the knowledge generated by the externalist scheme runs counter to our deepest 
commitments.  This worry, though, is not so much a philosophical one; it is a pedagogical 
one.  Our commitments and conscience change over time.  Once we educate ourselves to 
care about what we know to be the morally right course of action, our conscience will fall 
in line behind what we know is right.  Moving beyond the trope that Twain designed for 
him, we can imagine that Huck is not conflicted.  Our unconflicted Huck would possess a 
conscience informed by the moral knowledge generated by a reliable process external to 
his cognitive viewpoint.  This Huck would both know that the abolitionist cause is 
morally right and be in sympathy with the abolitionist cause.  As a boy, our Huck is an 
unlikely candidate for this unconflicted self.  But as an adult, he could join the ranks of 
the countless others who have undergone this transformation.   
 
2.1.2 The complete acknowledgement: the authenticity, autonomy, and 
transparency conditions. 
 
Let’s return to the three remaining conditions that, along with the veridicality 
condition, constitute a Complete Acknowledgement.  The authenticity condition states 
that the acknowledgement must be sincere – that is, something which the acknowledger 
herself believes.  Belief in the veridicality of what one acknowledges is definitional of 
acknowledgement.  Failure to believe in the truth of what one acknowledges is to traffic 
in inconsistency.  At the same time, to not believe in the truthfulness of what one 
acknowledges is to engage in a form of self-deception.  To deceive oneself or produce 
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inconsistent reports about the truth-value of what one knows to be the case is to defeat the 
authenticity condition.  Clearly, sincere acknowledgements are to be valued.   
The authenticity condition is an epistemic requirement, but justification is not part 
of its domain.  Rather, sincerity is the domain of this particular epistemic requirement.  
When we are sincere in what we avow, our beliefs are transparent to ourselves and to 
others.  Being sincere means that we “really mean” what we acknowledge. 
When we claim that we “really mean” what we acknowledge, we put forward a 
second-order belief about a first-order belief.  The authenticity condition is concerned 
with second-order beliefs about reliably-formed first-order beliefs.  The second-order 
beliefs serve as endorsements of the first-order beliefs.  The approbation they convey has 
normative force for both the acknowledger and the acknowledger’s interlocutors; in 
effect, the second-order beliefs demonstrate that the acknowledger really does sanction 
what she claims.  This sanctioning signifies the acknowledger’s sincerity, thereby 
satisfying the authenticity condition.    
Let me further develop what I mean by endorsement and sanction by examining 
the concept of acceptance.  Call a sincere acknowledgement of what one knows an 
acceptance of a belief.  According to Pojman, both belief and acceptance are cognitive 
attitudes relating to propositions.  But “whereas belief is an involuntary attitude that the 
proposition is true, acceptance is a voluntary attitude.”54  Pojman goes to some length to 
distinguish belief from acceptance, arguing against Keith Lehrer’s claim that acceptance 
is a special type of belief: 
One can accept a hypothesis that one does not believe.  I may accept your 
hypothesis for the sake of argument without believing it.  A scientist may accept a 
                                                 
54 Louis P. Pojman, What Can We Know: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 
319.   
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new hypothesis, although he or she is agnostic about it, but carry out a series of 
experiments in order to see what reactions will obtain or to see whether by some 
quirk it is true after all.  The scientist accepts the hypothesis for the sake of 
finding the truth but does not believe it. 
 
Furthermore, I can believe in a proposition and yet not accept it.  I see (and 
believe) that the evidence is against my hypothesis, yet I have a vested interest in 
the hypothesis, so I proceed as though the evidence didn’t count significantly 
against it.  I may even do this for the sake of truth.  I believe that the evidence 
counts significantly against my hypothesis, but I also realize that although the 
chances are less than 50 percent, if my hypothesis is true and if I can perform 
other experiments to verify it, then the outcome will be a greater display of 
truth.55   
 
For Pojman, beliefs may occur without our having decided to believe in them.  But the 
acceptance of a belief is always deliberate.56  Pojman claims that we “speak of beliefs 
being caused but acceptances being determined by reasons.”57  This distinction between 
belief and acceptance (or endorsement and sanction) has the virtue of being consistent 
with the externalism I advance in explicating the veridicality condition.  To use the 
Twain motif again, if unconflicted Huck sincerely believes in the veridicality of what he 
acknowledges, then he accepts/endorses the belief in question, thereby satisfying the 
authenticity condition.     
I conclude this analysis of the authenticity condition with an abbreviated 
consideration of accountability and its relation to attributions of blame.  Here, I am 
concerned with what is morally entailed by a sincere acknowledgement.  In this analysis, 
I am interested in moral accountability, not legal accountability.  When someone 
                                                 
55 Louis P. Pojman, What Can We Know: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 
319. 
56 As it happens, treating belief as an involuntary attitude and acceptance as a voluntary attitude is wholly 
consistent with the externalist theory of justification I endorse.  For the externalist, Huck Finn may not be 
able to accept abolitionism, but he could not claim to know that abolitionism is morally wrong.  The upshot 
of the individuation of belief and acceptance for the psychology of the moral agent is that the agent may be 
left schizophrenic, conflicted over whether or not to accept what they know.   
57 Louis P. Pojman, What Can We Know: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, Second Edition, p. 
320.  Emphasis not mine.   
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sincerely acknowledges something, we say that they are accountable for what they 
acknowledge.  To be accountable for X is to be answerable for X.  In holding a person 
accountable or answerable for what she acknowledges, we may simply require that she be 
ready to reproduce her acknowledgement at a future time.  In the case of an admitted 
moral transgression, we may require that the person make amends for the wrong that she 
sincerely acknowledges.58  Regardless, the ethics of accountability supervenes on the 
acceptance or endorsement of a belief in a sincere acknowledgement.   
The demand for accountability may take various forms, the most common of 
which may be the acceptance of blame.  To be blameworthy is to be both responsible for 
and culpable of a moral transgression.59  One way in which moral agents are determined 
responsible is by tracing a causal chain of events from the agent to the morally bad 
action.  If I, uncoerced, wielded the knife that cut my enemy, I am responsible for my 
enemy’s wound.  Culpability implies that the agent is at fault for the moral transgression.  
If I, without any provocation and without cause, stab my enemy, I am culpable.  If I 
proffer a sound excuse for my behavior, I am not culpable.  When it is established that 
the moral agent is responsible for and culpable of a moral transgression, the agent may be 
blamed for the offense.   
We need to get some kind of handle on blame.  George Sher argues that, formally, 
“blame is a stance or attitude that a person takes toward himself or another on the basis of 
a judgment that that person has in some way failed to conform to a moral standard.”60  
The stance or attitude is, of course, one of disapprobation.  The judgment concerning the 
                                                 
58 If the acknowledgement is part of an apology, the person may herself insist on making amends.  And 
even if others don’t hold us accountable for X, we may independently decide to hold ourselves accountable.     
59 See Garrath Williams, “Praise and Blame,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/praise/. 
60 George Sher, In Praise of Blame, p. 7.   
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failure to conform to a moral standard may be produced in the light of the offender’s 
acknowledgement-containing apology.  The blame that we direct at the accountable party 
is intended to have a certain effect.  Daniel N. Robinson observes that when “validly 
directed at a person, blame is expected to cause feelings of guilt, remorse, and shame.”61  
Of course, the offender may already feel these negative emotions.  But being blamed by 
another may intensify and prolong the effect of these feelings.  Being blamed by others 
reinforces and makes undeniable the reality of our transgression.     
Sher complements Robinson’s observation by discussing the act of blame.  Sher 
argues that “to blame someone… is to have certain affective and behavioral dispositions, 
each of which can be traced to the combination of a belief that that person acted badly or 
has a bad character and a desire that this not be the case.”62  On Sher’s account, blame is 
constituted by belief-desire pairs which “give rise to a characteristic set of behavioral and 
affective dispositions.”63  Insofar as the belief that a person has acted badly or has a bad 
character is derived from a moral principle, the full acceptance of such a principle is 
conceptually bound up with the desire to uphold the principle.64  As Brad Hooker 
explains in his review of Sher’s book, since “the belief that a moral principle is justified 
entails the desire that the principle not have been violated, and this belief-desire pair 
constitutes blame and gives rise to the familiar affective dispositions, whatever justifies 
the moral principle in the first place also justifies blame as a response to its violation.”65  
                                                 
61 Daniel N. Robinson, Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications, p. 4.   
62 Sher, p. 115.  
63 Sher, p. 137.   
64 See Sher, p. 124. 
65 Brad Hooker, review of George Sher’s In Praise of Blame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 
http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9105. 
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This examination of the ethical import of blame segues to the third condition for a 
Complete Acknowledgement.  The autonomy condition – the third condition - satisfies a 
moral requirement.  It states that the acknowledgement must not be forced or coerced, but 
freely arrived at.  An acknowledgement “based on physical force or inappropriately 
strong psychological pressure may be referred to as forced acknowledgment.”66  A forced 
acknowledgement is an acknowledgement in name only, as the acknowledger must, of 
her own volition, give expression to what she knows.  A forced acknowledgement fails to 
respect the agency of the acknowledger, as it runs roughshod over the deliberative 
process that often takes place in the mind of the one who offers the acknowledgement.  
To threaten67 the would-be confessor to acknowledge something is to compromise the 
integrity of the acknowledgement.   
Finally, the transparency condition, the fourth and last condition, states that the 
acknowledgement must be publicly transacted.  Like the authenticity condition, the 
transparency condition satisfies an epistemic requirement.  Unlike the authenticity 
condition, the transparency condition satisfies a communicative requirement.  The 
authenticity condition refers to a doxastic mental state, whereas the transparency 
condition refers to the quality of the transaction made by the acknowledger, given the 
belief.  According to the transparency condition, the acknowledgement must be one that 
is transacted with someone else. 
Acknowledgements are always transacted in a social setting.  In the production of 
an acknowledgement, the acceptance of a belief by the would-be acknowledger is always 
                                                 
66 Govier, “Acknowledgement and Forced Confession,” p. 9.   
67 I distinguish between threats, which often amount to some kind of physical, sexual, or emotional 
punishment, and encouragement and low-intensity pressure.  The latter are legitimate forms of coercion, as 
they respect the agency of the would-be acknowledger.   
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conducted publicly.  To accept a belief is to verbally make the acknowledgement to one 
or more persons who can hold you to what you acknowledge.  This exchange may take 
place in a private conversation with someone; it may take place in a public declaration. 
Acknowledging what you know at the top of your lungs in Grand Central Station does 
not qualify as an open acknowledgement, despite being in the presence of a throng of 
people who can all hear your voice.  There must be some kind of recognized and 
accepted social practice within which a sincere acknowledgement is recognized by all 
participants as an accountability-laden activity.68  For this reason, the Grand Central 
Station example does not meet the terms of open acceptance.  
What is expressed in an acknowledgement must be evident or unmistakable.  The 
acknowledgement must be obvious to the one who makes it and to the person to whom it 
is made.  Call the person to whom the acknowledgement is made the intended recipient.  
The intended recipient must be one whose judgment of the substance of what is 
acknowledged is relevant to the very end or goal of the acknowledgement.  In response to 
a number of pointed questions asked by a professor, a trouble-making student may 
acknowledge to the professor that she cheated on the exam and that this gave her an 
unfair advantage over other students.  In extending reparations for past injustices against 
an ethnic or racial minority, a head of state may acknowledge to (the descendants of) 
those who suffered under unjust practices the damaging nature of past policies and laws 
that permitted the oppression of the minority.  In offering an apology, I may acknowledge 
to the person I wronged that I wronged her.  Still the same, in the act of acknowledging X 
to the intended recipient, we necessarily acknowledge X to ourselves.  To not do so is to 
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use language unintelligibly.  The acknowledgement must be transparent to the 
acknowledger herself and to the intended recipient.   
 When the veridicality, the authenticity, and the transparency conditions are 
satisfied, a happy side-consequence or by-product is that the acknowledgement validates 
what the intended recipient of the acknowledgement (often) already knows.69  To validate 
knowledge is to confirm what is known in such a way as to authenticate its verisimilitude 
by corroborating one independently arrived-at account with another independently 
arrived-at one.  Both the acknowledger and the intended recipient of the 
acknowledgement have their own independently arrived-at accounts.  Even if both parties 
were present at the same event that the one offering the acknowledgement recounts, one 
account may focus more on some features of the event while neglecting other details.  
When the relevant features of each account match up with one another in a way that 
satisfies the intended recipient, we say that the acknowledgement validates what the 
intended recipient of the acknowledgement already knows.70  This matching process need 
not occur in any explicit manner; no formal checking of each claim in each respective 
account need be transacted.  In fact, the intended recipient of the acknowledgement may 
choose to not share her account with the acknowledger.   
If the acknowledger’s account is satisfactory to the intended recipient, then the 
latter will, in some way, make this known to the acknowledger.  The intended recipient’s 
judgment of the success or failure of the acknowledgement to corroborate with their own 
account will often be communicated in the ritual within which the acknowledgement is 
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validate what the third party already knows. 
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recipient of the acknowledgment.  But it may be the case that the intended recipient has her facts wrong.  In 
this case, the acknowledger must “set the record straight” by establishing the facts as they actually stand.   
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couched.  If, for example, the acknowledgement is part of an incriminating confession, 
then the intended recipient of the acknowledgement may mete out a suitable punishment, 
provided that she has the power and authority to do so, and provided that she finds the 
acknowledgement to corroborate with her own account of the infraction.  If the 
acknowledgement is part of a declaration of reparations by a head of state, then the 
intended recipients of the acknowledgement may apply for the compensation, 
opportunity, or other form of apportionment generated by the reparation.  If the 
acknowledgement is part of an apology, then the intended recipient of the 
acknowledgement may choose to forgive the person.  However, if the acknowledger’s 
account is not sufficiently similar in substance to the intended recipient’s account, then 
the ritual that provides the context for the acknowledgement may be radically altered, left 
incomplete, or even compromised.  If the confession fails to acknowledge all the relevant 
facts or the degree to which the acknowledger is to blame for the wrongdoing, then the 
intended recipient may decide to deliver a more severe punishment than she would have 
had the confessor offered a more robust acknowledgement.  If in the declaration of 
reparations the head of state glosses over the wrongs that the intended recipients 
passionately feel are the most egregious harms done to them or their ancestors, then they 
may collectively reject the compensation or opportunities generated made available by 
the reparation.  If the person apologizing inadequately acknowledges her full 
responsibility for the wrongdoing, then the intended recipient may refuse to forgive, thus 
making infelicitous the apology.   
Some of the reasons why acknowledgements fail include incompleteness, lack of 
accuracy, and insincerity.  In thinking about the consequences of this failure, the reason 
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why some of our beliefs need to be authenticated at all comes more clearly into focus.  
The verisimilitude of (some of) what we know needs to be authenticated for the purpose 
of satisfying whatever practice within which an acknowledgement is situated.  
Acknowledgement is always connected to a practice or ritual that is performed for a 
certain reason.  I have identified three such practices – confession, declaration of 
reparations, and apology – though there are many others.  As I have argued, when the 
acknowledgement fails, the practice or ritual may be radically altered, left incomplete, or 
compromised, depending on the practice at hand.  And insofar as we value these practices 
or rituals for the various sorts of meaning they generate, we will care about how 
acknowledgement is constitutive of these practices. 
 
2.2 The Moral Emotions: The Affective Dimension of Apology71 
Clearly, there is an affective component to moral apologies.  An apology is 
neither entirely motivated nor fully constituted by the sheer recognition of the wrong.  
Following the standard Humean view of human psychology, I maintain that the facts 
themselves - or any representations thereof, including acknowledgement - do not generate 
motivation for action.  Rather, guilt, shame, remorse or what we shall call categorical 
regret must be found in the heart of the one who apologizes.  These four emotions 
constitute what are often termed the moral emotions.72  The emotions frame the world for 
                                                 
71 In examining acknowledgement first and the moral emotions second, I am not implying that 
acknowledgement is chronologically prior to the work that guilt, shame, remorse and what we shall call 
categorical regret do in an apology.  Nor am I suggesting that acknowledgment has any direct causal 
relationship with the moral emotions.  Nor do I claim that acknowledgement and the moral emotions are 
not causally connected in some way.  As I see it, my analysis of apology can proceed without resolving this 
issue.  Rather, I maintain that acknowledgment works in tandem with the moral emotions; the choice in the 
order of the analysis reflects nothing more than a writer’s prerogative.   
72 In On the Emotions, Richard Wollheim notes that it is conventional to call shame, guilt, remorse, and 
regret the moral emotions.  I follow this convention.  See Wollheim, On the Emotions, p. 148.   
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us, and focus our attention on certain aspects of experience.  As Richard Wollheim puts 
it, the “role of the moral emotions, as of the non-moral emotions, is to provide the person 
with an attitude, or orientation.  What is distinctive about the moral emotions is that the 
attitude is reflexive.  It is an attitude that the person, specifically and of necessity, has 
toward himself: himself as a person.”73   The moral emotions guide the wrongdoer to 
offer an apology, prompting her to admit, in the presence of the wronged, that she was at 
fault and that she wishes to do what she can, with the permission of the wronged, to 
repair the wrong.  And yet, the moral emotions are incapable of doing their work unless 
an acknowledgment of the wrongdoing by the agent who brought the wrong about is 
forthcoming.   
Bach and Harnish claim to have identified the salient emotion behind any 
apology.  According to the Bach-Harnish account of apology that we examined in the 
first chapter, the wrongdoer (or, in their terminology, the speaker) expresses either regret 
for having done something regrettable to the wronged party or the intention that the 
utterance satisfy the social expectation that one expresses regret to said party.  However, 
the disjunction does not recognize the distinction between moral apologies and quotidian 
apologies.  Given the stark differences between moral apologies and quotidian ones, it 
seems unlikely to find an emotion common to both that drives our apology-making. 
Keeping the moral/quotidian distinction in mind, we may try to clear-up the 
confusion that the Bach-Harnish account generates by identifying the correct disjunct 
with the appropriate apology.  Since the first disjunct concerns regret, it seems correct to 
identify it with a moral apology.  But this is not always the case.  As I will show, there 
are a number of different forms of regret, and not all of them can motivate a moral 
                                                 
73 Wollheim, p. 149.   
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apology.  Both the first and the second disjunct rightly refer to the more common 
intentions involved in quotidian apologies.  Quotidian apologies are used to meet the 
demands of etiquette – what I take it Bach and Harnish mean (or should mean) by “social 
expectation” - not the demands of morality.  In some quotidian apologies, the regret will 
be genuine.  In other quotidian apologies, the regret will be feigned and manipulated as a 
means to the end of the satisfaction of social expectation.74 
 To experience regret is, minimally, to be disappointed.  But regretting can mean 
many things.  As Nick Smith observes,  
[s]everal of these meanings can be consistent with an outright refusal to 
apologize.  Whereas regret typically expresses a sentiment that I wish things 
could be otherwise, this does not necessarily entail that I believe that I have done 
anything wrong.  I might regret, for instance, that you have taken offense at my 
refusal to convert to your religion.  Or I might find my host’s dismay of my 
breach of etiquette regrettable.  In these cases I regret the acts of others, rather 
than my own, because I believe the fault lies with them.  I might also regret a state 
of affairs without being able to attribute blame to anyone, such as the regret I 
might experience in response to the suffering caused by a natural disaster… 
Likewise, a patient may find it regrettable that others cannot afford an expensive 
life-saving surgery while she can, but this does not necessarily indicate that she 
regrets her choice to exercise her advantage.75 
 
Clearly, we need to distinguish the forms of regret that cannot motivate a moral apology 
from the ones that can.  Smith identifies what he terms categorical regret with the latter.  
For Smith, categorical regret refers to “an offender’s recognition that her actions, which 
caused the harm at issue, constitute a moral failure.  In this sense, an offender wishes that 
the transgression could be undone.”76  Smith goes on to emphasize that as it relates to 
                                                 
74 The quotidian apology bears only a superficial similarity to a moral apology.  Some of the same words – 
“I’m sorry for X” – are used in both forms.  On the basis of this superficial similarity, we may misinterpret 
a quotidian apology for a moral one, and vice versa.  Or we ourselves may finagle a quotidian apology to 
do the work of a moral apology, thereby (wrongly) relieving ourselves of our moral responsibility to, at the 
very least, emotionally comport ourselves appropriately.  Awareness of the different demandingness of 
moral and quotidian apologies serves to keep us, and others, honest. 
75 Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies, pp. 67-68.   
76 Smith, p. 68.   
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apologizing, categorical regret refers specifically to the acknowledgement of “a mistake 
rather than an expression of sorrow over a missed opportunity.”77  Only if I believe that I 
made the morally wrong choice, and not just one that led to an inconvenient outcome, can 
I express categorical regret.  Smith exhorts that unless I believe that I “should have 
chosen otherwise, … sorrow over the recognition of what was lost rather than categorical 
regret best captures my sentiment.  [Therewith], I cannot apologize fully if I would again 
make the same choice however difficult or tragic it may be.”78  As regards the satisfaction 
of the affective component of moral apologies, expressions of sympathy or 
disappointment are not sufficient. 
 Beyond categorical regret, the other moral emotions that must be considered for 
their contributions to the moral apology are remorse, guilt and shame.  I treat each in 
turn.  I view remorse as an emotional response to great harm that the agent herself 
caused.  We would expect that the lamentations of a penitent who admits that she played 
a role in causing an atrocity echo the remorse that gnaws at her from the inside.  Remorse 
has been classified as a form of deep regret in the OED.  However, I tend to think that 
this underestimates the phenomenological quality of remorse.  In my estimation, 
Raimond Gaita provides some of the most poignant and telling descriptions of remorse in 
the philosophical literature. 
Those who, in remorse, suffer in guilty recognition of what they have become are 
radically singular, and for that reason remorse is a kind of dying to the world.  
The ‘world’ in this sense is a common world, and its kind of commonness is 
marked by the ‘we’ of fellowship.  I call genuine remorse a kind of dying to the 
world because it is the discovery of a dimension of ourselves that cannot enter 
into common and consoling fellowship with others.79 
 
                                                 
77 Smith, p. 69.   
78 Smith, p. 69.   
79 Raimond Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, Second Edition, pp. 48-49.   
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If it is, in fact, a deep form of regret, remorse is qualitatively so unlike regret that 
it deserves its own category.  Both in its intensity and in its success in occupying the 
space of our emotions for long periods of time when we experience it, remorse has the 
ability to utterly transform – even ruin – its host.  Those who (properly) experience 
categorical regret are not morally responsible for having caused great harm, while those 
who (properly) feel remorse are.  The emotional trigger that ought to activate remorse is 
the recognition in the agent of the great harm she has brought about.  Those who feel 
categorical regret may yet enjoy what Gaita calls the ‘we’ of fellowship, while the 
remorseful person cannot.80  In locating the place of remorse on the moral spectrum, 
Gaita claims that remorse is an awakened sense of the “reality of another through the 
shock of wronging her, just as grief is a recognition of the reality of another through the 
shock of losing her.”81  While categorical regret need not be accompanied by this 
existential realization, remorse is defined by it. 
 As with categorical regret, those who truly experience remorse would not perform 
the same action again had they the chance.  For this reason, apology is consistent with 
and often a favored means of expunging the psychological pain constitutive of categorical 
regret and remorse.  The same is true of guilt.  Like categorical regret and remorse, guilt 
is part of the motivational apparatus that moves us to do what we can to right a wrong.  In 
fact, any one of the four moral emotions, by themselves, can serve as a necessary 
condition for the motivation of an apology.  While any one of the four moral emotions 
                                                 
80 Gaita explains the ‘we’ of fellowship as follows: “The capacity to say ‘we’ – we mortals, we who have 
suffered together – not merely enumeratively but in fellowship, consoles.  ‘We of this family’, ‘we of this 
nation’, ‘we who have been left behind’ when said at a funeral, are examples of the ‘we’ of fellowship… 
[When we cooperatively participate in horrendous evil acts with others] there can be only corrupt 
consolation in the knowledge that others are guilty as we are.”  Gaita, p. 48. 
81 Gaita, p. 52.   
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may independently satisfy this necessary condition, phenomenologically, the moral 
emotions usually come in clusters.  For the non-psychopath, knowing that I have done 
something morally wrong should make me feel categorical regret, guilt (if causally 
responsible), and shame (if culpable).  If I know that I have done something horrendously 
wrong, I ought to also feel remorse.  As we shall see, an apology couples an expression of 
this knowledge (in the form of an acknowledgement) with at least one of these emotions.                  
 In analyzing guilt, we need to distinguish between being guilty and feeling guilty.  
One may be guilty without feeling guilty, and vice versa.  When we say that a person is 
guilty, we often appeal to a legal concept.  Here, guilt is established by an objective 
determination of the violation of a law.  However, we need not maintain that the law in 
question enjoys the kind of standing that any functioning judicial system provides.  In 
fact, I may fashion for myself various laws that pertain to my own behavior, laws that, for 
instance, require that I not watch movies until the weekend, or that I consume no more 
than X calories per day.  The laws that I fashion for myself (and myself alone), under 
which I pronounce myself guilty upon their violation, derive their force from a 
commitment I make to myself, rather than from a contract that holds between me and the 
state.              
In being found guilty, the person so deemed may not feel guilty, for she may 
believe that the law is cruel or misapplied.  To feel guilty – insofar as such a feeling is a 
fitting affective response to an objective determination of the violation of a law – the 
person must, Gabriele Taylor argues,  
accept not only that he has done something which is forbidden, he must accept 
also that it is forbidden, and thereby accept the authority of whoever or whatever 
forbids it.  The person who accepts the authority does not merely recognize its 
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power and so thinks it simply prudent to obey its commands; he also accepts its 
verdicts as correct and binding.82  
 
Only if nothing was forbidden – or, at least, only if agents failed to accept the purported 
authority of those who claim to forbid certain classes of actions – would we find 
ourselves free from the possibility of experiencing guilt.      
Martha Nussbaum defines the feeling of guilt as a “type of self-punishing anger, 
reacting to the perception that one has done a wrong or a harm.”83  In having done 
something wrong, my feeling guilty should be seen as evidence of my endorsement of 
norms that forbid the very action that I have performed.  When we feel guilty, we 
criticize our own actions or our own failure to act; we censure having transgressed a set 
of injunctions.  But since the same can be said of our experience of remorse and 
categorical regret, this observation fails to meaningfully identify the psychology specific 
to guilt.  Any analysis of the psychology specific to guilt ought to take into account, to 
some degree, what it is (like) to feel guilty.  A phenomenology of guilt is needed. 
Taylor proposes a phenomenology of guilt that I find to be consistent with 
Nussbaum’s definition of it as a type of self-punishing anger.  Taylor’s phenomenology is 
grounded in an understanding of the psychological pain that one’s guilty feelings cause.  
This psychological pain prompts those who suffer from it to take measures to expunge it 
from their psyche.   
The important feature of guilt is that the thought of the guilty concentrates on 
herself as the doer of the deed.  Having brought about what is forbidden she has 
harmed herself.  She has put herself in a position where repayment from her is 
due…    That, in the agent’s view, reparation is required is due to her conception 
of herself as disfigured and the consequent need to do something about it.  The 
greater the supposed disfigurement, the greater, of course, such a need – and the 
                                                 
82 Gabrielle Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, p. 85.   
83 Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, p. 207.      
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more unlikely, perhaps, that the agent should think adequate payment is possible.  
Hence the self-torments the guilty sometimes let themselves in for.84   
 
Allow me to put Taylor and Nussbaum in conversation.  In perceiving that I have 
wronged or harmed a person (or even an institution), I have, consequently, harmed 
myself, insofar as I feel guilt as a self-punishing emotional response to the harm or wrong 
I’ve caused.  When operating correctly, guilt is something akin to a norm-sensitive 
barometer, alerting us to a wrong we have committed.  The emotional mechanism which 
sounds the alert often turns into a persistent dull throb which refuses to let up, lest we do 
what we can to repair what we have broken in doing the wrongful act.  Our own anger, 
self-directed, is impossible to ignore.   
When we feel guilty, we feel guilty for either moral or non-moral reasons, or 
both.  That we may feel guilty for violating moral as well as non-moral norms is due to 
the heterogeneity of the concept of guilt.  In feeling guilt, nothing about the norms 
endorsed - which, in forbidding the action performed, generate guilt - need be moral 
norms.  Guilt, as with regret, comes in two guises: there is a moral form and a non-moral 
form of the emotion.  It is a mistake, then, to treat all forms of guilt as if they were 
cognate moral expressions.  Only what I term moral guilt, wherein one feels guilty for 
transgressing a moral norm, is the genuine moral emotion.  When it is appropriate that 
guilt be felt by the apologizer in offering a genuine moral apology, the guilt felt must be 
moral guilt.      
    Consider the following argument, offered by Herbert Morris.  As I read it, 
Morris’ argument shows that the non-moral form of guilt fails to satisfy the necessary 
emotional element of an apology.   
                                                 
84 Taylor, pp. 97-98.   
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A person who feels guilty may not be disposed to say, “I’m sorry” or “Forgive 
me;” he may not feel sorry about what he did.  And he may not be prepared to 
disavow his act and commit himself to not doing it again.  He may be neither 
contrite nor repentant.  A person feeling guilty might suffer and also take 
satisfaction in doing what he did.  There might be pride over what was done.  We 
need only think of the young boy who disobeys his father and who, while feeling 
guilty, also looks upon himself with more respect.  He feels guilty but prefers 
being damned to renouncing his act.85 
  
Notice that in substituting “feels categorical regret” or “feels remorse” for “feels guilty” 
in the first sentence of the Morris excerpt, we invite conceptual confusion.  One cannot 
take satisfaction in performing an action that leads one to experience remorse or 
categorical regret for said action.  Those who feel remorse or categorical regret must, by 
definition, feel sorry for what they have done.  The same, I think, is true of moral guilt.   
I have one final observation about guilt writ large.  Since guilt is a type of self-
punishing anger, the guilty torment themselves in feeling guilt.  Feeling guilty logically 
entails that one be angry at oneself86, even though the object of guilt is the wrongful act 
and not the self.  Though the guilty torment themselves, the self is not the object of guilt 
any more than the self is the object of remorse or categorical regret.  In guilt, as with 
remorse and categorical regret, one’s wrong action is the object of the emotion.87 
In virtue of their having an object, guilt and all of the other (moral) emotions 
exhibit intensionality.  Not all inner, private experience is intensional; pain, for instance, 
does not have an intensional object.88  The sense of “object” that I here employ “derives 
from the grammatical notion of the object of a transitive verb.  The object of fear is what 
                                                 
85 Herbert Morris, “Guilt and Suffering,” p. 432.   
86 I submit that the boy in Morris’ example must be angry at himself to some degree, even though he takes 
pride in having disobeyed his father.  The emotional complexity of our mental life, I think, allows for the 
possibility of feeling anger toward oneself and feeling proud for having flouted a rule.  The self is no 
stranger to being sometimes conflicted.   
87 Of course, the self is the object of the anger we feel in guilt.  But that we feel anger towards ourselves at 
all is necessitated by guilt.  Since guilt is what drives our anger, the self-as-object is subordinate to the act-
as-object.  
88 See Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion, and Will, p. 6.   
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is feared, the object of love is what is loved… [E]ach of the emotions is appropriate – 
logically, and not just morally appropriate – only to certain restricted objects.”89  So, in 
feeling guilty, I feel guilty for doing (or not doing) X, where X is the intensional object of 
my guilt.   
But an inquiry into the intensionality of the moral emotions can offer us more 
than just a taxonomy of the various relations between the emotions and their objects.  
Ideally, such an inquiry should explain how each of the emotions entails a specific, 
defined set of evaluations of the permissibility (or impermissibility) of the actions to 
which the emotions are a response and with which they are compatible.  Feeling non-
moral guilt for doing X (where non-moral guilt is the emotion) and, simultaneously, 
taking satisfaction in doing X (where being satisfied is an evaluation of the permissibility 
of the action) are compatible with each other.  This, I think, is what Morris’ argument 
establishes.  But feeling moral guilt for doing X and, simultaneously, taking satisfaction 
in doing X are incompatible.  Likewise, feeling remorse or categorical regret for doing X 
and, simultaneously, taking satisfaction in doing X are incompatible. 
Categorical regret and remorse share a similar structure, intensionally, with 
feeling guilty.  In guilt, remorse, and categorical regret, the intensional object is a wrong 
action that the agent herself has performed.  That is, the guilty, remorseful and regretful 
don’t torment themselves for who they are, but for what they have done.  Shame, though, 
is different.  In being ashamed, I feel shame for being (or not being) a certain kind of self, 
where my own self is the intensional object of my shame.  Those who feel shame criticize 
themselves for the kind of person they have become.  While the intensional object of guilt 
                                                 
89 Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion, and Will, pp. 187-88 and 192.  Emphasis not mine.   
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is the action that the guilt-experiencing agent has herself performed, the intensional 
object of shame is the self who has performed the repugnant action.   
When we feel shame, we feel awful.  More specifically, we feel awful about who 
we are or what we have become.  In short, shame causes us to feel awful about ourselves.  
Shame is a self-directed negative emotion.  Shame internalizes the critical normative 
assessments that others make – and might make - of us, such that the self morally 
evaluates itself, vis-à-vis its shortcomings, using the judgments – actual and possible - of 
others – real and imagined - as its guide.   
The literature on the psychology of shame is quite heterogeneous.  One popular 
account of the psychology of shame is offered by Sartre in Being and Nothingness.  
Gabriele Taylor succinctly summarizes this view.  
[Imagine that] a man makes a vulgar gesture.  He then realizes he is being 
observed.  This realization makes him look at what he is doing from the 
observer’s eyes.  Seeing it from that point of view he realizes that what he is 
doing is vulgar, and he feels shame.  Here we have an observer who, the agent 
realizes, watches him and judges his actions adversely.  The agent accepts the 
judgement and thereby accepts the standard or values involved.  So he realizes 
that he… [has performed] a vulgar action, and this degrades him in his own eyes.  
The crucial point is that only by seeing what he is doing through the other’s eyes 
does he recognize the nature of his action, and so it is crucial, it seems, that there 
be some other through whose eyes he can look at his action.90 
 
Sartre’s account, though popular, is mistaken, I think.  Shame does not necessarily hinge 
on the immediate gaze of the other.  Also critical of the Sartrean view is Bernard 
Williams.  In Shame and Necessity, Williams takes aim at the purported power of the 
other’s gaze, and in so doing, foreshadows part of the view that I advance.  Williams 
argues that it is a  
silly mistake… to suppose that the reactions of shame depend simply on being 
found out, that the feeling behind every decision or thought that is governed by 
                                                 
90 Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, p. 57-58   
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shame is literally and immediately the fear of being seen.  If everything depended 
on the fear of discovery, the motivations of shame would not be internalized at all.  
Even if shame and its motivations always involve in some way or other an idea of 
the gaze of another, it is important that for many of its operations the imagined 
gaze of an imagined other will do.  Sartre describes a man who is looking through 
a keyhole and suddenly realizes that he is being watched.  He might think that it 
was shameful to do it, not just to be seen doing it, and in that case, an imagined 
watcher could be enough to trigger the reactions of shame.91     
 
For Williams, we may feel shame when we are unobserved or even when alone, provided 
that we imagine that others would hold us in judgment.  In what follows, I use Williams’ 
account as a springboard for the argument that for imagination to have the power to 
produce shame, the imagined others92 must be those with whom we share values, and the 
imagined judgment must be negative, and be negative for our having violated a value we 
share with the imagined others.   
Shame is an unambiguously social emotion.  If my self-criticism is 
idiosyncratically my own and is not shared with others, then it cannot produce shame.   
As Robert C. Solomon points out, shame “involves the sense of seriously failing those 
around you, violating their norms, falling short of their expectations, letting them 
down.”93  If we exclusively concentrate on the sociality of shame, though, our 
understanding of it will be distorted.  Moving away from an account that emphasizes its 
sociality, Solomon argues that while shame 
is derived from one’s social relations, it is for the most part self-imposed.  Shame 
might be imposed on a person, by way of public criticism or through the rituals of 
shaming and shunning, but what is imposed is the need for the person to take 
upon him or herself the blame for having done wrong.  Because it is self-imposed, 
it is by its very nature taken to heart.  One can to a considerable extent shrug off 
                                                 
91 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity, p. 81-82.   
92 By “imagined others” I do not mean fictitious persons from fairy tales.  Instead, an imagined other should 
be someone, living or dead, who plays or has played an important role in our life and who we know or 
knew, and who shared with us a sense of the moral significance of the value that we have violated.    
93 Robert C. Solomon, True to Our Feelings: What Our Emotions are Really Telling Us, p. 95.   
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other people’s criticism and even their contempt, but one cannot shrug off one’s 
own.94   
 
Solomon’s account complements Williams’ view.  But even in combining them, the 
amalgamated account would be incomplete.  Understanding shame requires that we 
provide an account of what is self-imposed, and neither Solomon nor Williams fully 
explicate this.   
I propose the following claim to complete the analysis.  Call it the Disjunctive 
Shame argument.  For my criticism of myself to cause me to feel shame, either my own 
criticism must mirror the actual criticisms that others, whose moral standards I share, 
have of me as a violator of these shared standards, or my own criticism must mirror the 
criticisms that others, whose moral standards I share, would have of me as a violator of 
these shared standards, if only they knew the circumstances of my moral failure.95  In the 
first disjunct, knowledge of my moral failure is more-or-less public; in the second 
disjunct, this knowledge is held in private, known only by me.  The first disjunct forms a 
common-sense view of what is self-imposed in shame.  The second disjunct, though it 
has not made an established place for itself in our intuitions, is just as essential as the 
first.  My violation of the norms of those whose assessments of me matter to me may, in 
fact, remain unknown to everyone but me.  Likewise, my having fallen short of the 
expectations of those whose expectations of me matter to me may remain hidden.  I may 
nonetheless feel shame for having violated the norms or for having fallen short of the 
                                                 
94 Solomon, p. 96.   
95 I offer two clarifications.  First, the “others” referred to in the second disjunct may be interpreted as 
“imagined others.”  Second, the disjunction and its ensuing analysis explains why, in introducing shame, I 
submitted the following claim, which I reproduce here in full.  I italicize the parts of the claim which echo 
the relevant part of the second disjunct: “Shame internalizes the critical normative assessments that others 
make – and might make - of us, such that the self morally evaluates itself, vis-à-vis its shortcomings, using 
the judgments – actual and possible - of others – real and imagined - as its guide.” 
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expectations.  So long as I imagine that others, whose moral standards I share, would 
criticize me for my moral shortcomings were they to have knowledge of them, I ought to 
feel shame for my moral shortcomings.96         
This observation makes sense of the moral force behind the familiar censure: 
“You ought to be ashamed of yourself!”  But rather than conjuring the image of a scolded 
child, hand caught in the proverbial cookie jar, imagine a married couple having a marital 
crisis.  Let’s call them Dan and Jan.  Dan has just learned from a trusted source that Jan is 
having an extramarital affair.  Upon hearing the news, Dan is terribly upset, is 
emotionally wounded, and feels betrayed.  Dan confronts Jan; among the many things he 
tells her is that she should be ashamed of herself.  Presumably, Dan does not mean that 
Jan ought to feel ashamed only because he, Dan, now knows about her infidelity.  Dan is 
                                                 
96 Williams’ observations cannot be enlisted to support the Disjunctive Shame argument, as his conception 
of the imagined other allows that he be nothing but the product of my imagination.  I present Williams’ 
argument in full.  Williams argues that 
 
the other need not be a particular individual or… merely the representative of some socially 
identified group.  The other may be identified in ethical terms.  He... is conceived as one whose 
reactions I would respect; equally, he is conceived as someone who would respect those same 
reactions if they were appropriately directed to him. 
 
But if the other is identified in ethical terms, is he any longer playing any real role in these mental 
processes?  Has he any independent part in my psychology if he is construed out of my own local 
materials?  If he is imagined to react simply in terms of what I think is the right thing to do, surely 
he must cancel out: he is not an other at all. 
 
It is a mistake to take that reductive step and to suppose that there are only two options: that the 
other in ethical thought must be an identifiable individual or a representative of the neighbours, on 
the one hand, or else be nothing at all except an echo chamber for my solitary moral voice.  Those 
alternatives leave out much of the substance of actual ethical life.  The internalized other is indeed 
abstracted and generalized and idealized, but he is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and 
somebody other than me.  He can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live 
if I act in one way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my relations to 
the world about me. (Williams, p. 84). 
 
Williams’ account is provocative but, I think, inadequate.  I am incredulous about the wholly imagined 
other – Williams’ other – being able to provoke in us shame, for how can shame operate unless there is 
something really shared?  Moreover, to claim that the two options, to which Williams refers in his third 
paragraph, “leaves out much of the substance of actual ethical life” sounds a bit like a promissory note that 
has been unfulfilled.  And what exactly does it mean to say that the wholly imagined other is “potentially 
somebody?”  In these passages, Williams leaves us with more questions than answers.   
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not suggesting that were it not to have come to light that Jan had an affair that Jan not 
feel ashamed.  Rather, Dan means that since Jan shares with Dan the same moral 
standards about faithfulness in marriage, Jan ought to feel shame as a consequence of her 
failure to maintain the very moral standards that they both endorse.  Moreover – and this 
is the crucial part - I take it that Dan intends that this feeling of shame ought to have 
washed over her at the inception of her infidelity, and not merely at the moment that she 
knew of her infidelity’s disclosure to him.  In short, Dan means that Jan ought to have 
internalized the moral standard of faithfulness in marriage in such a way that, in violating 
the standard, she would (at least) suffer the pain of shame as a consequence.97   
Shame comes in degrees.  In those circumstances where it is appropriate to feel 
shame, one ought not to feel too little or too much shame.  Feeling too little shame fails to 
sufficiently motivate the agent to right the shame-inducing wrong she committed.  
Feeling too much shame morally incapacitates the agent.  Because shame is concerned 
with reputation, honor and public esteem, shame may create, at least in those who suffer 
it in bouts, a preoccupation with the self and its status.  Sometimes this preoccupation 
becomes near-obsessive; in some cases, it becomes a full-blown obsession.  Call shame 
which culminates in an obsession with the self and its status obsessive shame.  Obsessive 
shame is unable to motivate a moral apology. 
As I will argue, a moral apology is a form of moral repair, the task of which is to 
restore, stabilize, or create the basic elements that sustain human beings in recognizably 
moral relationship.  Obsessive shame’s preoccupation with the self prohibits the self from 
                                                 
97 It is precisely because of the internalization of moral standards that criminals sometimes turn themselves 
in to the law, or make it easy for law enforcement to catch them, even when they could have thoroughly 
covered their tracks.  Shame, more than guilt, drives these criminals to behave in ways that, from the third-
person perspective, appear to be rationally self-defeating.   
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developing a sensitivity to how its actions have genuinely harmed someone else.  This 
sensitivity is thwarted because obsessive shame makes those who suffer it egoistic and 
massively self-centered; for the shame-obsessed, one’s own self is the locus mundi. 
Obsessive shame prevents the ashamed from responding to the concerns of others in a 
moral way.  A moral action proper cannot be driven by a massively self-centered, egoistic 
disposition, as those with such dispositions do not have the requisite concern for others 
that is constitutive of moral action.  So, when the shame-obsessed offer an apology or 
undertake some other form of moral repair, they tend to treat the person through whom 
the attempted repair is facilitated as a mere means to the end of overcoming shame and its 
concomitant pain.  In such situations, while the formal element of the apology may be 
satisfied, the appropriate emotional component is neglected.        
In non-obsessive shame, our shame is overcome by the act of forgiveness, 
provided that a satisfactory apology precedes the forgiving.  When we are granted 
forgiveness, any shame we might have felt as associated with the wrongdoing we 
committed ought to begin to dissipate, to wane, to loosen its grip on us.  We may not 
overcome our shame immediately; our psychology doesn’t typically work that way.  But 
we may overcome our shame – gradually, over time - in having our apology accepted in 
the act of forgiveness.  But the point to be stressed here is that the overcoming of shame, 
the first steps of which are taken when we offer a moral apology, is a side-consequence 
or by-product of our being forgiven, and therefore not the goal or end of the apology.  
This is what those who suffer obsessive shame do not understand: that the telos of the 
apology is to repair what we have broken.    
65 
 
Let’s take stock.  In sum, I have argued that the affective component to moral 
apologies has a motivational function.  The moral emotions constitute the engine that 
drives the action of apology.  The moral emotions are not “mere feelings;” rather, they 
provide for us an orientation by means of which we see how our actions may fit with the 
world.  I have offered a modest psychological profile of each of the four moral emotions, 
arguing that any one of them - categorical regret, remorse, guilt or shame – satisfies a 
necessary condition needed to transact an apology.   
In our account of the necessary conditions of a genuine moral apology, we have 
one remaining necessary condition to examine: the attitudinal component.  It is to this 
that I now turn. 
 
2.3 Humility: The Attitudinal Dimension of Apology 
 We expect those who offer us an apology to demonstrate in word and deed an 
appropriate degree of humility in acknowledging the wrong they did to us.  Humility is 
not an emotion and cannot be reduced to one.  I treat humility as one of the virtues, as a 
character trait that, at least in certain circumstances, makes one modest, reverential and 
lacking in offensive pride.  Humility conveys and is constitutive of a certain manner or 
demeanor wherein one is humble and reserved.  In short, humility constitutes an attitude.  
In what follows, I will analyze the concept of humility and explain why humility, in 
being recruited in the service of an apology, must not give way to servility.  I also 
examine the notion of the restoration of moral stature, which is one of the prime goals of 
the apology ritual.     
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 I begin with an observation about the importance of humility in apology.  When it 
is said that someone is “very apologetic” or “not very apologetic” or something in 
between, it should give us pause.  Contra what these casual remarks imply, apologies are 
either successful or unsuccessful; they do not admit of degrees.  But humility does.  
When it is said that someone is “very apologetic,” we are, I think, using shorthand to 
express that the apologizer was humble and sincere, and that we appreciate both of these 
qualities in the apology offered us.  If our language about apologies ought to be 
interpreted this way, then an examination of the role that humility plays in apology is in 
order.  
Like the moral emotions, humility provides us with an attitude.  Unlike the moral 
emotions, though, the attitude that humility provides is not reflexive.  Humility is not 
self-directed, but other-directed.  In his analysis of the attitudinal component of a genuine 
apology, Luc Bovens claims that there are three aspects to the attitude of humility, each 
of which exhibits the other-directedness of humility.  
First, I may metaphorically or literally bow my head as an expression of the 
shame of my having done wrong.  Second, in bowing my head, I attribute special 
respect to you and thereby try to make up for the deficit of respect with which I 
treated you through my wrongdoing.  Third, in bowing my head, I relinquish 
power to you in that I let you be in charge of restoring my moral stature.98     
 
Bovens need not restrict the bowing of the head to an expression of shame; the 
expressions of guilt, remorse and categorical regret are also suitable candidates.  
Regardless, in expressing my feeling of shame (or guilt, etc.) in the literal act of bowing 
my head, I communicate to the one I have offended the authenticity of the emotion.  So, 
while humility is not reducible to an emotion, it often serves as a vehicle for the 
expression of the moral emotions in an apology. 
                                                 
98 Luc Bovens, “Apologies,” p. 231.   
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 Though it is not altogether clear what it means to metaphorically bow one’s head, 
the notion is not unintelligible.  I take it that Bovens means a certain earnestness, perhaps 
expressed in tone of voice as much as in posture, that is indicative of the offender’s 
willingness to do what she can to repair what she has broken.  Such willingness may take 
the form of attributing special respect to the person wronged or harmed; it may also 
reveal itself in petitioning the offended party to grant the offender forgiveness, thereby 
restoring what Bovens calls the offender’s “moral stature.”  Bowing the head, whether 
metaphorical or literal, is important in an apology, as it lets the offended party know that 
the offender takes the grievance she caused seriously.  Because the affective states that 
the (moral) emotions cause are private and therefore not immediately known by anyone 
other than the individual experiencing them, humility becomes the public means by 
which others assess the claims the apologetic offender makes about the moral emotions 
she experiences.  In witnessing the humble apologetic offender before her, the would-be 
forgiver might reason that only a true penitent – one who feels the right amount of guilt, 
shame, remorse or categorical regret for the harm or wrong they caused – would bow her 
head to her in just this way. 
 Bovens’ notion of (the restoration of) moral stature also requires examination.  In 
claiming that each of us enjoys a certain moral stature, Bovens means that each of us 
have certain claims to respect.  Bovens’ analysis, which relies on a modest Kantian 
framework, is straightforward.  He argues that 
people are owed respect as members of a community of moral equals.  The 
offender violates this respect.  He treats the victim with less respect than is due 
her.  To view oneself as a member of a community of moral equals is to view 
oneself as someone to whom respect is owed and who owes respect to others.  
Now in treating the victim with less respect than is due to her, the offender acts as 
a person who places himself outside of the community of equals.  He thereby 
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incurs a loss of moral stature – he foregoes certain claims to respect.  The 
offender turns to the victim and asks her to restore his moral stature, to accept him 
again as a full member in the community of moral equals so as to regain all claims 
to respect.  [In asking to be forgiven, the offender] offers the victim the power of 
being the judge over his moral stature and thereby restores the balance of respect 
between victim and offender.99   
 
I take it that this analysis resonates with many of our intuitions about what constitutes a 
community of moral equals.  It also presents what I see as one of the prime goals of the 
apology ritual, namely the restoration of the offender’s moral stature in and through 
forgiveness.   
Bovens is right, I think, to note that the offender forgoes at least some of his 
claims to respect in harming or wronging the victim.  It is difficult, though, to discern just 
which claims the offender has reasonably forsworn, even when the context is 
unambiguous.  But it is clear that the claims the offender forgoes must be adjusted to the 
severity of the harm or wrong she committed.  Bovens suggests that these claims may 
include  
a claim to (complete) physical integrity, a claim not to be lied to, a claim not to be 
deceived, etc.  Such claims are contingent on one’s own agency and can be 
squandered.  It is with regard to these claims to respect that one can lose one’s 
moral stature.  An unredeemed offender is no longer worthy of certain types of 
respect proper to a community of moral equals.100  
 
There is, of course, no guarantee that the offender will be fully welcomed back into the 
community of moral equals even if she has been forgiven by her victim.  Forgiveness 
may restore some but perhaps not all of the offender’s moral stature.  Even though, as 
Bovens points out, the offender asks his victim to restore his moral stature, the 
community at large, to which the repentant offender yearns to return, may not entirely 
                                                 
99 Luc Bovens, “Must I be Forgiven?,” p. 230.   
100 Luc Bovens, “Must I be Forgiven?,” p. 231.   
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accept him again as a full member in the community of moral equals, even though his 
victim does.  Such are the consequences of serious wrongdoing.     
 Let us return again to humility.  If humility is a virtue, then it constitutes what 
Aristotle calls a mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency.  The extreme of 
excess of humility is servility, while the extreme of deficiency of humility is overbearing 
pride.  As with many virtues, it is not required or even preferable that humility be 
expressed at all time and in all places.  There are circumstances where other virtues will 
be called for.  All virtues are context-dependent attitudes; as the context changes, so 
ought our attitudes as well.  While humility is appropriate and even required in offering 
an apology, we ought not integrate humility into the very fabric of our character.  To be 
humble, reserved and modest in every possible situation is to fail to acquire other virtues 
that are more appropriate than humility for that context.  Being virtuous is not 
synonymous with being one-dimensional. 
 Similarly, humility must not find itself transformed into servility for the sake of 
an apology (or for the sake of anything else).  Thomas Hill argues that servility “betrays 
the absence of a certain kind of self-respect.”101  Servility undermines the restoration of 
moral stature that the offender seeks in and through forgiveness.  In other words, the very 
moral stature that the apologizer wishes to restore is not possible if the apologizer 
assumes a servile posture.  The reason this restoration is not feasible is that the servile 
person cannot treat herself as the moral equal of others.  Instead, she treats others as her 
moral superiors, discounting her own moral intuitions and moral judgments.  This 
disapprobation is a consequence of her lack of self-respect.  Failing to appreciate her own 
                                                 
101 Thomas E. Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, p. 6.   
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moral worth, the servile person cannot adequately adopt the moral point of view.  Hill 
explains the moral point of view as follows. 
Roughly, this means not only that each person ought to do what is morally 
required and refrain from what is morally wrong but also that each person should 
treat all the provisions of morality as valuable – worth preserving and prizing as 
well as obeying.  One must, so to speak, take up the spirit of morality as well as 
meet the letter of its requirements.  To keep one’s promises, avoid hurting others, 
and the like is not sufficient; one should also take an attitude of respect towards 
the principles, ideals, and goals of morality.  A respectful attitude toward a system 
of rights and duties consists of more than a disposition to conform to its definite 
rules of behavior; it also involves holding the system in esteem, being unwilling 
to ridicule it, and being reluctant to give up one’s place in it.102    
   
I take it that the inability to appreciate the idea and practice of equality in relationships, 
including one’s own place in relationships with others, entails a failure to adequately 
adopt the moral point of view.   Being unable to collaboratively reconstruct or again 
value a relationship with one’s forgiver is just one shape that moral inequality may take.  
Reconstructing and valuing once again a relationship with one’s forgiver are signs that 
one’s moral stature has been restored by one’s forgiver.  Since servility is dependent on 
moral inequality, servility is incompatible with the restoration of moral stature in an 
apology.  So, having security in one’s moral stature, whether it be recently restored or 
long maintained, assumes a basic level of self-respect.103  Ultimately, the subservient and 
the obsequious need to learn that freedom from servility (which, despite appearances, 
they really want) does not come from without, but from within.       
                                                 
102 Hill, p. 13.  Emphasis mine.   
103 There are three necessary conditions that must be satisfied in order to have one’s moral stature 
guaranteed.  The first condition is self-respect.  The second is being accepted or respected by a community 
of moral equals of which one is a member.  The third condition requires that one satisfy the demands of 
morality, whether this is understood in consequentialist, deontological, or aretaic terms.  While the first two 
conditions have already been examined to some degree, I make no attempt to justify the third.  None of 
these three conditions, individually or jointly, can be taken as a sufficient condition for the restoration of 
one’s moral stature following the loss of one’s moral stature.  If any one was or all three were sufficient for 
restoring one’s compromised moral stature, then forgiveness would be irrelevant.  It should also be noted 
that failure to have one’s moral stature restored (if, say, one is not forgiven) does not in any way 
compromise one’s ability to successfully adopt the moral point of view.    
71 
 
 In an apology, humility works in tandem with acknowledgement’s authenticity 
condition to certify that the apology is sincere.  Recall that sincerity about beliefs is the 
domain of the authenticity condition.  When we are sincere in what we acknowledge, we 
“really mean” what we say.  Likewise, when we are sincere in what we profess to feel, 
we “really are” how we feel.  Call emotional sincerity being veracious in our 
representations of how we feel.  Such representations need not be couched in language.  
There are a number of different ways in which emotional sincerity is communicated.  As 
regards apology, I submit that the most convincing way in which emotional sincerity is 
expressed is by being humble.  Here, emotional sincerity shows itself as a by-product or 
side-consequence of humility.  In and through our humility, we exhibit outward, 
recognizable signs that we really do feel guilt, shame, remorse or categorical regret for 
the harm or wrong we have done.  Humility is akin to a stage upon which our moral 
emotions are publically played.  While the theater need not have an audience – the moral 
emotions will be “on stage” regardless - if it does, those present may evaluate the 
authenticity of the emotions in and through our humility.  To exhibit these outward, 
recognizable signs is to communicate our emotional sincerity.  In an apology, the most 
meaningful expression of emotional sincerity is found when we make these signs visible 
to those we have harmed or wronged.   
 When, in an apology, our sincere acknowledgement of wrongdoing is coupled 
with a veracious representation of the relevant moral emotions we ought to feel, then the 
apology is a sincere one.  Only if we are sincere in apologizing, and make an unreserved 
commitment, manifested in our future actions, to follow-through with the various pledges 
we may make in the act of apologizing, can it be the case that we are indeed genuinely 
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apologetic.  When we sincerely apologize and, in so doing, make an unreserved 
commitment, manifested in our future actions, to follow-through with our pledges, it can 
be said that our deeds have lined up isomorphically with our words.  I argue that being 
what we say we are – being apologetic when we apologize and doing our utmost to carry 
to completion the intention to behave differently in the future in accordance with what we 
apologize for – is having our deeds share an isomorphic relation with our words.  This 
isomorphism of words and deeds resolves what I call the rectification puzzle, which I 
discussed in the previous chapter.   
 
2.4 Defining apology 
 It is important to provide a definition of apology so that we may properly 
discriminate between bogus “apologies” that masquerade as the real thing and the 
authentic act itself.  Ours is a culture awash in celebrities, politicians, CEOs and other 
high-profile figures who, after doing or saying something offensive, callous or immoral – 
and upon perceiving the necessity of “damage control” - casually reach for whichever 
pre-packaged sound bites they think will make themselves appear contrite, even when 
they often are not.  For them, by and large apologies are merely a means by which to 
manipulate others; in their eyes, apologies have no significant moral dimension.  This 
way of understanding and practicing the meaning of the apology ritual tends to 
misconstrue our sense of the protocol and the value of the apology-forgiveness exchange.  
Apologies should not be used for such shallow, self-serving purposes.   
In diagnosing the causes of the difficulties we have in discriminating satisfactory 
apologies from their bullshit cousins, Nick Smith finds that   
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[a]t least three factors cloud our ability to judge apologies: 1) we are uncertain about 
what a full apology is and lack a framework for analyzing acts of penitence; 2) we often 
consider any gesture with a family resemblance to an apology – such as the bare 
utterance of the word ‘sorry’ – to be equal to a full apology; and 3) given this confusion, 
we may accept whatever satisfies our lowest standards for apologies so that we can 
consider ourselves ‘apologized to.’104   
 
Smith’s 2008 book, the only philosophical monograph devoted to apologies since 
Maimonides’ Hilchot Teshuvah, provides one account of what this framework for 
analyzing apologies might look like.105  Presumably, with an adequate framework in 
hand, we would be able to identify satisfactory apologies while justifiably discriminating 
against those that don’t measure up; absent such a framework, identifying good apologies 
is left to guessing.  I share Smith’s assumption about the value of a philosophical 
framework for analyzing apologies and his identification of the factors that hinder our 
ability to adequately judge good apologies.  But I do not find his substantive proposal as 
illuminating as it could otherwise be.   
Smith enumerates what he calls the “meanings” of apologies by identifying 
eleven elements106 that, combined together into what he terms the “categorical apology,” 
make an apology maximally significant for the victim.  I understand Smith’s use of the 
word “meaning” to echo Martin Heidegger’s use of the term, when, in Being and Time, 
he raises the question of the meaning of Being.  Smith explains that “meaning invokes a 
‘sense’ of how the world and our experiences in it come to have importance for us.  
Meaning here includes not only what is signified, but also what is significant, valued, 
                                                 
104 Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies, p. 10.   
105 See Smith, p. 1. 
106 The eleven elements Smith identifies are: a corroborated factual record, the acceptance of blame, the 
identification of each harm, the identification of the moral principles underlying each harm, an 
endorsement of the moral principles underlying each harm, a recognition of the victim as moral 
interlocutor, having categorical regret, performance of the apology, reform and redress, intentions for 
apologizing, and emotions.  In providing this list, I have used the same phraseology as Smith.    
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worthy, and interesting.”107  For Smith, we can speak of the meaning of an apology in 
much the same way that we speak of the meaning of a work of art.  I have no objection to 
this way of interpreting apology per se.  It seems to me, though, that Smith’s strategy – 
cataloguing and describing the meanings of apologies – is taken as an excuse for 
eschewing the definition of apology.108  To avoid defining apology impoverishes our 
understanding of the necessary and sufficient conditions of apology.  Ultimately, any 
account of apology that takes itself to be a substantive philosophical contribution to our 
understanding of apology that does not define apology will tend toward lack of rigor and 
precision.   
Case in point: in explaining his eleven-point strategy for interpreting apology - 
wherein each of the eleven points or elements is said to contribute a new layer of 
meaning to an apology - Smith makes the following observation:  “In some cases, a 
victim may desire each of the [eleven] forms of meaning I mention.  In others, she may 
seek only one sort of meaning such as a sincere expression of sympathy or a remorseless 
payment to cover the costs of repair.”109  Smith’s observation, I think, reveals what is 
problematic with his entire approach.  Though they may be in some way meaningful for 
the victim, I fail to understand how sincere expressions of sympathy or remorseless 
                                                 
107 Smith, p. 22.  
108 In an autobiographical statement, Smith makes the following confession: “My own attempts to provide 
a definition of apologies collapsed under a barrage of questions.”  See Smith, p. 19.  Immediately after this 
statement, Smith identifies some of the questions that hobbled his attempts at offering a definition.  I list 
some of them here, from Smith pp 19-20.  “What if I express remorse for events that I did not cause in any 
obvious sense, for example the African slave trade or Rwandan genocide?  Should this ‘count’ as an 
apology?  Have I apologized if I admit to causing the harm and provide some compensation, but I fear that 
I lack the self-restraint to act differently in the future?  …Must I experience certain emotions to have 
apologized properly?  If so, which emotions and to what degree of intensity?  …What if my family 
practices a tradition requiring a repentant offender to bake an apple pie for the wronged relative, and no 
words are needed given the symbolic meaning of the pastry as a gesture of reconciliation?”  In anticipation 
of the definition of apology I endorse, I answer what appear here as Smith’s second, third, fourth, and sixth 
questions: No, no, yes, and no.          
 
109 Smith, p. 12.  
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payments can, by themselves, count as meanings of apologies.  Without a definition that 
identifies the regulative standard to which all apologies, in virtue of being apologies, 
must adhere, any talk about X counting as an apology or as one of the meanings of 
apologies is spurious at best.      
Smith’s maximally meaningful apologies are, still the same, apologies.  They may 
have more “bells and whistles” than do their spartan siblings, but they are, presumably, 
apologies nonetheless.  And for a speech act to count as an apology, it must satisfy the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for what it is to be an apology.  It is to the definition 
of apology that I now turn.   
Having examined the relevant topography of speech act theory in the first chapter, 
and having isolated and analyzed the three necessary elements of any genuine apology in 
the present chapter, I am ready to present the definition of apology that I advance.  I 
argue that a genuine moral apology is a speech act that expresses a Complete 
Acknowledgement of wrongdoing and contains an affective component and an attitudinal 
component that provide the motivation for and manner of the apology, respectively.  To 
this definition I add the following proviso: the apologizer needs to explicitly say “I’m 
sorry for X” or “I apologize for having done X” or some such similar expression that 
conveys the same meaning.  In explicitly stating that I apologize for X, I tie what I am 
sorry for having done to what I acknowledge having done.  So, saying “I’m sorry/I 
apologize for X” always involves an acknowledgement.  Uttering no more than the words 
“I’m sorry” is never sufficient.  Far too much is left unsaid and, from the perspective of 
speech act theory, undone. 
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 Just why a Complete Acknowledgement and the affective and the attitudinal 
components are the necessary conditions of an apology requires some explanation.110 
Because we are never just “sorry” but always “sorry for X,” I find it uncontroversial to 
identify acknowledgement as a necessary condition for an apology.  In practice, we all 
recognize that the very intelligibility of an apology is compromised if it is offered by 
someone who fails to (fully) acknowledge that she has wronged the one from whom she 
seeks forgiveness.  To acknowledge wrongdoing in an apology is, as we say, to “own up” 
to the wrongness of what we have done.  In owning up, we take the first step in making 
amends with the victim.  And even though the amends we are willing to make may be 
rebuffed or deemed insufficient by the victim, anything less than a Complete 
Acknowledgement in an apology is always inadequate and so unsatisfactory.   
Some may hold that the conditions needed to satisfy a Complete 
Acknowledgement are overly demanding in apologies.  I find that the demandingness 
objection is easily dismissed.  Though my analysis of a Complete Acknowledgement is 
rather involved – the Veridicality, Authenticity, Autonomy, and Transparency Conditions 
constitute any and every Complete Acknowledgement - satisfying the four conditions in 
practice is not burdensome.  Satisfying all four conditions tends to happen, so to speak, in 
one fell swoop, regardless of whether the apology ritual serves as the context or not. 
Unlike a Complete Acknowledgement, the affective and attitudinal requirements 
of an apology tend to be more subtle, and therefore more difficult to establish.  The 
affective component of a genuine moral apology must include at least one of the four 
moral emotions.  The relevant moral emotion or emotions must be an adequate response 
                                                 
110 Since much of the “heavy lifting” has been accomplished in the earlier parts of this chapter, I need not 
provide an extensive justification for apology’s three necessary conditions here.    
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to the harm or wrong done.  In some situations, it will be morally appropriate that the 
wrongdoer feel categorical regret.  Other situations will call for guilt, shame, or even 
remorse to be experienced by the apologizer.  If we fail to experience the requisite moral 
emotion(s) in offering an apology, we traffic in insincerity.  And an insincere apology 
cannot be a moral apology.111   
Finally, since the experience of the emotion by the one who apologizes is a 
private, subjective matter, the authenticity and even amplitude of the emotion must be 
independently determined by the would-be forgiver in and through an assessment of the 
apologizer’s humility.  While the moral emotions serve as the source of motivation that 
drives the wrongdoer to apologize, the manner, ideally humble, in which the apology is 
made provides the would-be forgiver with indirect access to the apologizer’s state of 
mind.  Without this indirect access, the would-be forgiver is unable to assess the full 
range of the apologizer’s intentions.  Inability to assess the full range of the apologizer’s 
intentions compromises the would-be forgiver’s ability to make a considered judgment.     
The affective component and the attitudinal component are like two sides of the 
same coin.  The value of the tender may be in dispute, though.  As we all know, not all 
apologies are accepted; the person to whom the apology is directed may not appraise as 
highly as does the apologizer the worth of the apology.  In fact, she may find that her 
version of events, which she has no reason to doubt, does not line up with the 
apologizer’s version in his acknowledgement.  Or, she may doubt the amplitude or even 
presence of the moral emotion that the apologizer claims to feel.  So, an apology will fail 
if it does not satisfy all three necessary conditions.  The would-be forgiver must employ 
reasonable standards in determining the satisfactoriness of the proffered apology, though; 
                                                 
111 However, an insincere apology may satisfy the demands of etiquette.   
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to expect servility or an effusive emotions outburst is unreasonable.  The expectations we 
have about what we think constitutes a good apology must not be incompatible with the 
self-respect of the apologizer. 
However, even if the apologizer has satisfied all three necessary conditions, the 
apology will fail if the would-be forgiver rejects it.  It is for precisely this reason that the 
three necessary conditions for an apology cannot be jointly sufficient for an apology’s 
transaction.  I argue that the liberty the victim has to reject (almost) any apology – even 
those that satisfy all three necessary conditions – is consistent with the agent’s moral 
freedom, a claim I examine in more detail in the third chapter.  There is, though, an even 
more basic reason that explains why apology’s three necessary conditions cannot be 
jointly sufficient.  At the most fundamental level, the simple bilateralism of apology 
prohibits the three necessary conditions from jointly satisfying apology’s sufficient 
condition.  The words and emotions of the apologizer and the accepted conventional 
procedure of offering an apology cannot, by themselves, guarantee the performative 
success of an apology.  But provided that the three necessary conditions are satisfied, the 
act of forgiveness guarantees apology’s performative success.  In other words, 
forgiveness is the sufficient condition for the success of any apology that has already 
satisfied its three necessary conditions.  I will discuss this in greater detail in the next 
chapter.  But first, a brief discussion of the phenomenon of moral repair is required to 
complete the analysis of apology I have advanced.   
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2.5 Apology as a Form of Moral Repair 
The human being, Elizabeth V. Spelman claims, is a repairing animal.  When 
things break – or when we find people and institutions to be broken – we have to choose 
whether or not to do what we can to put them back together, to make them whole again.  
Unfortunately, we often find our belongings, our relationships, and our body to be in 
need of repair more often than we would prefer.  Spelman notes that to repair is  
to respond to the fracturability of the world in which we live in a very particular 
way – not by simply throwing up our hands in despair of the damage, or otherwise 
accepting without question that there is no possibility of or point in trying to put 
the pieces back together, but by employing skills of mind, hand, and heart to 
recapture an earlier moment in the history of an object or a relationship in order to 
allow it to keep existing.112 
 
The family of “repair activities,” Spelman observes,  
shares the aim of maintaining some kind of continuity with the past in the face of 
breaks or ruptures to that continuity.  They involve returning in some manner or 
other to an earlier state – to the bowl before it was broken, to the friendship before 
it began to buckle under weight of suspicion, to the nation before it was torn apart 
by hostility and war.  Even though taking superglue to the bowl repairs it without 
fully restoring it to its preshattered condition, both repairer and restorer want to 
pick up a thread with the past.113 
 
Spelman identifies apology as belonging to the family of repair activities.  But Spelman 
fails to provide a satisfying account of the way in which apology repairs.  Margaret 
Urban Walker remedies this deficiency.   
In examining what she calls moral repair, Walker analyzes the “process of 
moving from the situation of loss and damage to a situation where some degree of 
stability in moral relations is regained.”114  Walker treats apology as a species of moral 
repair, as part of the task of restoring and stabilizing the “basic elements that sustain 
                                                 
112 Elizabeth V. Spelman, Repair: The Impulse to Restore in a Fragile World, pp. 5-6.   
113 Spelman, pp. 4-5.   
114 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair: Reconstructing Moral Relations after Wrongdoing, p. 6.   
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human beings in a recognizably moral relationship.”115  The basic elements that so 
sustain are, she observes, trust and hope.  Likewise, a moral relationship for Walker 
signifies a way of relating to others that embodies the shared standards, underwritten by 
trust and hope, that they avowedly mutually enjoy.  These shared standards have been 
explicitly examined in the literature of normative ethical theory, and can run the gamut 
from the principles of deontology to the orientation of care ethics.  While they can be 
questioned and reflected upon, in a moral relationship these shared standards are 
primarily “embedded in … [our] responses, feelings, and attitudes, as well as… [our] 
beliefs.”116  Our shared standards, so embedded, constitute the functioning moral order 
we depend upon in our daily transactions with others.  When those shared standards are 
violated, the trust and hope that undergirds the relationship are compromised.   
I find Walker’s account of moral relationship – and therewith moral repair - to be 
most suited to close, personal associations that suggest an intimacy, or at least 
identifiable common ground, not found in casual encounters with strangers or those with 
whom we have limited contact.  Walker explains that to 
sustain moral relationship we require confidence in shared standards (that some 
standards as we know them are shared, that they are recognized as such, and that 
there is reason to think they lead to worthwhile lives), and trust among 
individuals, and in a common human environment, that we ourselves and others 
will be responsive to these standards (and to the reproach we deserve when we 
transgress them).  At bottom, living in moral relationship requires a residual and 
renewable hopefulness that we and others are worthy of the trust we place in each 
other, and that our world allows us to pursue the goods to which our shared 
understandings are meant to lead us.117   
 
I take family members and friends, partners and lovers, and co-workers and colleagues to 
be the best examples of the (kinds of) individuals who qualify for the special treatment 
                                                 
115 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair, p. 23.   
116 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair, p. 23. 
117 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair, p. 24.  Emphasis not mine.   
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expected in moral relationship.  The confidence we have in the standards we share with 
others we already know; the trust we have in those who avowedly share our standards; 
the hope that our trust in others - and their trust in us - is well-placed: all find their origin 
and sustenance in the kind of relationships that suggest, if not intimacy, at least 
familiarity, and, perhaps, friendliness and even the feeling of being “at home” with the 
other.  With these features in mind, I find it uncontroversial that it would be inappropriate 
and unwise to blithely treat the stranger as if she were in a moral relationship with us.   
Those party to a moral relationship with us are fellow adults, not children; the 
equality found between adults is constitutive of moral relationship.  Moreover, inclusion 
in any moral relationship whatsoever is never automatically granted.  But some may 
object to both claims, arguing instead that parents are automatically privy to a moral 
relationship with their children.  I take it that this argument would point out that children 
naturally trust their parents, and so instinctively see their caretakers as standing in a 
moral relationship with them.  This argument, though, is wrongheaded.  Young children 
have no choice but to trust their parents.  This is acceptable so long as the parent has the 
child’s best interests in mind.  But abusive parents manipulate their children by means of 
this trust.118  Children are never in the position to choose their parents, abusive or decent.   
We ought to understand the conditions of moral relationship to be such that those with 
whom we share a relationship are fully chosen.  So, young children do not enjoy a moral 
relationship with their parents, even if unadulterated trust defines their association.  But 
most children learn, in large part, about the contours and complexities of moral 
                                                 
118 The physically, emotionally, or sexually abusive parent manipulates the trust the child places in him or 
her – a trust that the child cannot help but have, given the child’s absolute dependence on the adult and the 
child’s limited understanding of legal recourse. 
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relationship from their parents.  And therewith, children also learn about moral repair 
from their parents as well.   
For Walker, moral repair is the act of “restoring or creating trust and hope in a 
shared sense of value and responsibility.”119  She identifies six tasks that moral repair 
performs. 
1. Moral repair is served by placing responsibilities on wrongdoers and others 
who share responsibility for wrongs. 
2. Moral repair is served by acknowledging and addressing wrong, harm, affront, 
or threat to victims and communities. 
3. Moral repair is served by authoritatively instating or reinstating moral terms 
and standards within communities where wrong may have caused fear, 
confusion, cynicism, or despair about the authority of those standards. 
4. Moral repair is served by replenishing or creating trust among individuals in 
the recognition of shared moral standards and in their responsiveness to those 
standards and support of the practices that express and enforce them. 
5. Moral repair is served by igniting or nourishing hope that moral 
understandings and those who are responsible for supporting them are worthy 
of trust. 
6. Moral repair is served by connecting or reconnecting in adequate moral 
relationship those who have done wrong and those who have been harmed as 
a result, where and to the extent that this is possible, practically and morally.  
Where this is not possible, moral repair aims to stabilize or strengthen moral 
relationship among others and within communities.120 
 
I take it that the most successful and gratifying acts of moral repair are those that satisfy 
all six tasks. Furthermore, I take it that moral repair admits of degrees, and that, ceteris 
paribus, restoring the compromised relationship to its most feasible preshattered state is 
preferable to any other alternative.  Finally, I take it that the six tasks are conceptually 
separate, but not necessarily physically distinct; presumably, one act may complete, say, 
three or four tasks in one fell swoop.   
 Walker notes that apology often plays an integral role in making amends for a 
harm or wrong, and that making amends is a type of morally reparative action.  I apply 
                                                 
119 Walker, Moral Repair, p. 28 
120 Walker, Moral Repair, p. 28.   
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the distinction between offering an apology and apologizing I made in the previous 
chapter to an analysis of Walker’s six tasks of moral repair.  Offering an apology is often 
the first step in the rehabilitation of trust between the offender and the victim.  Since 
offering an apology involves the wrongdoer taking responsibility for the wrong, the 
wrongdoer acknowledging and addressing the wrong, and as Walker puts it, “practically 
and morally”121 connecting or reconnecting the wrongdoer with the one who suffered the 
harm, offering an apology satisfies the first, second, and sixth criteria (or task) of moral 
repair.  If the offered apology is accepted by the wrongdoer in the act of granting 
forgiveness, then the fourth and fifth (and perhaps even third122) tasks of moral repair are 
satisfied.  That is, as a form of moral repair, forgiveness replenishes or creates trust 
among individuals who recognize the shared moral standards and practices that reinforce 
them – the fourth task - and ignites or nourishes hope that moral understandings and 
those who should support them deserve the trust placed in them – the fifth task. 
I find it reasonable to assume that there are many circumstances where it may be 
morally incumbent on the wrongdoer to offer an apology without any expectation of 
having the apology accepted.  In fact, the wrongdoer may be morally required to offer an 
apology, knowing full well that what she offers will never be accepted by the party she 
wronged.  When, say, a murderer confesses to the crime in a court of law, the confession 
signifies the guilty plea.  But avowing guilt in a court of law does not amount to a 
recognition of the moral gravity of the crime.  A sincere apology, though, would.  Of 
course, such an apology could not be directed toward the victim of the crime; being dead, 
                                                 
121 Walker, Moral Repair, p. 28. 
122 I take it that the third task of moral repair is a community-wide effort that requires support from a 
sufficient number of members from the community for its completion.  But communities come in a variety 
of sizes.  Very small communities – families, perhaps – may complete the third task if the offending 
member or members of the family make amends to those they wronged.   
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the victim cannot appreciate the apology.  But the family of the one murdered may, at 
least in principle.  Even if the apology that was offered was never accepted by the family, 
it would still satisfy the first, second, and sixth tasks of moral repair, and may thereby 
help the grieving family heal in ways they are unable to understand in the thick of 
anguish.     
There are a variety of different ways in which moral repair may be accomplished, 
though apology distinguishes itself by being one of the most intuitive and most welcome.  
This, I think, is because of the way in which apology, as necessarily including an 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing, contains an expression of the wrongdoer’s 
accountability (or acceptance of responsibility) for the wrong, while leaving open the 
possibility of recompense, reparation, or some other compensation or service.  With this 
observation in mind, consider Walker’s salvo on what it is to make amends. 
‘Amends’ are intentionally reparative actions by parties who acknowledge 
responsibility for wrong, and whose reparative actions are intended to redress that 
wrong.  Nothing anyone does to relieve a harmed person’s pain or suffering, 
stress, anger, resentment, indignation or outrage will count as ‘making amends’ 
without an acceptance of responsibility as the reason for the effort.  Nothing 
anyone says or does to provide injured parties with compensation for losses, to 
restore a status quo prior to injury, to make a victim ‘whole,’ or to reaffirm or 
vindicate a victim’s dignity can be a kind of ‘amends’ without an 
acknowledgement of some kind of wrongdoing, wrongful complicity in harm, or 
wrongful profit from it.  Without that acknowledgment, reparative actions are 
charitable, compassionate, or generous, even dutifully so, but they do not ‘make 
amends.’  Making amends involves taking reparative action, but only action that 
issues from an acceptance of responsibility for wrong, and that embodies the will 
to set right something for which amends are owed, counts as making amends.123 
 
So, while some apologies, as means by which to make amends and thus facilitate moral 
repair, will require recompense, reparation, or some other compensation or service, others 
will not.  I take it that the nature of the wrong or harm and the reasonable demands placed 
                                                 
123 Walker, Making Amends, p. 191.   
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on the repentant wrongdoer by the wronged will determine the nature of the recompense, 
reparation, or service.  But as Walker stresses, actions meant to be reparative done in the 
absence of an acknowledgment of wrongdoing fail to bring about the result for which 
they are intended – or simply fail, morally.124 
 Similarly, words that mouth an apology, offered simply for the sake of “getting 
something off my chest” or because I “feel bad,” fail to qualify as a genuinely moral way 
in which to make amends.  While it is the case that confessing a wrongdoing to the victim 
will often ease the burdened conscience of the wrongdoer, using an apology as a means to 
the end of relieving our own conscience treats that person from whom we seek 
forgiveness as nothing more than a means to the end of our own psychological health.  
The problem is that this move is utterly self-centered, as it fails to take into consideration 
the wrongdoer’s relationship with the victim.  But apologizing as a means by which to 
repair that which is broken does.  The selfish apologizer - the one who mouths an 
apology simply in order to relieve her burdened conscience – mistakes one of the side-
consequences or by-products of apology, namely the anticipated improvement in one’s 
                                                 
124 It is for this reason that so many legal cases settled out of court that involve the defendant, in the 
absence of the admission of guilt, paying large sums of money to the plaintiff must be unsatisfying, from 
the point of view of moral repair.  I find Nick Smith’s observations about commodification in law 
particularly insightful here.  He writes: 
“When legal actors and institutions convert so many harms – from racial discrimination to the 
wrongful death of a child – into economic cost-benefit analyses, they can jeopardize certain forms of 
meaning incommensurable with money.  Although money may offer a convenient means of measuring 
value in a complex and pluralistic world, many of us experience a vague moral discomfort when legal 
systems convert the worth of human life into dollars and cents.  Something seems to be lost in the 
translation between moral and economic value… [D]espite the common conception that greed motivates 
litigants, many seek primarily moral rather than economic redress.  If you can imagine the horror of having 
a loved one killed by a faulty product or a grossly negligent surgeon, receiving a monetary award for your 
loss might be significant for many reasons.  This would be so even if the offender refused to admit 
wrongdoing, as we would expect within an adversarial legal system.  Although money can be useful in 
many ways, however, no amount of cash could provide the sorts of meaning that you might receive if the 
offender apologized, accepted blame, took moral as well as fiscal responsibility for the loss, and then 
honored a commitment never to cause such harm again.  Money may provide a common denominator for 
some losses, but often the most significant meaning cannot be reduced to cash value.”  See Smith, I Was 
Wrong, pp. 2-3.   
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own psychological health, for the purpose of apology.  The purpose of apology concerns 
a renewed moral relationship between victim and wrongdoer.  Many benefits for both 
may flow from this relationship, but the benefits must not be mistaken for the telos of the 
apology ritual.  The cathartic effect of apology ought not be mistaken for the point of 
apology.  
 This meditation on apology as a form of moral repair concludes my examination 
of the moral structure of apology.  I turn now to the third chapter, where I present an 
account of the moral structure of forgiveness.  In developing this account, I rely upon the 
theory of complex bilateralism I developed in the first chapter, while also stressing the 
significance that forgiveness plays in achieving moral relationship between the wronged 
and the wrongdoer.  But beyond tying together the various threads of this project, the 
next chapter will also explore new philosophical territory.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
Chapter 3: The Moral Structure of Forgiveness 
 
‘You have heard it said, “An eye for and eye and a tooth for a tooth.”  But I say to you, 
Do not resist an evildoer.  But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other 
also; and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well; and if 
anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile.’   Matthew 5:38-41 
 
In the Sermon on the Mount, the collection of sayings and teachings of Jesus from 
which this passage is taken, Jesus offers a number of his most well-known injunctions.  
Among these is the injunction to “turn the other cheek.”  Many interpreters take this to 
mean that Jesus advises us to not meet aggression with aggression.  I find this injunction, 
and others, to contain the seeds of the standard Christian understanding of interpersonal 
forgiveness.   
Traditional Christian theology holds that forgiveness from God requires the 
penitent to confess her sins before the Almighty in order to receive the benefits of God’s 
forgiveness.  But the forgiveness granted by one individual to another does not, on what I 
call the standard Christian account of interpersonal forgiveness, require the one forgiven 
to actively do anything to receive this forgiveness.  On the standard Christian account, 
those who are forgiven by those they harm need not confess the wrong or apologize for 
the harm to enjoy the benefits of forgiveness.  Rather, forgiveness happens in the time it 
takes to, metaphorically or not, turn one’s cheek.125   
                                                 
125 I appreciate that there is a certain amount of diversity among Christian theologians on the topic of 
interpersonal forgiveness and that the view I call the standard Christian account of interpersonal 
forgiveness does not represent all Christian views concerning forgiveness.  Regardless of this diversity, 
though, many popular inspirational Christian books endorse the very account that I criticize.  The 
cumulative effect that the virtual cottage industry of popular Christian books on forgiveness has tends to 
drown out alternative Christian views.  Recent bestselling publications in the popular vein include R. T. 
Kendall’s Total Forgiveness, Nancy Leigh DeMoss’s Choosing Forgiveness: Your Journey to Freedom, 
and John MacArthur’s The Freedom and Power of Forgiveness.  However, many scholarly contributions to 
Christian ethics also argue for the permissibility and even desirability of forgiveness in the absence of 
apology.  See in particular Chapters 5 and 6 in Anthony Bash’s Forgiveness and Christian Ethics, a recent 
monograph in the New Studies in Christian Ethics series with Cambridge University Press.   
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This view of forgiveness is very familiar, and not just within Christianity.  It is 
also, I contend, wrong.  I here isolate what I take to be four reasons why the standard 
Christian understanding of interpersonal forgiveness is either mistaken or unjustified.  
First, it violates the conditions of complex bilateralism which I have already established.  
Second, it assumes that we do not have (what I will call) the moral freedom to make our 
own decision regarding who and under what conditions we will forgive those who, as it 
were, trespass against us.  On the Christian view, that we should forgive those who have 
wronged or harmed us is mandated by God126, and there seems to be no arguing with the 
Almighty.  Third, the Christian account suggests a certain picture of human psychology 
that I take to be unrealistic; it seemingly assumes that, in forgiving in the absence of an 
apology, the one in the position to forgive can do so without running the risk of being 
sanctimonious.  Fourth, those who claim to be able to successfully forgive in the absence 
of an apology, I contend, will most likely find themselves in the unenviable position of 
having to facilitate the repair of the relationship with the offender on their own.    
In this chapter, I will present an analysis and exposition of the view of forgiveness 
I find most plausible.  Unlike the Christian account, I argue that the possibility of moral 
repair sets the scope for the set of actions that can be forgiven.  Forgiveness completes 
the entreaty, made by the apologizer, to repair the relationship between wrongdoer and 
wronged, and in so doing, sets both on the path to bring about the needed repair.  In 
investigating how the possibility of moral repair establishes the group of actions that we 
may reasonably forgive, a number of questions are raised. Can we ever grant forgiveness 
to the dead?  Does self-forgiveness strain the conditions of intelligibility?  I answer these 
                                                 
126 This mandate is suggested in the Lord’s Prayer, the traditional form of which reads, ‘forgive us our 
trespasses as we forgive those that trespass against us.’ 
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questions, while also broaching the subject of the unforgivable as a genuine moral 
category that puts constraints on those situations where we may, for whatever reason, be 
inclined to forgive, but, alas, cannot.  The basis for an answer to these questions is found 
in an analysis of forgiveness as a kind of moral repair.   
Before I develop and defend the account of forgiveness I find most plausible, 
though, I will present and criticize a popular, though I believe misguided, 
characterization of forgiveness as the forswearing of resentment.  This popular account, 
initially put forward by Bishop Joseph Butler in the early eighteenth century, has enjoyed 
endorsement of late by Trudy Govier, Charles Griswold, and Jeffrie Murphy.  It is also 
consistent with the very Christian account of which I am suspicious.  In an effort to draw 
out what I see as the deficiencies with the Butlerian view, I recount and examine the story 
of one victim’s attempt at putting the past behind her by unilaterally forgiving her 
unrepentant perpetrators.   It is to a presentation and criticism of the Butlerian account 
that I now turn. 
   
3.1 Forgiveness as the Overcoming of the Vindictive Passions 
 It is commonly held that the reason we ought to forgive those who wrong or harm 
us is to overcome the stranglehold that the vindictive passions of resentment, anger, 
hatred and desire for revenge have over us.  The vindictive passions encourage only 
emotional dyspepsia, and may thwart our ability to look forward to the future with a 
sense of hope and optimism.  Forgiveness, we are told, helps us to overcome the 
vindictive passions.  In fact, on one popular account, forgiveness is the act of overcoming 
and extinguishing the vindictive passions.  This view taps into one of the strong intuitions 
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we have about forgiveness.  It has something of a distinguished pedigree, being the 
beneficiary of endorsement by Bishop Joseph Butler in the early eighteenth century.  It is 
also, I maintain, mistaken.  I will argue that the Butlerian account misidentifies a side-
consequence or by-product of forgiveness for the end.   
Butler’s account of forgiveness, found in his Fifteen Sermons, has become 
something of a classic for many contemporary philosophers pursuing forgiveness studies.  
Butler’s account has the virtue of being uncomplicated; the core of his view is that 
forgiveness is achieved when we defeat the vindictive emotions we harbor toward those 
who harm or wrong us.  Jeffrie Murphy observes that in his sermon “Upon Forgiveness 
of Injuries,” Butler “characterizes forgiveness as primarily an internal matter, a change of 
heart.  [Forgiveness]… does, of course, have external behavioral consequences, but its 
essence is internal.”127   Recently, Trudy Govier, Charles Griswold, and Jeffrie Murphy 
have argued in favor of Butler’s analysis.  I will briefly report on how they each adopt 
Butler’s analysis. 
Jeffrie Murphy contends that forgiveness is a moral virtue that  
is essentially a matter of the heart, the inner self, and involves a change in the 
inner feeling more than a change in external action.  The change in feeling is this: 
the overcoming, on moral grounds, of the intense negative reactive attitudes that 
are quite naturally occasioned when one has been wronged by another – mainly 
the vindictive passions of resentment, anger, hatred, and the desire for revenge…  
Of course, such a change in feeling often leads to a change of behavior – 
reconciliation, for example; but, as our ability to forgive the dead illustrates, it 
does not always do so.128 
                                                 
127 Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Forgiveness, Self-Respect, and the Value of Resentment,” p. 34.   
128 Jeffrie G. Murphy, Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits, p. 13.   
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By treating forgiveness as the victim’s foreswearing of resentment in overcoming her 
vindictive passions toward the offender, Murphy shows his support for Butler’s 
account.129 
Butlerian intuitions are enlisted by Trudy Govier in imagining a scenario 
involving a married couple dealing with an infidelity. 
Suppose a man is trying to reconstruct his relationship with his wife, after an 
intense, passionate affair with a younger colleague.  He assures his wife that he no 
longer loves the younger woman and wants them to be reconciled; he says that 
affair is over.  There are tears and apologies and hugs and kisses, and she says to 
him “I forgive you.”  Nevertheless, in the following weeks and months she does 
not act as though she has forgiven him.  She continues to raise the issue of his 
affair and use it as a point against him in arguments.  She persistently inquires 
about the details of his comings and goings; acts skeptical when he says he loves 
her and asks him repeatedly about the colleague.  Her husband reminds her that 
she said to him “I forgive you.”  But such reminders are futile.  Her words and 
deeds betray attitudes of distrust and resentment; she has not forgiven.130  
Clearly, saying “I forgive you” is no guarantee that forgiveness has taken place.  But 
Govier goes farther than this observation.  The Butlerian intuition that motivates Govier’s 
reading of the moral of the story is that forgiveness is not tied to, conveyed by means of 
or indicated by a speech act whatsoever.  Butler’s analysis is that forgiveness is fully 
realized when the victim lets go of her resentment, anger and hatred for the offender.  
                                                 
129 It should be noted that Murphy’s support for Butler’s account of forgiveness is qualified, in that Murphy 
treats forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment on moral grounds.  Murphy’s qualification clarifies 
Butler’s intention or, perhaps, what Butler’s intention should have been.  Joram Graf Haber explains the 
significance of Murphy’s qualification: “If forgiveness is the overcoming of resentment simpliciter, then – 
by implication – any time resentment is overcome, forgiveness may be said to have taken place.  However, 
as Murphy sees it, there are cases where one has overcome resentment but we would hesitate to say that 
one has forgiven.  We can, argues Murphy, simply forget the fact that an injury has occurred.  In this sense, 
‘forgive and forget’ is not redundant.  We can also take measures to remove resentment, should such 
resentment poison our lives.  We can, for instance, enlist psychiatric help in an effort to gain peace of mind.  
But – Murphy says – such cases of natural and therapeutic forgetting could not possibly count as cases of 
forgiveness, if only because forgiveness is a virtue and there is nothing virtuous about these cases.”  See 
Haber, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Study, p. 17.  This qualification not withstanding, Murphy 
nonetheless assumes the cogency of Butler’s basic approach to forgiveness.           
130 Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, p. 43.   
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Govier endorses the Butlerian approach in claiming that “[f]orgiveness is a matter of 
working over, amending, and overcoming attitudes.”131   
Butler’s approach assumes that forgiveness is a wholly subjective event; it takes 
place entirely in the mind of the offended party.  Forgiveness is an internal, private affair, 
not a public one.  Doubtless, it is supposed that the effects of the mental act of 
forgiveness will have an impact on the manner in which we interact with the person we 
have forgiven.  Grudges will be dropped; resentments will fade away; abrasive exchanges 
will be replaced by common decency.  The main point, though, is that, for Butler, 
forgiveness simply is a kind of rearrangement of the composition of our emotional life, 
the blueprint for which should replace bad blood with inner tranquility and peace. 
Charles Griswold’s recent examination of forgiveness draws upon Butler’s 
analysis.  Griswold proposes that “forgiveness requires that resentment for the relevant 
injury be appropriately moderated and that the agent make a further commitment to work 
toward a frame of mind in which even that resentment is let go.  Forswearing the emotion 
is indeed the relevant goal [of forgiveness].”132  In emphasizing this dimension of 
Butler’s work, Griswold shares common ground with both Govier and Murphy. 
I reject the account of forgiveness defended by Butler’s analysis and supported by 
Griswold, Govier and Murphy.  Rather than simply offer counter-arguments to the 
Butlerian account, though, I want to first get a handle on the psychological dynamics that 
it is reasonable to assume would be at play in the mind of someone who acts in a way 
consistent with Butler’s analysis.  To do this I will tell a story – a story about suffering, 
misery, and, if we believe our protagonist, forgiveness and release.  My hunch is that a 
                                                 
131 Ibid., p. 43.  
132 Charles Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration, p. 42.  Emphasis not mine. 
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direct move to arguments runs the risk of making talk of forgiveness too abstract and 
disassociated from our lived experience.  In what follows, I recount the story of 
Holocaust survivor Eva Mozes Kor, whose life and struggle was made the subject of the 
2006 documentary Forgiving Dr. Mengele.   
Eva Kor and her twin, Miriam, were born in northern Transylvania in 1934.  At 
the age of ten, they and the rest of their family were taken from their home to a ghetto, 
and then to Auschwitz.  After frantically departing the train upon their arrival at the 
concentration camp, the twins lost contact with their father and two older siblings.  Soon 
after, Eva and Miriam were forcibly removed from the custody of their mother, who they 
never saw again and to whom they never said goodbye.  All of the members of Eva’s 
family, with the exception of Miriam, were murdered in Auschwitz.  The twins, though, 
were used by Dr. Mengele in medical experiments.     
The twins were of special interest to Mengele.  Kor recounts part of her ordeal in 
Auschwitz for The Forgiveness Project website.     
During our time in Auschwitz… [Miriam and I] talked very little. Starved for 
food and human kindness, it took every ounce of strength just to stay alive. 
Because we were twins, we were used in a variety of experiments. Three times a 
week we’d be placed naked in a room, for 6-8 hours to be measured and studied. 
It was unbelievably demeaning. 
In another type of experiment they took blood from one arm and gave us 
injections in the other. After one such injection I became very ill and was taken to 
the hospital. Dr Mengele came in the next day, looked at my fever chart and 
declared that I had only two weeks to live. For two weeks I was between life and 
death but I refused to die. If I had died, Mengele would have given Miriam a 
lethal injection in order to do a double autopsy. When I didn’t die he carried on 
experimenting with us and as a result Miriam’s kidneys stopped growing. They 
remained the size of a child’s all her life.133 
 
On January 27, 1945, Auschwitz was liberated by the Soviet army.  Both Eva and Miriam 
survived and, after spending close to a year in refugee camps, returned to their village to 
                                                 
133 Eva Kor, “Stories,” http://theforgivenessproject.com/stories/eva-kor-poland/. 
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find that no one else in their family survived.  In 1950, Kor and her sister emigrated to 
Israel, pursued an education, served in the Israeli Army, married, and had families of 
their own.  Kor and her husband, though, decided to move to the United States in 1960.  
Her sister, now Miriam Mozes Zeiger, remained in Israel and died there in 1993 due to 
complications with her kidneys.  The experiments Miriam Zeiger had endured as a child 
in Auschwitz had finally taken their toll on her.  Eva Kor was left as the sole survivor.   
 In the late 1970’s, Kor developed a serious interest in locating other survivors of 
Mengele’s experiments on twins.  In 1984, she founded CANDLES, Children of 
Auschwitz Nazi Deadly Lab Experiments Survivors.  In her capacity as president, Kor, 
with the help of her sister, located 122 survivors of Mengele’s experiments.134  Under 
Kor’s direction, CANDLES sponsored and supported a Holocaust Museum and 
Education Center in Terre Haute, Indiana, Kor’s home since 1960.  The Museum 
educates the public about the atrocities of the Holocaust in general and the unimaginable 
ordeals of the many twins on which Mengele experimented.  Kor’s efforts go beyond her 
work with community outreach programs, though; she has made an impact on Indiana 
state law.  In 2007, Kor worked with Indiana state legislators to gain passage of a law 
requiring Holocaust education in secondary schools throughout the state.135   
 It should be clear that Auschwitz left an indelible mark on the life of Eva Kor.  
This, though, is to be expected, as Kor is a survivor of a harrowing, violent trauma.  
Under such circumstances, one does not – one cannot – just “move on.”  Coping with 
trauma of such magnitude is, I imagine, something one must work on each day.  What 
                                                 
134 See http://www.candlesholocaustmuseum.org/index.php?sid=22. 
135 See http://www.candlesholocaustmuseum.org/index.php?sid=26.  
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makes Eva Kor’s story a compelling and, I think, puzzling one is the way in which she 
ultimately decided to cope with her trauma.  She decided to forgive the Nazis.   
 Kor reports that, even as late at the early 1990’s, she was tormented by her 
memories of Auschwitz, the emotional effects of which were sometimes near-
debilitating.  But after a trip to Germany in 1993, Kor claims to have muted the ongoing 
ensemble of pain that had afflicted her for decades.  Just weeks after her sister died due to 
complications with her kidneys in 1993, Kor flew to Munich to meet Dr. Hans Münch, a 
former Nazi doctor.  Despite having been acquitted of war crimes after the war, Münch 
felt terrible shame for his involvement with the Nazis, even though he did not carry out 
experiments on his patients.136  Kor contacted Münch in an effort to track down 
Mengele’s twins files.  Kor reported that she expected Münch to be a monster, and was 
surprised to find that he, too, suffered from nightmares about Auschwitz.  Witnessing the 
humanity of Münch compelled Kor to invite him to come with her to the fiftieth 
anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.  Münch agreed.  Kor wanted to respond in 
kind to Münch; she decided that the most meaningful gesture she could offer him in 
appreciation of his commitment to attend the fiftieth anniversary gathering was a letter 
forgiving him for the role he played at Auschwitz.  
 It should be noted that Münch never had any contact with, nor did he harm, Kor 
or her sister while they were in Auschwitz.137  Despite this, believing that she had 
forgiven Münch in having written and sent him her letter, Kor felt empowered.  She 
                                                 
136 Roman Heflik, “A Holocaust Survivor’s Path to Peace,” in Spiegel Online International, December 9, 
2005, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,389491,00.html. 
137 It is for this reason that it would be neither appropriate nor possible for Münch to apologize to Kor, on 
the view I advance.  However, it is entirely appropriate that Münch feel – and I would argue, continue to 
feel even today – shame, guilt and remorse for the role he played in the Holocaust.  But he cannot 
apologize to Kor as he never harmed or wronged her.   
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decided to capitalize on the emotional changes she felt stirring within her by taking an 
even bolder step in reconciling herself with her past.  In January1995, Kor returned to 
Europe to be present for the remembrance of the liberation of Auschwitz.  The event 
drew media attention, and it brought together a number of survivors of the camp.  At the 
event, Kor read a confession of guilt to the press that Münch had written for the occasion.  
She then used the event as an opportunity to publicly forgive and extend amnesty to all 
Nazis.  Kor added that she spoke only for herself, and did not mean to presume to forgive 
in the name of all those that the Nazis harmed.  Nonetheless, Kor reported that the act of 
granting the Nazis forgiveness completely transformed her emotional constitution; 
instead of continuing to feel burdened and afflicted, she claims to have felt free, 
powerful, and, as she put it, “good inside.”  “I felt as though an incredibly heavy weight 
of suffering had been lifted,” Kor said.  “I never thought I could be so strong.”138 
 Immediately after her public act of forgiveness, Kor turned to her fellow 
survivors, most of whom were shocked by her avowal, and said “It is time to heal our 
souls.”  Kor had, in effect, invited her fellow survivors to forgive their former tormentors 
as a means by which to achieve this healing.  The other survivors, unsurprisingly, failed 
to accept Kor’s proposal.  When interviewed for Forgiving Dr. Mengele, fellow Mengele 
twin experiment survivor Vera Kriegel’s terse response to Kor’s invitation was “All of 
me is one big ache.”  Kriegel implies that forgiveness, were it even possible, will fail to 
heal the ache she feels. 
 As I see it, Kor’s story and struggle fit the parameters of Butler’s analysis of 
forgiveness.  In the documentary, Kor reports that, upon forgiving the Nazis, she 
                                                 
138 See Roman Heflik, “A Holocaust Survivor’s Path to Peace,” in Spiegel Online International, December 
9, 2005, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,389491,00.html. 
97 
 
overcame the stranglehold that the vindictive emotions, produced by her horrific 
experiences in Auschwitz, had on her.  She claimed that her emotional life was no longer 
run by resentment, anger, and the desire for revenge.  I stand in awe of the courage and 
sanity that Kor has maintained in the face of the oppression by the Nazis and their 
grotesque mockery of human dignity.  I appreciate and am inspired by her resolve and her 
indomitable spirit.  But I doubt that she can truly enjoy the benefits of forgiveness as she 
claims she does.     
 Bracket, for the moment, any concern that Kor has violated the bilateralism 
constitutive of the logic of forgiveness, or that she, in fact, cannot forgive the Nazis, as 
they committed unforgivable acts.  There are still good reasons to doubt the success she 
claims to have made in forgiving.  I aim to demonstrate at least one of these reasons for 
doubt by means of the following thought experiment.  Call it the Mengele Encounter 
thought experiment. 
Imagine that Kor encounters Mengele, the very man who directed the experiments 
that she and her sister suffered.139  The Angel of Death, it turns out, did not die in exile in 
South America, but is alive and well.  Moreover, Mengele remains unrepentant for his 
crimes.  He fails to acknowledge them or have the requisite emotional constitution that 
we expect a known guilty party should have.  Most disturbing of all, Mengele, who is no 
longer a wanted man, has taken up residence in Kor’s home town; she has already 
encountered him on the street, and future encounters are not unlikely.  In such a situation, 
would Kor’s professions of forgiveness hold up?  Would she treat Mengele as a man she 
                                                 
139 In this thought experiment, we can substitute for Kor any other survivor of an atrocity who claims to 
have forgiven, in the absence of a genuine moral apology, the person or persons who harmed the survivor.  
Moreover, we can substitute for Mengele any other individual or group who caused or greatly contributed 
to the suffering of our survivor. 
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has forgiven and to whom she has extended amnesty?  Or would the vindictive passions 
well up in her - the very emotions she claims to have overcome in the act of forgiving the 
Nazis?   
The latter, I think, is the more likely scenario.  The reason I think this is because 
Kor never had – and never had a reason to have – what Walker calls a moral relationship 
with Mengele.  Recall that for Walker, moral relationship, in the most basic sense, is “a 
certain disposition of people toward each other and the standards they trust, or at least 
hope, are shared.”140  Earlier, I characterized a moral relationship as a way of relating to 
others that embodies the shared standards, underwritten by trust and hope, that they 
avowedly mutually enjoy.  Moral repair, as the task of restoring and stabilizing the “basic 
elements that sustain human beings in a recognizably moral relationship,”141 assumes for 
its intelligibility the presence of this moral relationship, even if only in a compromised 
state.  But where there is no moral relationship, where there are no shared standards, 
where the conditions for the possibility of hope and trust have been eviscerated, there will 
be no moral repair.  And therewith, no forgiveness.   
So, despite her insistence to the contrary, Kor cannot have truly forgiven the 
Nazis.  But this does not mean that she cannot, to some degree, have healed herself by 
other means.  Those who have endured much less harm than Kor may be able to, as we 
blithely say, “let bygones be bygones.”  The fact that this phrase has attained the 
ignominious status of a cliché does not mean that what the phrase indicates is any less 
desirable for those who try to achieve it, or any less restorative for those do.  Sometimes 
we say that a person has “made peace with their past” or that he has “moved on.”  Here 
                                                 
140 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair, p. 23.    
141 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Repair, p. 23.   
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again, the common usage tends to detract from the power and potential significance of 
the activity that this phrase signifies.  Those who make peace with their past or “move 
on” may do so by means of the forgiveness ritual, but this need not be the only way.  As 
the passage of time removes those harmed or wronged from the event that has marked 
them, the intensity of the vindictive passions often subside, allowing the victim to 
experience a kind of inner tranquility unavailable to them at times closer to the advent of 
the harm or wrong.  The past does not control the present for those who have made their 
peace with it.  While “letting bygones be bygones” and “making peace with one’s past” 
may be satisfying healing strategies for some, my hunch is that these options are largely 
unavailable for survivors of trauma the magnitude of which is know to have been the case 
in the Holocaust.  Again, I am not claiming that Kor has not been able to heal herself to 
some degree, but rather that she could not do so by means of forgiveness or by “letting 
bygones be bygones,” and most likely not by what most take “making peace with one’s 
past” to mean.     
It is clear that Kor takes the overcoming of the vindictive passions to be the 
purpose or object of forgiveness.  This understanding is consistent with and implied by 
the Butlerian account.  However, I submit that this view misidentifies a side-consequence 
or by-product of forgiveness for the real aim or purpose of forgiveness.  I hold that the 
aim or purpose of forgiveness is the moral repair of the relationship between the 
wrongdoer and the wronged.  I concede that Butler is right to claim that the vindictive 
passions must be overcome in forgiveness.  But context matters.  I argue that in 
forgiveness the victim overcomes the hostile feelings she harbors toward the wrongdoer 
in and through a mutual commitment by the wrongdoer and the one wronged to recreate 
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or create a moral relationship built on trust and hope.  In fact, the apologizer’s Complete 
Acknowledgment and forthright humility (and, in some situations, promise to never harm 
or wrong her victim in such a manner again) provide the reason and motivation for the 
would-be forgiver to let go of her hostile feelings.  I develop an account of forgiveness as 
a kind of morally reparative action in the next section.   
 
3.2 Forgiveness as a Form of Moral Repair 
In the last section of the second chapter, I examined what it means to call apology 
a form of moral repair.  I there presented and appropriated for my own use Walker’s 
account of moral repair.  Recall that for Walker, moral repair takes place when we 
recover or build trust and hope in a shared understanding of what is important and of 
what we are responsible for.  Those involved in reparative actions of the kind Walker 
describes have their own unique part to play in bringing about this shared understanding.  
One upshot is that moral repair is transactional; it takes place between and by means of 
the efforts of two parties – the one wronged and the one in the wrong.  Some forms of 
moral repair – restitution or reparations, for instance - may require the party in the wrong 
to expend more effort in mending the relationship between the parties.  But apology and 
forgiveness are more egalitarian; both the apologizer and the forgiver contribute roughly 
equal parts to put back together what has been broken.   
I have argued that the apologizer does her part to facilitate moral repair by 
acknowledging the wrong, experiencing the right moral emotions to the right degree, and 
being appropriately humble in offering the apology to the one she wronged.  The one in 
the position to forgive has an entirely different set of responsibilities which are, I think, 
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no less demanding.  In proffering forgiveness, the forgiver must “soften her heart” by 
overcoming hostile feelings toward the wrongdoer.  But the forgiver must also actively 
and patiently work toward reconciliation with the wrongdoer in order to restore what was 
damaged between them by the wrong or harm.  Finally, the forgiver must “wipe clean the 
slate” of the repentant wrongdoer by removing or suspending the wrong.  Call this 
tripartite account of forgiveness the Forgiveness Triptych.  Each part of the Forgiveness 
Triptych identifies a necessary condition of forgiveness.  The Forgiveness Triptych is 
inspired by the work of Eve Garrard and David McNaughton.142  However, Garrard and 
McNaughton fail to appreciate the bilateralism of forgiveness; they allow forgiveness to 
be transacted in the absence of apology.  I do not.  In what follows, I develop and defend 
the account of forgiveness represented by the threefold view, situating it within my 
appropriation of Walker’s analysis of moral repair. 
 
3.2.1 The forgiveness triptych 
The first part of the Forgiveness Triptych requires the would-be forgiver to not 
only cease to express, but also cease to feel, hostility toward the wrongdoer.  In short, the 
first part of the threefold view is that the person in the position to forgive must overcome 
the vindictive passions.  The imperative to extinguish one’s resentment toward the 
apologetic wrongdoer is the same one proposed by Butler.  What is different is that, 
under the rubric of the Forgiveness Triptych, the imperative to overcome the vindictive 
passions is treated as directly contributing toward the repair of the moral relationship 
between the one in the wrong and the one wronged, and only indirectly toward any 
therapeutic effect by which the forgiver may emotionally profit.  Forgiveness, then, 
                                                 
142 See Eve Garrard and David McNaughton, “In Defense of Unconditional Forgiveness,” pp. 39-60.   
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should not be framed as primarily benefiting the would-be forgiver by providing the 
vehicle through which she sheds the vindictive passions, as it is on Butler’s account.  To 
be sure, the hostile emotions harbored against the wrongdoer are overcome in 
forgiveness, and the forgiver is emotionally compensated when the resentment she once 
harbored is replaced by, at the very least, “an attitude of good will… towards the 
wrongdoer.”143  But this is most properly facilitated in and through a mutual commitment 
by both parties to recreate or create a moral relationship built on trust and hope.  In this 
context, the overcoming of the vindictive emotions is a side-consequence or by-product 
of a larger process which it ought to be in the service of; namely, the greater scheme of 
moral repair. 
Granting a repentant wrongdoer forgiveness is no guarantee that the forgiver has 
or even can, at the moment the words “I forgive you” (or some such equivalent) are 
uttered, overcome all of her resentment toward the wrongdoer, though.  The vindictive 
passions do not usually evaporate in the act of extending forgiveness.  Our emotions 
simply don’t work that way.  Often, it takes time – often time with the rehabilitated 
wrongdoer – to completely let go of the resentment.  Accounting for this “extended-
release” feature of forgiveness makes us sensitive to the way in which the emotions 
actually operate in us.   
The “extended-release” feature of forgiveness also puts constraints on our 
understanding of just how forgiveness can be accomplished.  One cannot, by means of 
the will, voluntarily overcome the hostile emotions any more than one can will oneself to 
be sad or feel delighted.  That said, the will is, I contend, crucial for forgiveness.  The 
person in the position to forgive can will herself to commit to a collaborative reparative 
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project wherein, over the course of time, she lets go of the resentment she harbors toward 
the wrongdoer as the relationship continues to be patched together again.  So, when we 
forgive someone with whom we are still angry and resentful, we submit something akin 
to a promissory note to ourselves and to the apologetic wrongdoer – we make a 
commitment to ourselves and to the apologetic wrongdoer to, in the course of the moral 
relationship we cooperatively craft, overcome the vindictive passions.  The one in the 
position to grant forgiveness - though unable to, at the moment the forgiving words are 
uttered, overcome her vindictive passions - may will herself to participate in a 
collaborative project to repair the relationship.   
The second part of the Forgiveness Triptych requires the forgiver to actively and 
patiently work toward reconciliation with the wrongdoer in order to restore what was 
damaged between them by the wrong or harm.  Restoring what was damaged may result 
in the apologizer and the forgiver collaboratively reconstructing whatever relationship 
between them existed prior to the harm or wrong.  A basic sense of goodwill ought to 
pervade the process and be found in the reconstructed relationship.  The reconstructed 
relationship need not duplicate the way in which the relationship was arranged prior to 
the damage.  If various structural problems in the relationship tend to lead to injustice or 
exploitation for one of its members, then reconciliation may be seen as an opportunity to 
fix, and not just restore, the relationship.  If no relationship existed, then restoring what 
was damaged may amount to reestablishing the inoffensive indifference that each 
expressed toward the other in anonymity.     
The emphasis on restoration in the second part of the Forgiveness Triptych is 
important.  Consider the case of two close friends who have a dramatic falling-out.  
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Imagine that Mary is notorious for having bad judgment and publicly embarrasses her 
friend Sue in the most insulting of ways.  Sue is hurt and distressed.  Mary comes to 
realize the wrongness of her actions and apologizes to Sue, hoping that things can be 
patched-up between them.  Sue says that she accepts Mary’s apology and forgives her.  
But then Sue informs Mary that she never wants to see her again.  Clearly, Sue fails to 
appreciate the role that restoration plays in forgiveness. 
   I submit that Sue is confused.  One cannot both forgive and eradicate the 
conditions that make possible the very reconciliation involved in forgiveness.  
Forgiveness is not compatible with all possible states of affairs.  Sue must either forgive 
Mary and work with her to collaboratively reconstruct what was good about their 
relationship, or Sue must rebuff Mary’s apology by refusing to grant her forgiveness.  If 
Sue chooses the second disjunct, then she must either forgo her friendship with Mary or 
continue it.  If she maintains her relationship with Mary in its present fractured state, then 
the relationship will almost certainly disintegrate.  Once the fabric of the relationship has 
torn, the hole will only grow larger, unless it is repaired in time.  Precisely because of its 
suitability to the kind of damage done, forgiveness is the most appropriate form of moral 
repair qualified to do the job of putting the pieces of Mary’s and Sue’s relationship back 
together.        
The third part of the Forgiveness Triptych requires the forgiver to “wipe clean the 
slate” of the repentant wrongdoer by removing or suspending the wrong.  The drama 
invoked in the hyperbole ought not to distract us from the meaning of the third 
requirement.  Here, a slate is a record of past performance or activity.  The kind of slate 
we are interested in is the record of past wrongs or harms that the offender has committed 
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against the forgiver for which she apologizes.  To claim that forgiveness involves wiping 
clean the repentant wrongdoer’s record means that the forgiver “behaves as if the wrong 
had never happened.”144  As a consequence, the forgiver drops all reference to the wrong, 
and encourages both herself and the apologetic wrongdoer to look toward the future 
instead of dwelling on or ruminating about past harms or wrongs.  For Walker, this 
process amounts to “restoring the offending party to full faith and credit.”145  In other 
words, the moral equality of the wrongdoer is fully rehabilitated in the eyes of the 
forgiver, even if nothing more than harmless indifference characterized their behavior 
toward each other in anonymity.  In a certain way, forgiveness may be said to restore the 
humanity of the apologetic offender.  Again, Walker puts it well when she writes that 
“[t]o forgive is, certainly, to recognize wrongdoers as human beings, fallible and limited, 
capable of choice and worth, neither monstrous nor beneath contempt; in forgiving one 
needs to humanize, rather than to idealize or to demonize, the wrongdoer, because that 
puts the wrongdoer back into a world of moral relations that morally valuable forgiveness 
affirms.”146     
The basic appeal of wiping clean the slate of the repentant wrongdoer is twofold: 
it prevents the forgiver from holding a grudge and it frees the apologizer from being 
reminded of her moral shortcomings.  What is entailed in wiping clean the slate of the 
repentant wrongdoer is more feasible and justifiable than what the tired adage “forgive 
and forget” seemingly requires.  When we cease to make reference to the repentant 
wrongdoer’s record of harms or wrongs against us, we are under no obligation, were it 
even possible, to forget them.  One may keep in mind the wrongdoer’s record of past 
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wrongs or harms while simultaneously welcoming the possibility of the reformed 
wrongdoer’s break with her past.  In time, as moral repair achieves its objective, the very 
memory of the reformed wrongdoer’s history of wrongs may be unwelcome.  The point is 
that while holding a grudge is incompatible with forgiveness, voluntarily erasing any 
memory of the harm or wrong is cognitively impossible.   
It is important to observe that condemnation of the wrongdoing and the 
wrongdoer’s punishment for harm or restitution for wrongs are not incompatible with 
wiping clean the slate of the offender.  Sometimes punishment or restitution is morally 
reparative.  Moreover, as a means by which to rehabilitate the offender, punishment may 
provide the offender with the opportunity to more adequately reflect upon the whys and 
wherefores of the project of moral repair, thereby enabling her to make a more 
substantive contribution to it.  Regardless, forgiveness must not be confused with mercy 
or clemency.  Efforts to bring about reconciliation between the wrongdoer and the one 
wronged and a commitment to justice need not conflict. 
 
3.2.2 Reconsidering Austin’s Γ Conditions: Forgiveness as a Test Case   
The Forgiveness Triptych makes this much clear: to make forgiveness more than 
“just words,” forgiveness must reveal itself in active and patient efforts at reconciliation.  
But it must, in tandem, inwardly transform the attitude the forgiver has toward the 
wrongdoer, replacing resentment with, at the very least, goodwill (or inoffensive 
indifference, in the case of strangers who will never become familiar).   
Those who grant forgiveness but fail to reveal or be inwardly transformed by the 
forgiveness that they speak violate either one or both of Austin’s Γ conditions.   Recall 
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that the Γ conditions require the following: where, as often, the procedure is designed for 
use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain 
consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so 
invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants 
must intend so to conduct themselves, and further, must actually so conduct themselves 
subsequently.  In our case, the “procedure” is forgiveness, the feelings at issue are those 
that ought to emerge once the vindictive passions have been overcome, and the conduct 
in question is that of goodwill between the forgiver and the forgiven.  
For Austin, violations of the two Γ conditions do not invalidate a speech act’s 
felicity.  Instead, violations of the two Γ conditions are unseemly, as they amount to an 
abuse of the procedure.  One may be tempted to think that an argument from Austin’s six 
felicity conditions concludes that those who speak forgiveness but fail to reveal or be 
themselves transformed by the forgiveness they grant the repentant wrongdoer 
nevertheless do, in fact, forgive the wrongdoer.  This, I contend, is the wrong conclusion 
to draw. 
Recall that Austin’s B conditions require that the procedure be executed by all 
participants correctly and completely.  At first blush, it seems perfectly acceptable to 
consistently separate the B conditions from the Γ conditions.  After all, regardless of how 
I feel about returning your pitchfork, if I have promised to return it, then a promise was 
made.  Even if bride and groom have fallen out of love by the time of their wedding, so 
long as the vows have been exchanged and the wedding officiant has pronounced them 
husband and wife, then the unhappy couple is married.  Their not being in love does not 
invalidate the marriage contract.  In both of theses cases, the Γ conditions are, if anything, 
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an afterthought; the satisfaction of the A and B conditions has facilitated the action.  
However, it is possible to imagine a procedure the intelligibility of which requires that 
the B conditions subsume the Γ conditions, rather than let them stand alone.  Forgiveness 
is such a procedure.       
There is at least one procedure the correct and complete execution of which 
includes the facilitator of the practice having certain thoughts or feelings and conducting 
herself in a certain way subsequent to the completion of the formal aspects of the 
procedure.  Forgiveness satisfies this criterion.  In forgiveness, the facilitator of the 
procedure is the one in the position to forgive, the feelings in question are those that 
ought to be felt in the wake of resentment’s extinction, and the conduct at issue is that of 
goodwill between the apologizer and the forgiver.  Simply put, for the recipient of an 
apology to say “I forgive you” to the repentant wrongdoer when the would-be forgiver 
has no intention of overcoming her vindictive passions or fostering goodwill in her future 
interactions with the apologizer is to fail to forgive tout court.  Under such circumstances, 
no action has been performed; forgiveness has not been granted.  In short, words – words 
intended to mislead – have been spoken, but nothing, except a deceptive sham count, has 
been done.  So, when we are in a position to forgive, we must satisfy the A, B and Γ 
conditions in order to genuinely transact forgiveness.  In forgiveness, failure to satisfy the 
two Γ conditions does not result in a mere abuse of the procedure; it results in a misfire.           
Insofar as being what we say we are matters to us, we will want to have our 
actions and our emotions line up isomorphically with our words.  To do otherwise is to 
traffic in inconsistency and deception.  Even if these worries fail to move us, we still have 
good reason to be forgiving when we grant forgiveness.  Most of us, I think, find it 
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important to “be true” to the commitments we make for reasons that have to do with 
authenticity.  When we grant forgiveness, we make a commitment to ourselves and to the 
repentant wrongdoer to change our emotional disposition and our behavior toward the 
repentant wrongdoer.  The project of being an authentic self is compromised when we 
ourselves deliberately frustrate or block our actions and our emotions from representing 
or enacting the commitments we make.  If worries about inconsistency and deception do 
not motivate us to be forgiving when we grant forgiveness, then perhaps our own interest 
in living an authentic life will move us to isomorphically line up our actions and our 
emotions with our words.147      
 
3.3 Defining Forgiveness 
Having examined the relevant topography of speech act theory in the first chapter, 
and having isolated and analyzed the three necessary elements of any genuine act of 
forgiveness in the present chapter, I am ready to present the definition of forgiveness I 
advance.  I argue that forgiveness is a speech act, offered in response to a genuine moral 
apology and granted in order to facilitate moral repair, that satisfies all three parts of the 
Forgiveness Triptych.  To this definition I add two provisos.  The first proviso requires 
that the forgiver explicitly say “I forgive you” to the apologizer or some such other 
locution that convincingly conveys the same meaning.  The second proviso requires that 
the apologizer accept the forgiveness she has been offered – the very same forgiveness 
she requested in apologizing – by exhibiting a change in her behavior and attitude toward 
her forgiver.   
                                                 
147 However, I suspect that those who are unmoved by worries over inconsistency and deception are not the 
kind of moral agents who would be disposed to appreciate the value of forgiveness in the first place. 
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In virtue of its complex bilateralism, forgiveness can be granted only in response 
to an apology – in particular, one that satisfies the necessary conditions for a genuine 
moral apology for which I argued in the second chapter.  Forgiveness complements an 
apology by completing the act inaugurated by the apologizer; it also achieves a greater 
and more satisfying degree of moral repair than can apology by itself.  When we, for the 
sake of achieving moral repair, satisfy all three parts of the Forgiveness Triptych, 
forgiveness achieves its end: hostility toward the wrongdoer is overcome, reconciliation 
with the wrongdoer is achieved, and the wrongdoer’s moral equality is restored. 
A word is in order about the two provisos to the definition of forgiveness I 
advance.  The first proviso requires that forgiveness live up to its name as a speech act by 
guaranteeing that the forgiver communicates the right words to the right audience under 
the right conditions in order to achieve the effect that only an exchange of this type can 
produce.  In short, the first proviso guarantees that the performative quality of the 
utterance “I forgive you” (or some such other locution taken to have a similar meaning) 
play an integral role in bringing about forgiveness.  Moreover, the utterance “I forgive 
you” certifies that forgiveness has, indeed, been granted.  In addition to those already 
marshaled, one argument in support of the first proviso is that the utterance “I forgive 
you” provides something akin to a roadmap for both the apologetic wrongdoer and the 
wronged to follow to achieve moral repair in their relationship.      
Consider the following scenario, a twist on Govier’s example of the married 
couple dealing with the fallout caused by the husband’s infidelity.  This time, though, 
imagine that the wife, upon listening to her husband’s assurances that the affair is over 
and that he wants to be reconciled, remains unresponsive when her husband apologizes.  
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She does not say that she forgives him; nor does she say that she does not.  Instead, she 
listens to his entreaty impassively.  Relations between them are uncomfortable for many 
months.  The husband becomes fully committed to working things out, and proves 
himself to be singly devoted to the marriage just as he said he would.  He is attentive, 
cooperative, and caring.  Yet she remains cold, unmoved and standoffish.  For many 
months, she feels nothing but resentment for her husband.  Then, slowly, the wife begins 
to soften.  It starts when she lets him embrace her again, and embraces him in return.  She 
laughs at his jokes again.  In time, they begin to enjoy sexual intimacy again.  Their once-
frosty relations are replaced by warmth, intimacy and trust.  She finally lets go all of the 
resentment she once had toward him, and restores her husband to full faith and credit.  In 
the years to come, their post-affair married life is stronger than married life was for them 
before the affair.148 
On Butler’s account, the inevitable conclusion to draw is that the wife has 
forgiven her husband.  I find this to be the wrong conclusion for reasons already 
discussed.  It also reads too much into the scenario; the wife could have made a 
commitment to herself to not forgive her husband.  It might be further objected that the 
wife did, in fact, forgive her husband, as she satisfied the three parts of the Forgiveness 
Triptych.  This objection, however, neglects that satisfying the three parts of the 
Forgiveness Triptych constitute a necessary and not a sufficient condition for the 
possibility of forgiveness.   
In virtue of the husband’s apology, the marriage did experience some of the 
benefits that moral repair achieves.  (Recall that in offering an apology, the first, second, 
and sixth tasks of moral repair are satisfied.)  I contend, though, that the marriage could 
                                                 
148 Thanks to Prof. Ann Cudd for suggesting this scenario.   
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have experienced further benefits of a morally reparative kind had the wife forgiven her 
husband.  That is, if forgiveness were to have been granted, then the benefits that 
accompany the satisfaction of the fourth and fifth tasks of moral repair could have been 
enjoyed in a manner more meaningful than the manner in which they presumably were 
enjoyed, if they were at all.  And part of what provokes us to make the fourth and fifth 
tasks of moral repair meaningful when they are realized in forgiveness is the clear, 
unambiguous avowal of the forgiver who utters “I forgive you” to the repentant 
wrongdoer.  Here, saying “I forgive you” signifies to both the apologizer and the forgiver 
that herein they collaboratively pursue a course of action in an effort to morally repair 
that which has been damaged.  The course of action, though, is akin to a script the plot 
for which has already been written.  The apologizer already knows that he must begin to 
shed the negative self-image he has of himself as a wrongdoer, and that a certain amount 
of delicacy is required at first in interactions with the forgiver.  The forgiver already 
knows that she must actively and patiently work toward reconciliation with the apologetic 
wrongdoer and do her part to foster, at the very least, a sense of goodwill between them.  
In effect, saying “I forgive you” puts both apologizer and forgiver on a path the basic 
direction of which they both already know and must walk together.  And if the forgiver 
strays from that path, or backtracks, by rekindling the very resentments she forswore, the 
forgiven can remind her of her commitment and hold her to account.  Saying “I forgive 
you” signifies that a recognizable roadmap for moral repair has been placed into the 
hands of both the apologizer and the forgiver – and that each can hold the other to 
account.  But this option is not available to the husband in the above scenario.        
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The second proviso requires that the apologizer accept the forgiveness she has 
been offered by exhibiting a change in her behavior and attitude toward her forgiver.  In 
the first chapter I argued that the act of forgiveness is a speech act that contains a grant.  
When we forgive, we grant a previously-made request proffered by the wrongdoer in the 
form of an apology.  As with any grant, the recipient must accept it in order for that 
which is granted to “take effect.”  As regards forgiveness, the apologetic wrongdoer upon 
whom forgiveness is bestowed accepts forgiveness by treating herself and behaving as if 
her moral equality has been restored.  Her posture changes from one burdened by, say, 
shame and self-loathing, to one whose full faith and credit has been rehabilitated.  But if 
the apologetic wrongdoer continues to wallow in guilt even after the one to whom she 
apologized has said “I forgive you,” then forgiveness has been forfeit.  In fact, those who 
forfeit the benefits of forgiveness by continuing to treat themselves and behave as if they 
must endure a state of perpetual moral inequality cause both the forgiveness they seek 
and the apology they proffered to misfire.  From the standpoint of speech act theory, 
nothing has been done. 
The satisfaction of the criterion provided by the second proviso is crucial for the 
performative success of what I call Complete Forgiveness.  Even if the person in the 
position to forgive has satisfied all three parts of the Forgiveness Triptych in a course of 
action that facilitates moral repair and said “I forgive you” to the apologizer, Complete 
Forgiveness is not achieved until the nominally-forgiven apologetic wrongdoer acts in a 
way consistent with the comportment of one to whom forgiveness has been granted.  
Until this change in the apologetic wrongdoer takes place, we say that the apologizer 
enjoys only Nominal Forgiveness, so long as the person in the position to forgive, in 
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charting a course of action that facilitates moral repair, has satisfied all three parts of the 
Forgiveness Triptych and said “I forgive you” to the apologizer.  The upshot is that the 
satisfaction of the criterion provided by the second proviso is a sufficient condition for 
the performative success of Complete Forgiveness, so long as Nominal Forgiveness has 
been conferred.         
The distinction between Nominal Forgiveness and Complete Forgiveness, and the 
possible transition from the state represented by the former to the one represented by the 
latter, underscores the observation that forgiveness is a process.  It takes time and effort 
to make the requisite change from Nominal Forgiveness to Complete Forgiveness.  The 
time it takes the apologizer to change from that of a life – or just a season - lived with 
overwhelming guilt to one lived out of an appreciation of what it means to be fully 
restored as a moral equal in the eyes of the person that one harmed or wronged is often 
proportional to the severity of the harm or wrong.  The migration from the former to the 
latter is one often fraught with missteps and trials and errors.  Sometimes the nominally 
forgiven will find herself plagued by feelings and self-assessments that draw her off the 
path toward Complete Forgiveness.  In short, the transition from Nominal Forgiveness to 
Complete Forgiveness is rarely immediate or automatic, especially when the harm or 
wrong is not slight.  Kinks must be ironed out, and it is often touch-and-go. 
In a similar way, satisfying all three parts of the Forgiveness Triptych is a process 
that the forgiver must, over time, make an effort to achieve.  Clearly, the second part of 
the Forgiveness Triptych requires some measure of contact and collaboration with the 
repentant wrongdoer, and therefore cannot be immediate or automatic.  Reconciliation is 
a process, and a social one at that.  That leaves the first and third parts of the Forgiveness 
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Triptych to be accounted for.  There is no guarantee - nor should there be any expectation 
- that when the words “I forgive you” have been uttered, the forgiver has already 
overcome her hostility toward the wrongdoer and wiped clean the repentant wrongdoer’s 
slate.  I have already argued that the “extended-release” feature of forgiveness allows us 
to expect that it will take time to satisfy the first part of the Forgiveness Triptych.  The 
same must be said for the third part of the Triptych.  The emotions operative in satisfying 
the first and third parts of the Triptych are quite similar; both sets of emotions usually 
require the passage of time – often time with the apologetic wrongdoer - to achieve their 
ends.  Although one cannot automatically overcome the vindictive passions or wipe clean 
the slate of the repentant wrongdoer by means of any utterance whatsoever, a certain 
commitment is made, on the part of the would-be forgiver, when she says “I forgive you” 
to the repentant wrongdoer.  Call what this commitment expresses Promised Forgiveness.  
In Promised Forgiveness, the one uttering the words makes a commitment to satisfy, 
under her own power, the first and third tasks of the Forgiveness Triptych – and, with the 
cooperation of the apologizer, the second task.  Following through on this commitment is 
no less a process than is the path from Nominal Forgiveness to Complete Forgiveness.  In 
fact, Promised Forgiveness contains the embryo of Nominal Forgiveness.  After an 
apology has been proffered, Promised Forgiveness is the first step in forgiveness, 
followed by Nominal Forgiveness, and finally culminating in Complete Forgiveness.           
 
3.4 Moral Freedom and the Limits of Forgiveness  
In this section I introduce and apply to forgiveness the concept of moral freedom.  
I take moral freedom to be the liberty to make our own moral decisions by the light of our 
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own reason without fear of external pressure, manipulation, or compunction.   It is an 
ideal inspired by both Kant’s notion of autonomy and Mill’s conception of liberty.  Even 
though what I call the “light of our own reason” serves as the guide, the reason to which I 
make reference here is not merely idiosyncratic.  It must be possible for the light of my 
own reason and the light of your own reason to illuminate the same object; moral 
freedom should not be abused to support a form of moral relativism.  Still, reasonable and 
even intractable disagreements can legitimately occur between different moral agents. 
We apply the concept of moral freedom to forgiveness by determining for 
ourselves the conditions under which we will forgive – and by taking seriously the 
freedom to decide to not forgive.  No doubt, determining the conditions under which we 
forgive, or the decision to refuse forgiveness, requires deliberation and considered 
judgment.  On the view I advance, determining the conditions of forgiveness amounts to 
evaluating the meaningfulness or value of the moral relationship that we had – or could 
have, albeit in a restored form – with the offender.  So, the conditions under consideration 
may involve an appraisal of the level of intimacy we shared with the apologizer prior to 
the offense, and/or an assessment of the degree to which we want to pursue an emotional 
bond in the future.  Our considerations must be sensitive to whatever we think the 
severity of the offense reveals about the offender’s character.  Our considerations should 
orient us toward the conditions under which forgiveness makes sense; that is, where 
forgiveness is rational.149  We might come to the conclusion that the offender’s infraction 
and the manner in which it was carried out betray the true personality of the offender.  
                                                 
149 I take it that the conditions under which forgiveness makes sense will be informed by whichever moral 
theory the moral agent happens to hold.  But whichever moral theory we hold ought not to determine or fix 
the conditions under which forgiveness makes sense; to do so would compromise our moral freedom at 
another level.     
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And we may recoil from what we see.  Or we might conclude that the offense was just a 
fluke, that there were excusing conditions, or that the severity of the offense was not 
nearly as damaging as it first appeared to be.  Regardless, it is by means of our moral 
freedom that we determine whether or not to take steps to facilitate moral repair, or just 
walk away.   
Not all accounts of forgiveness are compatible with our moral freedom.  Case in 
point: the standard Christian account of interpersonal forgiveness undermines our moral 
freedom to forgive.  On the Christian view, the autonomy I might otherwise use to 
determine who and under what conditions I will forgive those who wrong or harm me is 
overruled by the religious mandate to, without hesitation, extend absolute forgiveness to 
any and all.  On the Christian view, whether I, as someone in the position to forgive, have 
or am interested in creating a moral relationship with the offender is irrelevant.  
Moreover, my assessment of the sincerity of the offender’s apology, if one has even been 
proffered, lacks application on the Christian view.  Anything short of unconditional 
forgiveness, for even that of the most heinous offense, is warded against by the pious 
interpreters of Jesus’ beatitudes.  This undermines our moral freedom to forgive. 
I worry that the influence of the traditional Christian reading of Jesus’ 
pronouncements about forgiveness serves as a form of ideological coercion.  The idea of 
unconditional forgiveness has a strange hold on us.  Even in a secular culture, violating 
Jesus’ injunctions about forgiveness is often accompanied by a strong sense of guilt or 
failing by the one who refuses to forgive unconditionally.  As theologian Anthony Bash 
contends,  
when it comes to forgiveness, most people fail to live up to their own standards, 
and (if they were to think about it) they know that they do not live up to God’s 
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standards.  Whatever the nature of an act of wrongdoing, there will be some who 
find they are unable to forgive, who feel guilty about this, and who will also feel 
guilty about having disagreeable – or even brutish – feelings toward those who 
have mistreated them.150  
 
The problem isn’t so much that the Christian account of forgiveness is incompatible with 
the exercise of our moral freedom, though.  Many other ideas are likewise incompatible.  
These other incompatible ideas, though, may be unpopular.  The real problem is the 
tendency, through guilt or some other negative self-assessment, to internalize Christian 
norms privileging Jesus’ injunctions about forgiveness over whichever ones we may 
arrive at by means of our own reason.  We cannot simultaneously express a commitment 
to Jesus’ injunctions about forgiveness and to moral freedom.  
It must be stressed that moral freedom also has its limits.  Nothing about moral 
freedom should lead us to conclude that by its means we can intelligibly or justifiably 
forgive in the absence of apology.  Similarly, nothing about political freedom entails that 
I have the liberty to treat my fellows any way I see fit.  Just as there are restrictions – the 
rights of others and the duties I have to observe them - built into political freedom, there 
are restrictions built into moral freedom.  Our moral freedom has limited scope; with 
regard to forgiveness, it does not permit us to forgive in the absence of apology.  The 
submission of a genuine moral apology of the kind defined in the previous chapter is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of forgiveness whatsoever.  Once the condition for 
the possibility of forgiveness has been satisfied, then the one from whom forgiveness is 
sought is in the position to determine, by means of her moral freedom, whether or not to 
forgive the penitent, so long as what we forgive is not one of what I call the three 
Insurmountable Restrictions.      
                                                 
150 Anthony Bash, Forgiveness and Christian Ethics, p. 2.  
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The three Insurmountable Restrictions put limits on our moral freedom to forgive, 
even in those contexts where an apology has been forthcoming.  The three 
Insurmountable Restrictions mandate that we do not have the moral freedom to forgive 
the dead, to forgive ourselves, or to forgive the unforgivable.  I analyze each in turn. 
That we do not have the moral freedom to forgive the dead follows from 
arguments already made about the necessity of having a possible moral relationship with 
the apologizer and the importance of collaboratively working with the apologizer to bring 
about moral repair.  Alas, there is no possible moral relationship we can conceivably have 
with the dead; similarly, there is no way in which the dead can collaboratively work with 
us to achieve moral repair.  When an unrepentant wrongdoer dies, the possibility of 
forgiveness is no longer available.  Thankfully, there are alternative means by which to 
deal with a harm or wrong that an unrepentant offender has committed against us, though 
often at least some of these alternative means are mislabeled “forgiveness.”  Depending 
on the seriousness of the wrong, we may be able to “let bygones be bygones.”  Some may 
be able to, as we say, “make peace with the past” or “move on.”  None of these coping 
mechanism, whatever they might mean and however they achieve the inner peace desired 
by the one harmed or wronged, amount to forgiveness.  There is nothing genuinely 
transactional about “making peace with one’s past.” 
  But there may arise situations where the wrongdoer dies before she is able to 
apologize, though in which we have unquestionably sound reason to believe that she 
would have offered an apology had she lived.  I admit that the problem of counterfactual 
knowledge of this kind fails to be accommodated by the view of forgiveness for which I 
argue, and that some will take that as a weakness of the theory.  Some of our moral 
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intuitions prompt us to argue in favor of granting forgiveness to the deceased in such a 
scenario.  However, I maintain that forgiveness in such a situation is impossible.  Though 
the would-be forgiver may very well be able to satisfy, under her own power, the first and 
third tasks of the Forgiveness Triptych (thereby satisfying the lion’s share of the 
conditions built into Promised Forgiveness), she is unable to ever meaningfully speak the 
forgiveness she may fervently desire to grant.  And speaking – or, more generally, 
communicating – forgiveness to another who understands what has been granted and 
responds accordingly – is at the heart of what makes forgiveness a speech act. 
The second of the three Insurmountable Restrictions is that we don’t have the 
moral freedom to forgive ourselves.  There is much talk about the supposed virtues of 
self-forgiveness in today’s pop psychology literature.  But in many cases, what passes as 
self-forgiveness is really euphemistic advice that encourages us to not be “too hard” on 
ourselves, or which touts the psychological benefits of cutting ourselves some slack.  
Such advice cannot be said to count in an argument in favor of self-forgiveness.  One 
philosophical defense of self-forgiveness views it as a unilateral exchange that one has 
with oneself.  Recall that an exchange is unilateral if and only if the action-performing 
quality of the performative utterance is satisfied by none other than the singular speaker 
who utters the performative.  However, I am hard-pressed to find a performative 
utterance of the kind needed to qualify as a token of such a unilateral exchange.  
Furthermore, there does not seem to exist an accepted conventional procedure wherein 
such a self-directed performative utterance would have the effect of achieving self-
forgiveness.  That is, there are no felicity conditions for self-forgiveness.   Additionally, 
self-forgiveness contradicts the view that forgiveness is intelligible only as a kind of 
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bilateral exchange.  Finally, self-forgiveness violates the basic elements of moral repair – 
or preserves them at the price of infusing moral repair with an altogether unpalatable 
narcissism.     
Consider the following list of questions about self-forgiveness.  If self-forgiveness 
is possible, must I apologize to myself first?  If yes, is it possible that I might rebuff my 
own apology?  If no, has my moral freedom been compromised?  In forgiving myself, 
should I refer to myself in the first, second, or third person?  These are not questions that 
deserve answers, as they border on the ridiculous.  To treat myself as the receptive 
audience of the very performative utterance I speak is odd, at best.  In the end, I find the 
very idea of self-forgiveness to rest on a confusion.  And yet, I can imagine a therapist 
advising a client on the need to forgive herself, and further imagine that the client finds 
this advice to be meaningful and life-changing.  But I contend that being counseled to 
forgive oneself is, at root, nothing more than euphemistic advice for “taking it easy.” 
The last of the three Insurmountable Restrictions is that we don’t have the moral 
freedom to forgive the unforgivable.  I understand the unforgivable to refer to a genuine 
moral category.  This category contains the set of actions marked by exceptional 
wrongdoing or harm of an especially egregious kind.  While it may be possible to 
ascertain the necessary and sufficient conditions that determine membership within the 
category of the unforgivable, I prefer to come at the question of membership from the 
standpoint of family resemblance.  Types of exceptional wrongdoing or harm of an 
especially egregious kind of which we notice a family resemblance include, for example, 
suffering non-accidental serious bodily harm, being brutally tortured, having your life 
totally ruined by the direct intentional actions of another, and witnessing your family 
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murdered in front of your eyes.  What makes these examples of exceptional wrongdoing 
or harm unforgivable is that they utterly compromise the possibility of any meaningful 
future moral relationship between the agent who caused the harm or wrongdoing and the 
person who suffers it.  In short, unforgivable actions obliterate the hope, trust, and 
confidence in shared standards needed to sustain or create activities of a morally 
reparative kind.   
The unforgivable puts constraints on our moral freedom, as it belongs to a class of 
actions that, in principle, may not be forgiven.  As a consequence, regarding situations in 
which those who wrong or harm us present a sincere apology, and in which the situation 
under consideration unambiguously involves either unexceptional wrongdoing or 
exceptional wrongdoing, our moral freedom to respond as we may like is curtailed by the 
moral contours of the action under evaluation.   
I here conclude my analysis of forgiveness.  I move on to the concluding chapter 
in which I consider the moral status of revenge as a possible response to the unforgivable.   
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Chapter 4: Revenge 
 
‘Do not take revenge, my friends, but leave room for God’s wrath.  For it is written, “It is 
mine to avenge, I will repay,” says the Lord.’  Romans 12:19   
 
In Romans, Paul beseeches his flock to not be vengeful.  But Paul does not 
condemn vindictiveness as such, for it seems as though the Almighty himself is in the 
revenge business.  Perhaps Paul believes that revenge is God’s proper concern, and not 
ours, because God is simply more efficient at exacting revenge than we are.  Or perhaps 
Paul assumes that the satisfaction God takes in “balancing the scales” outweighs 
whatever satisfaction we might enjoy in pursuing revenge ourselves.  Whatever the 
reason, one thing seems clear: resentment is not itself to be eschewed, but may, in fact, be 
treasured and even encouraged.  After all, we ought not to condemn or be lukewarm 
about an action that the Almighty decides to pursue.  If my reading of this verse from the 
Epistle is defensible, then this is bad news for any scheme that hopes to draw all of its 
inspiration from the New Testament for a position in favor of lasting peace.  Thankfully, 
parts of the Gospels and other Pauline letters offer greater reassurance for those who wish 
to seek models of peacemaking and peacemakers in its pages.  This is a point to which I 
will return at the end of this chapter.         
To conclude this dissertation, I will inquire into the moral status of revenge as a 
possible response to the unforgivable.  As I have already argued, forgiveness has its 
limits.  If the unforgivable is a genuine moral category, then it seems reasonable to ask 
about the moral status of vengeful action that the egregiously harmed may wish to pursue 
vis-à-vis those who commit unforgivable offenses against them.  And yet, we know that 
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revenge often leads to further retaliation, escalating into a tit-for-tat cycle of violence that 
seems interminable.  And while those who have suffered damages of the magnitude and 
kind captured by the category of the unforgivable may delight in the knowledge that 
those who harmed them are “getting theirs,” sometimes the only way to find the peace 
and security they really want is to put an end to hostilities once and for all.  Just how to 
accomplish this, if it can be accomplished at all, is exceeding difficult.  In what follows, I 
don’t pretend to offer a panacea, only food for thought.          
 
4.1 Ways of Restoring Equilibrium: Apology, Retribution and Revenge  
Let me briefly defend the place of revenge in the context of my project as a 
whole.  It may not be immediately clear as to why revenge is even discussed, since it is 
not a speech act, as are apology and forgiveness.  However, the coupled activities of 
apology and forgiveness on the one hand and revenge strategies on the other are, broadly-
speaking, ways of restoring equilibrium - of “evening the score,” as it were.  Crudely put, 
a moral wrong or harm can be seen as a “minus,” whereas the act of apology can be seen 
as a “plus.”  Forgiveness certifies the desired effect of the apology, allowing the offender 
and the victim to “break even.”  In forgiveness, the equilibrium that was there before the 
wrong or harm was committed is restored.  This way of framing apology and forgiveness 
is indebted to a game theoretic approach to human behavior.  While game theoretic 
approaches run the risk of distorting human activity when they fail to leave room for 
alternative (non-game theoretic) ways of interpreting human activity, I find something 
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deeply plausible about seeing apology and forgiveness as ways of restoring 
equilibrium.151      
Revenge is an alternative, retaliatory way of attempting to satisfy the mathematics 
of the moral balance between the offender and the victim.  Even the metaphors we 
employ to represent revenge - “payback,” “blood for blood,” and “getting even” - suggest 
a violent and painful means by which to restore equilibrium.  Of course, revenge is not 
the only alternative way in which to try to satisfy the mathematics of the moral balance 
between offender and the victim.  Punishment and reparations count as well.  But 
punishment and reparations, provided they are pursued through the judicial system or 
some other system that operates in accordance with public, objective standards, are not 
retaliatory ways of achieving the desired moral balance that the wronged (and, 
sometimes, those in the wrong) want.152 
Often, those who suffer a harm or wrong will report that they desire to see the 
wrongdoer brought to justice.  But the greater the severity of the offense, the more likely 
it is that those who suffer a harm or wrong frame their zeal for justice in the language of 
revenge.  From a standpoint that appreciates how the vindictive passions serve to protect 
us and our interests, this is understandable.  Jeffrie Murphy observes that those “who 
                                                 
151 The difficulty, I think, comes into play as soon as there is the attempt to quantify or put a numerical 
value on the apology - the “plus”.  Nick Smith observes what he sees as a worrisome trend in the practice 
of law.  He writes, “Legal actors do in fact put a price on apologies.  Expressions of contrition within legal 
institutions have increasingly become another commodity.  Studies show that a few words of contrition, 
regardless of their sincerity by any measure, can dramatically decrease the likelihood of costly litigation.  
Thus if one were to say something like ‘I am sorry that the lawn mower we manufacture injured your 
child,’ evidence suggests that this provides a highly cost-effective means of avoiding litigation.  
Considering that a refusal to accept blame for an injury often provides the fundamental grounds for a 
dispute arriving in the courts in the first place, these findings encourage attorneys and litigants to offer 
apologetic words without admitting guilt.  It can be lucrative to apologize, in other words, so long as you 
avoid accepting blame.”  See Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies, pp. 3-4.  I share what 
I take are Smith’s worries.     
152 It should be noted that forgiveness does not obviate punishment.  Punishment is compatible with 
forgiveness, but may be pursued when forgiveness is not forthcoming.  The point is that punishment may 
be an alternative way in which to restore equilibrium. 
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have vindictive dispositions toward those who wrong them give potential wrongdoers an 
incentive not to wrong them.”153  Writing tongue-in-cheek, Murphy makes the following 
declaration: “If I were going to set out to oppress other people, I would surely prefer to 
select for my victims persons whose first response is forgiveness rather than persons 
whose first response is revenge.”154  Murphy also finds that we express our basic self-
respect through vengeance, explaining that “a person who does not resent moral injuries 
done to him… is almost necessarily a person lacking in self-respect.”155  Robert C. 
Solomon, though, goes further, arguing that “to seek vengeance for a grievous wrong, to 
revenge oneself against evil – that seems to lie at the very foundation of our sense of 
justice, indeed, of our very sense of ourselves, our dignity and our sense of right and 
wrong.”156  For Solomon, revenge and justice share a common origin and purpose.  In 
fact, on Solomon’s reading, when we enact revenge, we pursue justice.             
Solomon’s view, though it has intuitive appeal, is mistaken, I think.  Justice – in 
particular, retributive justice – ought not to be equated with revenge.  I argue that Robert 
Nozick’s distinction between retribution and revenge is conceptually sound.  In what 
follows, I reproduce Nozick’s argument for why retributive justice may not collapse into 
revenge, as it does for Solomon.   
Nozick recognizes five points of dissimilarity between retribution and revenge.  
The first point, he observes, is that retribution is done for a wrong, but revenge may be 
carried out in response to acts that are not always wrongs, such as (accidental) injuries or 
slights.  The second point is that “[r]etribution sets an internal limit to the amount of 
                                                 
153 Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Forgiveness, Self-Respect, and the Value of Resentment,” p. 37. 
154 Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Forgiveness, Self-Respect, and the Value of Resentment,” p. 37. 
155 Jeffrie G.Murphy, Forgiveness and Mercy, p. 16.   
156 Robert C. Solomon, A Passion for Justice: Emotions and the Origin of the Social Contract, p. 273.  
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punishment, according to the seriousness of the wrong, whereas revenge internally need 
set no limit to what is inflicted.  Revenge by its nature need set no limits, although the 
revenger may limit what he inflicts for external reasons.”157  Thirdly, Nozick notes that 
retribution is impersonal, whereas revenge is personal.  The person exacting revenge will 
do so in his own name, in the name of his father, in the name of his group, etc.  Nozick 
claims that “revenge can be desired only by someone with a personal tie (others can 
desire that some such person inflict revenge, but their desire is not a desire for revenge) 
and it can be inflicted only by (the agent of) someone with a personal tie.”158  However, 
the agent of retribution need not have – in fact, ought not have - any special or personal 
tie to the victim or perpetrator of the wrong for the retribution he exacts.  The fourth point 
is that the agent of retribution does not take pleasure in the suffering of another, whereas 
those who enact revenge enjoy pleasure in witnessing the suffering of the revenge.  The 
last point is that there are general principles involved in retribution, but no such general 
principles apply to revenge.  Nozick explains that seeking vengeance, or believing it 
appropriate to do so, depends on how those disposed toward revenge feel at any given 
time.  In contrast, the “imposer of retribution, inflicting deserved punishment for a 
wrong, is committed to (the existence of some) general principles (prima facie) 
mandating punishment in other similar circumstances.”159  Furthermore, the principles 
that guide the retributive action are made known to the guilty.   
Nozick’s five points of dissimilarity give us good reason to think Solomon’s view 
is incorrect.  But we still need to determine whether revenge is ever a permissible moral 
option. It is to this question I now turn.    
                                                 
157 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 367.   
158 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 367. 
159 Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, p. 368.  
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4.2 On the Limited Justifiability of Revenge     
Observe that the question as to whether an offense is forgivable or unforgivable 
need not arise in order for the wronged party to take action against the offender.  In a 
society governed by the rule of law, individuals wronged or harmed in certain kinds of 
ways may become litigants, and the action they thereby pursue is directly handled by the 
courts and, if need be, indirectly handled by correctional facilities, regardless of whether 
the offense is deemed forgivable or unforgivable.  That private citizens need not trouble 
themselves with the rather nasty and time-consuming business of seeing that those who 
harm or wrong them at any of the levels that the law presides over – from, say, simple 
trespassing to assault and battery – is, as John Locke noted in his Second Treatise of 
Government, one of the great benefits of consenting to live under the rule of law in a civil 
society.  For Locke, retributive justice is the business of the state, and revenge, which is 
tantamount to taking the law into one’s own hands, has no place in civil society.   
There have been and still are, however, societies not governed by the rule of law.  
Today, we have come to call such societies failed states.  Failed states are marked by 
widespread social problems, political instability and economic decline, and include states 
(or, perhaps, territories and zones) locked in seemingly interminable civil war.  Examples 
of such societies in our present political environment include Somalia, Sudan, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, to name just a few.  Existence in a failed state is 
perilous and tenuous at best.  Inhabitants of failed states often live on the knife’s edge of 
famine, pestilence and war.  The basic physical requirements necessary to sustain human 
existence are largely unavailable to the vast majority of the inhabitants of failed states.  In 
short, their lives are marked by misery.           
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It is unlikely that those unfortunate enough to live in failed states will be 
successful in forming a social contract of the kind imagined by Locke in order to 
establish or re-establish laws and their associated institutions.  Instead, they must 
navigate their way through a perpetually lawless and unstable social environment by 
whatever means necessary.  One such means, morally permissible, I contend, in the 
absence of the rule of law, and especially attractive in response to unforgivable actions, is 
revenge.  Without reliable institutions to realize retributive justice, sometimes the only 
response to which the wronged may resort to preserve life and limb is revenge.  Human 
existence under the extreme duress produced in the absence of the rule of law creates an 
environment akin to that of war.  In fact, Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan equates living 
under extreme duress with war. 
In Chapter Thirteen of Leviathan, Hobbes argues that “it is manifest that during 
the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
condition which is called war, and such a war is of every man against every man.”160  
Since there is, by definition, no common power in a failed state, those who live in a failed 
state live in a state of war.  Hobbes famously characterizes human existence in such a 
state as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”161  Later in the same chapter, Hobbes 
espouses his contractarian view about the origin of moral norms.  Hobbes makes the 
following claim: “To this war of every man against every man, this is also consequent: 
that nothing can be unjust.  The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have 
there no place.  Where there is no common power, there is no law; where there is no law, 
                                                 
160 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 76. 
161 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 76. 
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no injustice.”162  According to Hobbes, failed states cannot sustain the basic moral 
principles that structure our ethical behavior.  When our own survival becomes the 
highest – or only – value we honor, anything in support of our own survival is 
permissible.  And so, in (an environment akin to) war, revenge becomes a means of 
rational self-defense.  For Hobbes, revenge is permissible in the State of Nature.   
 
4.3 Irrational Forgiveness 
It must be observed that, despite the limited justifiability of revenge for which I have 
argued, acting upon plans of revenge tend to be, at least in the long-run, ultimately self-
defeating.  The reason that revenge tends to be self-defeating is that it tends to exacerbate 
the very lawlessness and instability that the vengeful often wish - at least in their own 
lives - to eliminate.  Although revenge appears to be rational when viewed against one’s 
short-term goals, the self-defeating quality of revenge becomes visible as more time 
elapses; your act of revenge, momentarily successful, inspires a retaliation that requires 
another response, and so on.  The cycle of violence becomes seemingly inescapable, 
ineluctable.  Eventually, participation in a tit-for-tat blood feud becomes an end in itself.   
For those locked in this cycle, it must seem as if there is no way out.  If that for which 
one exacts revenge are actions marked by exceptional wrongdoing or harm of an 
especially egregious kind – unforgivable actions – then the theory I advance about the 
structure, justification and scope of apology and forgiveness offers little in the way of 
consolation or practical guidelines.  However, I take the theory of apology and 
forgiveness for which I have argued in this dissertation to be a rational account, 
                                                 
162 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 78.   
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supported by arguments about what it is reasonable for rational agents to think, feel, and 
do.  But perhaps an irrational account ought to be considered as well.  
Pacifists, peacemakers, and the moral saints of the great religious traditions tend to 
characterize forgiveness in ways that deviate considerably from the analysis I have 
provided in this dissertation.  Insofar as what they call forgiveness and what I call 
forgiveness are incompatible, I maintain that they have the wrong view about forgiveness 
proper.  But that does not mean that their views are any less useful in, at least, certain 
specified circumstances.  In those circumstances where one’s “back is against the wall” – 
where one both endures and propagates a seemingly interminable cycle of violence in a 
tit-for-tat blood feud – the rational account of apology and forgiveness I endorse gets no 
traction.  But perhaps a different view, one that promotes what might be called Irrational 
Forgiveness, does.   
Irrational Forgiveness cannot be couched in the same classification scheme as that of 
the concept I have analyzed.  First, Irrational Forgiveness is not (necessarily) a speech 
act.  It is a private decision that does not require a linguistic medium for its effect.  
Second, Irrational Forgiveness is granted in the absence of apology and for unforgivable 
actions.  It calls for a cease to hostilities, or prohibits them from escalating in the first 
place, even though such a cessation or prohibition on escalation may not be in the short-
term interests of the individual pursuing Irrational Forgiveness.  Third, Irrational 
Forgiveness achieves the First and Third tasks of the Forgiveness Triptych, though not 
for the sake of achieving a morally reparative effect of the kind Walker endorses.  In 
short, Irrational Forgiveness is a drastic response to desperate circumstances.   
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I see Jesus’ injunction to “turn the other cheek” to be an example of a moral principle 
that has its basis in Irrational Forgiveness.  His injunction was itself a drastic response to 
desperate circumstances – the desperate circumstances of the Israelites under the heavy 
yoke of Roman occupation in the first century of the Common Era.  The efforts and 
powerful moral insights of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., many of which come 
from a place seemingly informed by Irrational Forgiveness, were made in response to the 
desperate circumstances of the people they helped. But whether or not Irrational 
Forgiveness is a chimera – a beautiful but ultimately empty idea - cannot be decided here.      
 
  4.4 Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I have argued that apology and forgiveness are deeply 
interconnected, and that this interconnectedness – what I have called their logic – 
generates constraints on how we conceptualize and perform apologies and acts of 
forgiveness.  In particular, I have argued that the intelligibility and meaningfulness of 
either apology or forgiveness is dependent on the recognition and feasibility of the other.  
I have also argued that the philosophical psychology that constitutes the moral structure 
of an apology requires that three crucial ingredients – an acknowledgement of harm or 
wrong, (at least one of) the moral emotions, and an appropriate degree of humility – 
constitute the necessary conditions of any apology.  And yet, the apology, which must 
always find expression in an accepted conventional procedure conducted by means of the 
utterance of certain words – “I was wrong and I apologize for X” – will fail if the person 
to whom it is addressed refuses to forgive the wrongdoer.  I have argued that forgiveness, 
the scope for which is set by the possibility of moral repair, requires the would-be 
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forgiver to respond to an already-proffered apology by overcoming hostility toward the 
wrongdoer, actively and patiently working toward reconciliation with the wrongdoer, and 
wiping clean the wrongdoer’s slate.  I argued that forgiveness is a process, whereby a 
commitment to live up to the forgiveness to which we commit ourselves (Promised 
Forgiveness) is superseded by more perfect forms (Nominal Forgiveness and Complete 
Forgiveness) as both the apologizer and the forgiver, individually and collaboratively, 
work to repair what was damaged by the harm or wrong.  I conclude the dissertation by 
arguing that revenge, though sometimes momentarily gratifying, fails to encourage the 
very peace and security that the vengeful themselves seek.  And while the vengeful, in 
seeking to achieve the mathematics of the moral balance between themselves and those 
who commit unforgivable offenses against them, cannot use the rational strategies argued 
for in this dissertation, they may pursue a strategy involving what I call Irrational 
Forgiveness – provided the very idea and the hope it is meant to inspire is not vacuous - 
to achieve the peace and security they seek.   
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